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Abstract
This thesis addresses two problems of trust:
1. Knowledge on Trust: If we are provided with information by a variety of
individuals, whom we trust to different degrees, what is the best overall
theory we can form from the information we are given?
2. Social Trust: If one does not have direct experience of an individual, how can
one establish an initial degree of trust through the offices of society?
It addresses the first problem by developing a formal, mathematical and compu-
tational, model of Bonjour’s Coherence Theory of Knowledge, and the second by
adapting abstract argumentation theory to reason about networks of relationships
of trust and distrust between individuals. In developing the latter it develops
a notion of generalised argumentation systems, giving their semantics via the
Galois Connections induced by binary relations, and provides a general scheme of
evaluation of these systems based on propositional model finding.
Throughout, some effort is made to set the work in the context of both theories
of trust and of the day-to-day trust situations that one encounters in everyday life.
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Preface
Much of what we do in life is governed by one activity – making sense of things.
It is something we do every day as part of all sorts of activities, be it dealing
with the round of social life or finding explanations in the physical and social
sciences. We collect pieces of information from disparate sources, we supplement
this information by filling in missing pieces from experience (or prejudice) and
create a coherent account of a piece of life. We do not know if this account is true.
It is not knowledge, but it is belief. It is our best account of what is, given the
information available to us and our perspective upon the world. This is the sense
of logic that is used in the title. Logic, in its most general form, is the process of
making sense of things.
Our lives as social animals are bound together by trust, and much of the quality
and success of our lives is governed by how well we answer the question of the
still small voice inside us, that from time to time asks: does it make sense to trust this
person? And answering it is a process of making sense. Most of the time the answer
will not be incontrovertible. The decision will be a matter of judgement, based
on reason, based on logic. This dissertation is my attempt to explore how such
notions can be formalised, using the tools of discrete mathematics, familiar enough
to a computer scientist, but still rarely found in the disciplines of philosophy and
the social sciences that have been the sources of the primary actors in this field.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Why Study Trust?
Today nearly everyone seems to be talking about “trust”.
Bernard Barber, 1983
The opening sentence of Bernard Barber’s “The Logic and Limits of Trust” could
have been written today.
Consider the role of trust in the following three recent news stories.
The “banking crisis” escalated from an issue about the value of investments
based on sub-prime mortgages to a global banking crisis as banks lost trust in one
another over disclosing risk in their portfolios.
The UK Liberal-Democrat party leader, Nick Clegg, has possibly done irrepara-
ble damage to his party by, as many people see it, breaking trust over the matter
of a pledge about tuition fees.
In the WikiLeaks case, a trusted individual, American soldier, private Bradley
Manning, broke trust and disclosed a large quantity of data. This leak was, at best,
embarrassing to many, and, at worse, at least for some, placed life or freedom in
jeopardy1.
These stories engage our interest not only because of the consequences they
have for us but also because they underline the role of trust in our society.
Trust binds us together. It allows us to live together in relative freedom, work
together for common goals and delegate power, authority and action, to others. It
allows us to conduct business-as-usual without taking undue risk. The failure of
trust means that business-as-usual ceases to be an option.
However there are other stories that are equally about trust that barely graze our
collective consciousness. These stories have less impact because they are bound
up with the technical world of the Internet. Such stories are often reported as
technical, business or personal failures rather than as anything indicative of an
underlying flaw.
Here are five Internet related news stories from recent years. They raise questions
about the nature of trust in the context of the Internet.
In April 2010 iTunes accounts were hacked and the stolen account details
sold on the Chinese market. The purchasers of these accounts could then buy
products at the iTunes store and download them to their machines with the
charge going to the real account owners. An examination of the mailing list
https://discussions.apple.com indicates this problem has not been fixed and
is still ongoing.
1This case also illustrates that although trust and security are related they are different notions.
Bradley Manning was using a technical secure computer system at a secure location. Unfortu-
nately, at least for the US government, Bradley Manning was, in this context, untrustworthy.
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Such incidents are not isolated. In April 2011 Sony Playstation accounts were
hacked and the personal details of 77 million players were lost and the Playstation
network taken down for a week. Two weeks later in May 2011 a second hack
lost details of a further 25 million, and in October of 2011 details of 93 thousand
accounts were lost (on this occasion there was no significant network outage and
the accounts were quickly locked to prevent access).
In June 2011 DigiNotar, a Dutch based Certificate Authority, was hacked. As a
result, in July 2011, DigiNotar signed falsified certificates undermining SSL, which,
for many, is the backbone of Internet security.
Each of these events had real financial, and other, consequences. Apple bears
the cost of the hacked accounts both in financial terms and loss of confidence
in its services and level of customer care2. Sony has suffered both from lost
confidence by its users and from the loss of confidence by investors with a 4%
drop in share price being directly attributed to the earlier hacks. DigiNotar has
declared bankruptcy resulting from the general loss of confidence in its service3.
Meanwhile, Google, Adobe, Mozilla and Apple have been forced to create updates
to purge DigiNotar certificates from their products and Microsoft has delayed
a major product update to accommodate the required changes. But this is far
from the real cost. Falsified certificates include certificates for Microsoft, Google,
wordpress, Facebook, Twitter, Skype, Thawte Root, VeriSign Root, GlobalSign
Root, CyberTrust Root, DigiSign Root, and others. For most of these we do not
know what, if any, use has been made of them. However, we do know the falsified
certificates for Google were used for man-in-the-middle attacks against 300,000
Iranian users4. The consequences for these users are unknown. Finally DigiNotar
also issued certificates for Dutch government departments meaning that at least
some governmental material may be vulnerable, including material shared with
Holland by other nations.
The next two stories are about relationships between individuals. And each has
tragic consequences.
In March 2010 sentence was passed in two unrelated cases. Peter Chapman,
aged 33, was found guilty of the rape and murder of Ashleigh Hall, aged 17.
Ashleigh had “met” Peter when Peter posed as 17 year old Peter Cartwright on
Facebook. Ashleigh arranged to meet with Peter Cartwright and arranged by
texting to be met by Peter Cartwright’s father in a car. Posing as Peter Cartwright’s
farther, Chapman met Ashleigh and drove her to Thorpe Larches near Sedgefield
and attacked her. Peter Chapman was found guilty on multiple charges and
sentenced to 35 years imprisonment. The second crime was the murder of Camille
Mathurasingh by her ex-boyfriend Paul Bristol. Paul’s motive was jealousy. After
seeing a picture of Camille with another man on Facebook. Paul flew 4000 miles
to carry out the killing.
2Perhaps what is most surprising here is how well Apple have managed to stop this becoming a
larger story.
3Although it should be noted DigiNotar is only the most extreme example in a year of Certificate
Authorities being hacked.
4i.e. users thought they were talking securely to e.g. gmail servers but were in fact talking to an
intermediary that could read everything before passing it on to Google.
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Paul Bristol was sentenced to life imprisonment5.
These stories cause us to question trust on the Internet. Can we trust services
on the Internet? Can service providers keep our details safe? Can we really
rely on security mechanisms to make the Internet safe? Can we trust people we
“meet” on the Internet? What assumptions can we make about identities? What
assumptions can we make about information we post on the Internet and where
that information ends up? What promises are being made to us when we use the
Internet? Who makes these promises? And most importantly: What is a rational
basis for believing such promises? That is: What is a rational basis for trust?
The problem of finding a rational basis for trust is neither new nor unique to the
Internet. As societies evolve, as new business practices and technologies occur, the
situations over which we must exercise trust change and we must discover how
trust can be underwritten in these new situations. We may think of these as modes6
of trust, Society has already learned to cope with many forms of complex trust
relationships: A promise made now will be fulfilled at some point in the future.
A promise made here will be fulfilled elsewhere. A promise made by me will be
fulfilled by another. A promise made in a letter, i.e. made without you and me
being in the same place, at the same time, will bind me to what is promised. And
so on. Each new modality introducing its own grounds for uncertainty and raising
the question “What now underwrites this promise?”.
Our challenge is to examine the modalities of trust created in Internet usage
and to give an account of what underwrites them.
1.2. Why Study Trust as a Computer Scientist?
As computer scientists we strive to understand how to build systems that are
fit for purpose, function correctly and, in the face of unexpected eventualities,
fail gracefully and recover cleanly. Today that means understanding the role
that computer systems play in the mediation of everyday activities that involve
data management and communication, and the interplay between the concepts of
security and trust.
Security is about enclosures. It is about locks and gates and fences. Trust is
about when you need them and why they might work in the social environment.
As computer scientists we need not only to know how to build the enclosures
but also to know when they are required and how they can be made to work in
the social environment in which they are embedded. And, amongst many other
things, this requires us to understand how trust arises and propagates in society.
But there is another way of reading the question above, and that is: “What does a
computer scientist bring to the study of trust?”. The answer to this is more difficult
and, perhaps, more personal. For my own part, it is that a computer scientist
brings a particular outlook and set of tools that differ from those of say, a sociologist
or a physicist. Each discipline sees the world in certain terms. For example, the
sociologists sees the world as social processes whereas the physicist sees the world
as physical processes. In contrast, the computer scientist sees the world in terms of
5Normally 22 years followed by release under license.
6mode: A way or manner in which something occurs or is experienced, expressed or done. [OED]
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information processes and the tools that s/he uses are for describing and analysing
information processes. This difference in perspective leads both to the formulation
of different questions and the provision of a different style of answer.
1.3. Overview
In daily life, in order to bring about our goals, we must rely on others. We rely
on them to provide us with information and we rely on them to carry out actions.
We do this for a variety of reasons, including laziness on our part, economic
benefits that might accrue from specialisation, or because what we wish to achieve
is beyond our sphere of control or competence. In relying on others we open
ourselves to uncertainty, and we need to manage that uncertainty or suffer the
debilitating consequence of being unable to act.
When uncertainty exists, society provides many mechanisms for managing the
uncertainty, such as, contracts, insurance and hedging. But much of our daily life
is conducted relying on others without the use of such mechanisms.
In these circumstances we say “we take it on trust” that so-and-so will act in
a particular manner. Indeed, if we do not do this, life becomes unimaginably
complex, as we attempt to establish the network of contracts, insurance and
hedging required to replace the informal notion of taking things on trust.
But what is trust?7 This thesis starts from the idea that interaction in society is
regulated by the making and keeping of promises, which may be given implicitly
or explicitly. It then defines trust to be the belief that people will keep their
promises.
The problem then addressed is: What is sufficient reason to believe that these
promises will be kept?
Crudely, there are two mainstream theories of trust. What we may term the
classical theory of trust argues that trust arises from “thick relationships” which
develop between individuals over time where individuals have an opportunity to
build up a picture of the promise-keeping behaviour of others.
The other approach is Swift Trust introduced by Meyerson, Weick and Kramer to
accommodate situations in which the classical conditions for trust do not exist. In
their explanation, trust is founded jointly upon the roles inhabited by participants
in an interaction, and upon the perception by participants that they share certain
social categories with one another. Thus, for example, in an interaction at a doctors
surgery, I extend trust to the doctor because he is in the role of a doctor, at least
as far as medical discussions go. I might also extend trust because, for example,
the doctor shares some category with me, such as coming from the same town
or belonging to the same sports club. Role and category differing in that role
confers trust in some specific competence and intent that the doctor should possess
(summed up as medical expertise and the hippocratic oath) and category confers
some more general notion of trust in some overall intent (e.g. I believe people from
my town stick together and treat one another properly).
7Chapter 2 addresses this topic in some detail. Here we present enough of a discussion to set out
the main direction of this thesis.
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However both theories ignore a fundamental aspect of being a social animal
with the gift of language. It is possible to learn things from the experience of others
by being told. In dealing with other people we do not need to use either classical
trust or swift trust, we may simply be told about an individual, by someone whose
opinion in the matter, we already trust.
This thesis considers this, often overlooked, source of trust, the embeddedness of
individuals in social information networks that provide them with information
about other individuals and circumstances with which they have no direct contact.
The term embeddedness here is used to capture the idea of established and lasting
relationships as opposed to those which are temporary and ad hoc. Because we
are embedded in a network of relationships we can make judgements about the
trustworthiness of the individuals with whom we are directly connected. And
those individuals can make judgements about the individuals to which they are
directly connected. And so on.
Using the social networks in which we are embedded we can synthesise plausible
views of the circumstances and trustworthiness of socially remote individuals.
This thesis considers two ways in which individuals can use their embeddedness
in their social information network:
1. Knowledge on Trust: If we are provided information by a variety of individuals,
whom we trust to different degrees, what is the best overall theory we can
form from the information we are given?
2. Social Trust: If one does not have direct experience of an individual how can
one establish an initial degree of trust through the offices of society?8
The goal is to answer these questions both mathematically and computationally.
That is, to give precise meaning to the concepts involved and to propose a way in
which the answers to questions might be computed in particular circumstances.
1.4. Mathematical Approach
In order to gain mathematical and computational leverage, other researchers (for
example, Stephen Marsh in “Formalising Trust as a Computational Concept” [68],
and Audun Jøsang and Stephane Lo Presti in “Analysing the Relationship between
Risk and Trust” [59]) have started their enterprise by assuming some numeric
framework for representing degrees of trust and degrees of uncertainty9. This
8This is not the same as pooling information through the reputation systems commonly discussed
in computing circles. The common assumption of rater anonymity is missing. Anonymity has
its advantages but has two serious disadvantages. First the rating is without consequence to the
rater. This means that the rater is free from pressures that might bias their view but also free
from pressures that otherwise might keep them honest. Secondly it is not possible to judge
the relevance of the rater’s experience. Rating from novice and expert, genius and idiot weigh
equally. Here, rather than thinking of assessing reputation through anonymous, aggregated,
sources, we consider assessing reputation through known, distinct, sources. The effect of this
change is that we may consider the reputation of the source as well as the report by the source,
in arriving at a conclusion.
9And indeed this may be the most appropriate vehicle for many applications.
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raises the question, Is such a representation always necessary, or can we make
useful progress by choosing other means? This thesis sets out to use the tools of
logic and discrete mathematics to see what progress may be possible without the
assumption of numeric representations and seeks other structures that might align
with informal social processes of trust that we might recognise.
1.4.1. Knowledge on Trust
The problem of Knowledge on Trust is approached by creating a formal model
of Bonjour’s Theory of Empirical Knowledge. Information sources are modelled
as providers of boolean assertions about the state of the world. The goal is to
determine a best, or most plausible, set of assertions that can be obtained by
combining the assertions from the sources. However, sources may contradict one
another. Sources come equipped with a preference ordering that indicates that
some sources are preferred over others. Inconsistencies are resolved by discarding
information from the least preferred sources contributing to the inconsistency, and
information is only discarded to resolve inconsistency.
The model is formulated in terms of forming maximally consistent sets of
propositions under the constraints induced by the preference ordering. The
approach bears many similarities to approaches taken to both paraconsistent logic
and non-monotonic logic.
1.4.2. Social Trust
Modelling of Social Trust is approached through Argumentation Theory and this
presents a choice in the possible mathematical tools that we might use to develop
argumentation theory and the computation techniques we might adopt to calculate
social trust.
The theory may be developed as graph theory, as an application of the theory of
binary relations or, more novelly, as an application of Galois Connections induced
by binary relations10. Here the latter approach is chosen since it provides an
elegant tool for developing a uniform and systematic account of Argumentation
Theory as used for modelling Social Trust11. On the computational front an equally
novel account is given of calculating the solution to Argumentation Systems that
model instances of Social Trust. A general approach is presented of compiling
quite general argumentation systems into Boolean Networks which can be “solved”
by use of a model checker12 (i.e. all models satisfying the boolean constraints are
found).
The compilation process, and the connection between the formal models of
Knowledge on Trust and Social Trust, rely on the proofs of a number of proposi-
10Standard references for Graph theory include Berge’s “Graphs and Hypergraphs” [10] and Haray’s
“Graph Theory” [46]. Standard references for the theory of binary relations are harder to find
but Schmidt and Ströhlein is an excellent source, as is Schmidt’s relatively newly published
“Relational Mathematics” [101]. Detailed references for Galois Connections are given later in the
chapter.
11And seems to be a novel approach to argumentation theory in general.
12For this thesis MACE4 was used for this purpose.
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tions. The proofs are given as (mainly) algebraic manipulations of formula about
Galois Connections.
1.4.3. Connecting Knowledge on Trust and Social Trust
There is notable similarity between the formal process of assessing Knowledge
on Trust and assessing Social Trust. The connection between the two is that
they are both consistency based processes and we can simulate some aspects
of argumentation consistency within the Bonjour coherence model. A short
investigation is made of this connection in Chapter 6.
1.5. Outline of Thesis
Chapter 2 surveys the philosophy and sociology of trust and introduces an analy-
sis of trust as the rational belief that another agent will keep its promises.
The chapter then sets out the consequent fundamental questions of trust that
arise from this analysis, that is:
• How to combine information from sources of different degrees of trust
to arrive at a most plausible theory, or explanation, based on those
sources.
• How to decide who, or what, to trust.
Chapter 3 briefly sets out the technical tools of binary relations and the Galois
Connections induced by a binary relation.
Chapter 4 sets a framework for addressing the first problem introduced in Chap-
ter 2, based on a formalisation of Bonjour’s Theory of Empirical Knowledge.
Here the argument is that reasoning from sources of information of different
degrees of trustworthiness is the same problem as reasoning from any form
of uncertain information. The main obstacle to applying standard probability
techniques in this area is that of not having an adequate basis for assigning
probabilities to “trust events”. As a result this chapter takes an alternative
approach of working with preferences expressed over information sources
and develops a logical, as opposed to probabilistic, analysis of the notion
of most plausible theory given the preference structure on the information
sources.
Chapter 5 sets out an approach to the second of the problems introduced in
Chapter 2, that is who or what to trust. This analysis is developed using
argumentation theory as a tool to define a logical notion of reputation. In
the process of developing the framework used, a substantial analysis of
argumentation systems is developed.
Chapter 6 shows that formal models developed in Chapters 4 and 5 are linked
by the notion that there is at least a partial simulation of one model by the
other.
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Chapter 7 briefly discusses a number of themes that arise out of the technical
analysis of trust offered in earlier chapters.
Chapter 8 draws the thesis to a close by discussing the significance of the models
of trust and privacy.
The Appendices As usual appendices have been used for additional materials,
which although interesting or useful, would disrupt the flow of the disserta-
tion.
1.6. Research and Published Papers
My research has progressed by weaving backwards and forwards between social
science and computer science. Part of this process has been trying out ideas on
different audiences concerned with social science, computer science and logic. The
workshop papers that resulted from this reflect my thinking about the topics of this
dissertation at particular points in time (these papers are included as appendices
D-G). On the whole, unlike many dissertations, the chapters are not amplifications
of the papers. Rather the chapters represent the result of feedback, reflection and
further research on the topics. That is to say, this research has evolved, progressing
by the age old process of performance, feedback and revision. Or, as Babba Brinkman
puts it more lyrically:
And sometimes people ask:“How does your show get written?”
Like this: performance, feedback, revision.
And how do I generally develop my lyricism?
Like this: performance, feedback, revision.
And how do human beings ever learn to do anything?
Like this: performance, feedback, revision.
And evolution is really an algorithm that goes
Like this: performance, feedback, revision
The Rap Guide to Evolution
Lyrics by: Baba Brinkman, 2011
1.7. Contribution
The central contribution of this dissertation is the analysis of trust as arising from
social embeddedness. In particular, it offers a theory of trust and trustworthiness
that is based on an informal theory of promises and promise keeping13. This
informal theory leads to considering two specific questions in relation to trust and
trustworthiness. How do we evaluate Knowledge-on-Trust? And: How do we
evaluate Social-Trust?
13The formalisation of this theory is proposed as an area for further work in the conclusions.
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These questions are explored using formal modelling. In the exploration a
number of technical contributions are made to the Coherence Theory of Knowledge
and to Argumentation theory.
The contribution to the Coherence Theory of Knowledge arises in Chapter 4
in the creation of a formal, mathematical and computational, model of Bonjour’s
Coherence theory and the application of this formalisation to a number of example
situations requiring reasoning from information gained from sources of known
relative trustworthiness to plausible conclusions.
In the case of argumentation theory, the technical contribution is the develop-
ment in Chapter 5 of:
• A Galois Connection approach to the argumentation theory,
• A generalised framework for argumentation systems extending both Dung’s
argumentation systems and bipolar argumentation systems,
• A computational model of argumentation based on boolean model satisfac-
tion.
This computational model has resulted in a new notion of sensitivity analysis
of argumentation systems which leads to a natural notion of the degree to which
the one argument affects another in forming a position (i.e. a mutually acceptable
collection of arguments). This analysis is discussed in the penultimate chapter
(Chapter 7) as one of the areas for further work.
Along the way new connections have been made between disciplines. In partic-
ular, the interaction between theories of trust and trustworthiness and the world
of computer security access control mechanisms, and the connection between
argumentation theory and the social sciences notions of Catnets, and Structural
Balance Theory, are discussed.
Finally, although in no way central to this dissertation, a brief outline is given
in appendix C of a novel approach to information flow security based on Galois
Connections arising from binary relations.
1.8. The Personal Journey
The concepts I hold about trust and trustworthiness at the end of this piece
of research are quite different from those I held at the beginning. Originally
I conflated the concepts of trustworthiness, reliability and risk and confused
the notion of a logic of trust with a logic of risk. My view now, as I hope is
evidenced in this dissertation, is that the concepts are quite distinct, even though
we may, in informal speech, tend to use the words interchangeably. Trust requires
a promise made, reliability requires an expectation, but not a promise, and risk is
a measure of uncertainty that trust is intended to offset. These points are made
more elaborately in Chapter 2. If one accepts such distinctions, as I do, but others
may not, it becomes natural to look at trust as a qualitative rather than quantitative
phenomenon. This dissertation is an attempt to work through such a view.
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In which we discuss:
• Theories of Trust.
• How Trust is related to notions of co-operation and risk.
• Some problems of modelling trust as subjective probability.
• How we can view trust as beliefs about keeping promises.
2.1. Introduction
We have limited control over the world in which we live. To achieve many
desirable things we must rely on the actions of others. But when is such a reliance
a reasonable, or indeed a rational, choice? What justifies our belief that another
will indeed act in a way beneficial to ourselves?
Over the last 30 years there has been an increasing interest in the study of trust.
This interest has arisen from the concern that in many western societies trust
is in decline, both in terms of generalized trust in government and institutions
and, in specific trust between individuals (see, for example, Barber [6]). Much
of the discussion of this trend focusses on the shift in structure of society from
community based interaction, in which, historically, individuals interacted with
small, fixed, communities over most of their lives to network based interaction, in
which individuals interact, directly and indirectly, with large numbers of others
through ever-changing networks of personal relationships and commerce [49]. The
main contention of the social theorists working in this field is that this change
in society weakens the generalized reciprocity that exists in small face-to-face
communities and replaces it by the specific reciprocity of direct interaction in the
network and systems trust (see Luhmann [66, page 68]) which is the trust “in the
ability of the systems to maintain conditions or performance”.
It is useful to categorize the extensive literature which has developed into
explanatory theories and utilitarian theories. Explanatory theories explain the
role or function of trust in societies and how the notion of trust changes as the
structure of societies change. In particular most such theories are concerned with
the notion of trust in modern societies and how this notion acts as a cohesive force
to hold societies together against the internal dissipative pressure of modern life.
Utilitarian theories are concerned with the central problem that each of us face as
individuals, which is, how to make the decision of when, and when not, to trust
and what are adequate conditions for this decision to be considered reasonable or
rational?
The focus of this dissertation is a utilitarian theory of trust. To understand the
context of such a theory, it is necessary to examine the main themes of explanatory
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theories of trust but unnecessary to pursue them in great detail. To this end we
briefly summarize the main themes of the explanatory theories of trust in modern
societies and then discuss utilitarian theories of trust.
The plan of this chapter is to start in section 2.2 with a working definition of
trust to orient the discussion. This is followed in section 2.3 by a discussion of
trust’s near relatives. Section 2.4, Trust and Society, gives a brief discussion of
the explanatory theories of trust and some views of the role of trust in society.
Section 2.5 then takes up utilitarian theories of trust. Section 2.7 takes up the issue
of the role of forgiveness in maintaining trust relations. Section 2.8 summarizes
the concepts covered before the final section 2.9 briefly introduces a synthesised
theory of trust and trustworthiness that seems appropriate to our studies.
2.2. An Orientating Definition of Trust
To anchor the discussion, we give a working definition of trust, at least on a
temporary basis. Barber[6] describes trust as generalized expectancy of good
behaviour on the part of others over whom we have no control. Kydd [64, page 6],
in the context of international negotiations, provides a straightforward operational
definition “trust is a belief that the other side prefers mutual co-operation to
exploiting one’s own co-operation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side
prefers exploiting one’s co-operation to returning it. In other words, to be trust-
worthy, with respect to a certain person in a certain context, is to prefer to return
their co-operation rather than exploit it.” This view of trust in terms of beliefs
or dispositions neatly deals with several thorny issues. First it explicitly defines
the relationship between trust and trustworthiness. Second, by being disposition
based it defines trust in situations where meaningful action is not possible (what
does it mean to say “I trust the government” mid-term, when I have no recourse
to a meaningful action such as voting? c.f. Hardin’s discussion [49]). Third, it
clearly says that trust is contextual i.e. applies to “a certain person in a certain
context”. Fourthly, and finally, it says that trust is a determining factor between
the expectancy of co-operation and expectancy of exploitation.
Hardin[48] adds that the trust is about something in particular. That is, we trust
people for particular things, e.g. for being knowledgeable about some particular
discipline, or for returning loans promptly, rather than some blanket trust in which
we trust them in whatever they do or say. As Hardin puts it “trust is a three part
relation A trusts B for C”.
Many regard trust as originating as a component of generalized exchange [28,
pages 97-14]. That is, A and B wish to exchange goods regarded of equal value.
Ideally they would exchange goods simultaneously, and in the same place, so that
neither party may cheat in the arrangement. However, simultaneous exchange
is not always possible. Generally, exchanges may require the two parts of the
transaction to be separated in time or space (or both). Although it is often implied
that such distributed exchange is a modern phenomenon it can be found in
antiquity. For example, at the time of the Crusades the Knights Templar offered
one of the first international banking services in which a Knight could deposit
wealth with the Knights Templar in his home land and draw on that wealth in
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the Holy Land. Undoubtedly this was a distributed transaction in time and space
involving a large component of trust. The real difference between traditional and
modern society is that of the extent of distributed transactions. Once they were
the exception, today, at least for many of us, they are the rule. Trust’s role in
distributed exchange is to remove the uncertainties and doubts that one party
may have about the intentions of fulfilment of the other. And as Kydd’s phrasing
makes clear, the exchange may not be of material goods but of intangibles such as
access to land, rights and permissions to act in certain ways, intellectual property,
etc.
What then are the components of a trust based transaction, or generalized
exchange? The key elements are set out by Coleman[28] as:
• The trustor cannot achieve his ends, or cannot achieve his ends economically,
without the collaboration of the trustee.
• The trustee commits to actions on behalf of, or in the interest of, the trustor
(let us call these the trustee’s obligations), but the trustor has no control over
the trustee’s actions and so is subject to uncertainty or risk.
• If the trustee fulfills her obligations then the trustor will be better off than if
he had not trusted the trustee. If the trustee fails to fulfill her obligations,
the trustor will be worse off than if he had not trusted the trustee.
• Generally the trustor places resources at the disposal of the trustee but has
no control over what the trustee does with these resources. So the trustee
may use those resources for her own benefit, for the benefit of the trustor, or
for the benefit of both.
• As a result of the trust the trustee is in a position to do something that she
could not otherwise do.
• Finally, generally, there is a time lag1 between the commitment to the trans-
action by the trustor and the fulfilment by the trustee.
With these notions of trust in mind we will quickly compare trust with some of
its near relatives and then examine some explanatory theories of trust.
2.3. Trust’s Near Relatives
Trust is part of a network of mechanisms that have developed to handle social in-
teractions that are extended in time and space. Other parts of this network include
risk management, insurance, hedging, distrust, contract, statutory obligations,
power, control, authority, toleration and legitimacy. Each offers a way of reducing
uncertainties present in particular forms of social transaction either when used
individually or when used in concert.
When we cooperate with others to achieve some goal, we introduce uncertainty
in that, at least potentially, we make ourselves vulnerable to the possibility of
1We may add also “and/or spatial separation”
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exploitative behaviour on the part of others. When, then, may we rationally rely on
others to cooperate rather than exploit? There are many possibilities, indeed not
all cooperative behaviour requires a social mechanism to support it. For example,
if the other parties involved in the co-operation have no choice in their actions:
their options are so limited that their action inevitably benefits us. Alternatively
they may be acting in their own best interest and the benefit to ourselves is an
inevitable consequence. We may explain the perception of good behaviour of
others simply in terms of the predictability of the situation. It is in situations
where others have real choice of options, some of which benefit ourselves and
some of which do not, that we need to start to appeal to some social mechanism
to support our own goals.
Some mechanisms, such as insurance, reduce uncertainty by spreading risk over
many, uncorrelated, transactions. Failure of some transactions is compensated for
by success in others and an acceptable average outcome is obtained. In contrast
hedging[3] handles uncertainty by spreading risk over correlated events so that a
negative outcome in one area correlates to a positive outcome in another. Generally
both insurance and hedging have an associated cost and trade an overall lower
expected outcome for a safer outcome. But the closer relatives to trust manage
the uncertainty in a single transaction by filling in the missing information that
creates uncertainty.
To understand a little more what trust and its close relatives achieve, consider
two alternative games based on the well-known scenario of Prisoner’s Dilemma. The
first game is Prisoner’s Dilemma. Two prisoners, A and B, are being interviewed
in separate rooms. Each is offered the same deal. If they betray the other prisoner
then they will receive no sentence (0 years) but the other will receive a heavy
sentence (3 years). If neither betrays the other then they can expect a modest
sentence of 1 year but if both betray the other they will each receive a 2 year
sentence (see figures 2.1). The prisoners have a clear choice of cooperating with
one another or betraying one another. There is a built in bias for each prisoner to
betray the other in this game because each prisoner prefers to meet co-operation
with betrayal.
B
Cooperate Betray
Cooperate -1,-1 -3,0
A
Betray 0,-3 -2,-2
Table 2.1.: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Now consider an alternative game, the Assurance Game. The scenario is the same
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma but the payoff matrix is different. (see figure 2.2). In
the assurance game the bias is to return co-operation with co-operation. This
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is not sufficient to guarantee co-operation since each prisoner needs to believe
that the other prisoner will cooperate but, if each prisoner does so believe, then
co-operation will occur.
B
Cooperate Betray
Cooperate 0,0 -3,-1
A
Betray -1,-3 -2,-2
Table 2.2.: Assurance Game
The Assurance Game is an instance of a more general game known as the Stag
Hunt. The difference between the two games is that whereas the Assurance Game
is a two person game, the Stag Hunt is an n-person game. The game is a vehicle
for discussing the Social Contract and motivated by the following passage from
Rousseau’s “Discourse on Inequality” [95]:
“If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realised that he must
remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happen to pass within reach of one of
them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without
scruple.”
Since the Stag Hunt is most naturally phrased in terms of positive rewards (the
gain of a portion of a Stag or a Hare) and losses (wasted effort) we will rephrase
the game matrix used for the assurance game by adding a constant of 2 to all
entries:
Others
Cooperate Betray
Cooperate 2 -1
A
Betray 1 0
Table 2.3.: Stag Hunt
In this matrix the payoffs are shown for player A with the interpretation of the
action by others as, if all of the others co-operate and if any of the others betray. Of
course, the payoff matrix is the same for all other players. In this game if everyone
co-operates then the maximum reward is obtained by all, but if one person betrays
the enterprise then the betrayer gains a hare and all other players have wasted
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their time. The action of players depends on what they believe about other players
and the likelihood of a successful outcome to a stag hunt. Again, as with the
Assurance Game, if all players believe in the co-operation of other players the
rational outcome is co-operation.
The different social mechanisms can each be seen as a means of providing the
missing belief, or knowledge, that the other will cooperate. Some mechanisms arise
from “the general good” of social and legal (statuary) pressures or requirements.
But others need to be explicitly applied to a situation such as the creation of a
contract or the placing of trust in an individual or institution.
One interesting observation made by Brian Skryms is that iterating the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, with the same participants playing the game over and over again, with
no fixed end in sight, transforms the game to an instance of the Stag Hunt. Or as
he says:
The shadow of the future has not solved the problem of co-operation in the
prisoner’s dilemma; it has transformed it into the problem of co-operation in
the stag hunt.
That is, the expectation of future interaction and reward for continuing co-
operation changes the game we are playing.
A further insight can be gained from Hollis’s centipede games2 which he intro-
duces in [56] with the penny pinching game and further elaborates the analysis
in his monograph “Trust within Reason”[57]. Penny pinching is a game of two
players. A stack of pennies is placed on a table and players take turns at removing
pennies. The rules allow a player to either take one penny or two pennies in a
turn. If there are no more pennies the game ends. If a player takes a single penny
then the other takes a turn. If a player takes two pennies then the game ends.
Players keep the pennies they have taken. Consider a game with 8 pennies and
two players Alice (A) and Bob (B). Alice starts the game. What strategy should the
players adopt? If we examine the game tree for penny pinching we see it has a
peculiar structure:
(0, 0) A=1−→ (1, 0) B=1−→ (1, 1) A=1−→ (2, 1) B=1−→
A=2 ↓ B=2 ↓ A=2 ↓ B=2 ↓
(2, 0) (1, 2) (3, 1) (2, 3)
(2, 2) A=1−→ (3, 2) B=1−→ (3, 3) A=1−→ (4, 3) B=1−→ (4, 4)
A=2 ↓ B=2 ↓ A=2 ↓
(4, 2) (3, 4) (5, 3)
Here the game position is represented as a pair (Alice’s number of pennies,
Bob’s number of pennies) and the moves are: Alice takes 1 penny (A = 1), or Alice
takes 2 pennies (A = 2), and similarly for Bob.
2They are called centipede games because of the shape of the game tree
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At each turn, except at the very end when the option is not available, players can
do better for themselves by taking 2 pennies if they assume the other player will
take 2 pennies on the next turn. Ultimately such reasoning results in a backward
induction which is typical of finitely iterated games[104], where the first player
concludes that the optimal strategy is to maximise the minimum return by taking
2 pennies at the outset. Hollis’s point is that this is unreasonable in that one would
naively expect that both players have a preference for the game ending at the
high end of the tree i.e. at (3,4), (5,3) or (4,4). However it is always in the other
player’s “local” interest to end a step earlier i.e. if Alice believes that Bob will end
at (3,4) then Alice will do better by ending at (4,2). To obtain the higher payoffs,
either one player must accept a below optimal outcome and the other player must
believe this to be the case, or both players accept a below optimal (for them) but
“fair” outcome of (4,4) and both players believe this. That is, some form of trust
is necessary to realise outcomes better than (2,0). The problem is: What sort of
additional information can possibly lead to the required trust?
2.4. Trust and Society
The German social theorist Luhmann proposes that the primary role of trust in
society is the management of complexity in decision making by allowing the
possibility of actions in which benefits are deferred and the interval of acting is
expanded
“The world is being dissipated into an uncontrollable complexity; . . . Neverthe-
less, I have to act here and now. There is only a brief moment of time in which
it is possible for me to see what others do . . . In just that moment only a little
complexity can be envisaged and consciously processed, thus only a little gain in
rationality is possible.. . . If I can trust . . . , I can allow myself forms of co-operation
which do not pay off immediately and which are not directly visible as beneficial.
If I depend on the fact that others are acting, or failing to act, in harmony with me,
I can pursue my own interests more rationally.”[66, page 24]
The role of trust, in Luhmann’s theory, is to create certainty in the face of
uncertainty and thus allow action as opposed to endless indecision. Barber offers
us a similar insight. Building on the notion of justified expectation, he says “Trust
. . . has the general function of social ordering, of providing cognitive and moral
expectation maps for actors and systems as they continuously interact”[6, page
19]. That is to say, trust makes things predictable in a way that allows us to act.
Misztal elaborates this line of thought by discussing the role of different forms
of trust in creating different forms of order that reduce or eliminate various kinds
of uncertainty. O’Hara[81] provides a basic summary of Misztal’s view in Table 2.4
showing various roles or functions of trust and the underlying mechanism by
which these are achieved. Misztal’s work is integrative bringing together many
themes from across the spectrum of explanatory theories.
Here we see the roles or functions of trust across different forms of interaction.
Misztal’s own summary[76], Table 2.5, introduces additional notions of the kind
of order created in society by a particular kind of trust and the social mechanism
that the particular form of trust arises from.
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Trust: What it does How it does it
Makes things predicable Habit and routine
Living up to reputation
Remembering
Brings us together Family
Friends
Society
Helps us work together Solidarity
Toleration
Legitimacy
Table 2.4.: Misztal’s Synthesis of Sociological Theories of Trust
Order Trust Practice
Stable Habitus Habit
Reputation
Memory
Cohesive Passion Family
Friends
Society
Collaborative Policy Solidarity
Toleration
Legitimacy
Table 2.5.: Trust: Forms and Practice
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“Habitus is a system of dispositions ‘a past which survives in the present and
tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practices
structured according to its principles’ ” [76, page 97]. Habitus is acquired by
an agent through participation in society and may be seen as the set of implicit
rules or conventions that exists below conscious and rational thought, acquired
by the process of habituation, that govern social interaction in a given society.
Part of these rules and conventions perpetuate Habitus itself (as reflected in the
response to “Why do it this way?” being “Because we have always done it that
way”). Habitus gives rise to the predictability and stability that comes from the
expectation that people in society will implicitly follow its rules and conventions
and thus reduces the uncertainty of interaction.
Trust as Passion is trust arising from the development of the intimate social
bonds between people based on shared values and experiences. It is the “in-
ternalized trust” that arises from those basic face-to-face interactions in small
societies and its role is to hold together groupings within society, providing a basic
integrating and cohesive force.
Trust as Policy operates at the conscious dispositional level. That is, trust
as policy is built on the set of dispositions that we consciously hold towards
individuals and groups. Misztal [76, page 100] quotes Dunn’s summary “that
trust ‘is a more or less consciously chosen policy for handling the freedom of other
human agents or agencies’”.
Each of these forms of trust gives rise to a specific notion of order in society.
These notions of order are not seen as competing but rather as complementary
principles countering the dissipative forces pushing society apart.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this analysis is that different forms of
trust may be subliminally learnt or may be matters of conscious policy chosen
to impose order on a disordered world. To insist that trust was-one-or-the-other
would be to make the error that there is only one possible source of “internal
certainty”.
2.4.1. Abstract Systems and Anonymous Others
In modern societies we have a need to go beyond interaction with known indi-
viduals and extend trust to anonymous others. The chains of relationships can
stretch around the globe with little possibility of knowing any but a small number
of participants in the overall relationship. Most of the elements of the chain are
anonymous to us. How then do we reduce uncertainty? It may be possible to
assume that there are sufficient ties to a common society that Habitus and Policy
are sufficient grounds for trust but often this is not the case.
Luhmann argues that in modern societies, with their vast scope of possibilities
for impersonal interaction, the need to manage complexity gives rise to abstract
mechanisms of interaction such as Money and Power. These abstract mechanisms,
which Luhmann calls generalized communication media substitute for the personal
relationships built up in face-to-face societies and their role is to provide equivalent
certainty[66, page 50] to personal trust. But this then leads to a need for systems
trust which is the belief in the ability of these abstract mechanisms to guarantee
that equivalent certainty. Thus Luhmann sees systems trust as the cost, and
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necessary underpinning, of the modern, networked society.
This theme is picked up in the work of Giddens[42, page 120]: “Trust in
abstract systems is the condition of time-space distanciation3 and of the large areas
of security in day-to-day life which modern institutions offer compared to the
traditional world.”
It is possible to ‘trust’ anonymous individuals because interaction with them
is through generalized communication media, through generalized systems of
exchange, that are themselves supported by systems trust. We may posit the
general goal of any online trust framework is either to reflect the societal trust frameworks
built on Habitus, Passion and Policy or to establish a new generalized communication
medium to carry the burden of trust. In either case it must be supported by systems trust
underwriting the particular mechanism.
2.5. Individuals
Against this background of the functions and roles of trust in society we now
ask: What is trust from the individual point of view? What does it mean for
one individual to trust another? For the individual the role of trust is to reduce
or remove uncertainty by replacing external certainty with internally generated
certainty [66].
A different analysis of trust is provided by examining the reasons behind trust-
worthy behaviour. Hardin provides a summary of current theories of trust from
the viewpoint of the mechanisms underlying trustworthy behaviour. For Hardin
trust and trustworthiness are inseparable concepts and he contends that most
theories of trust are, in fact, theories of trustworthiness [49]. He divides theories of
trustworthiness into three types which we may call, moral, social and relationship
theories. Moral theories explain trust as arising from inner moral concerns of indi-
viduals. Social theories of trustworthiness contend that trustworthiness arises from
the effective possibility of social sanction i.e. an individual is trustworthy in so far
as the social norms of behaviour are concerned and trustworthiness is maintained
by social sanction for erring from the acceptable norms. Relationship theories of
trustworthiness maintain that trustworthiness arises from the desire to maintain a
relationship between the trusted and the trusting parties and failure to meet one’s
trust obligations results in damage to, or termination of, the relationship.
These particular explanations of trustworthiness may be set into a general
scheme. If A regards B as trustworthy for C, then A believes that there is a
property, φ, that B wishes to maintain and, if B undertakes an obligation to A for
C, then there is a mechanism whereby φ will be damaged if B fails to meet the
obligation to A. Placing Hardin’s examples into this framework is straightforward.
For example if we take moral theories we have the property being maintained
as “moral integrity” and the enforcement mechanism may either be an internally
imposed mechanism, such as an individual’s need to maintain self image and
avoid cognitive dissonance, or externally attributed mechanism such as “the wrath
of god” at immoral acts4. Similarly the social and relationship models may be cast
3the stretching of social relations across time and space
4There is no commitment in this to the external agency being real or actual. The framework is one
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into the framework. However we may also develop other examples that may use
other principles or be more specific than these general categories.
For example we may consider A buying from an online store B where C is
the fulfilment of the order. A believes that B wishes to maintain profitability. If
B undertakes the order, an obligation is created from B to A for C. If B fails to
meet this obligation then B’s profitability will be damaged via the mechanisms
of reputation, the credit card company (via financial sanctions and, ultimately,
withdrawal of service) and, ultimately, whatever legal framework that provides
customer protection in the domain in which the transaction was enacted. As this
example shows there may be multiple enforcement mechanisms in play and trust
may arise from their combination rather than the existence of any one of them.
Property
promise
Mechanism
Desires to 
maintain
makes
Damages
Monitors
to
A B
Figure 2.1.: Generalized Model
Hardin’s own theory of Encapsulated Interest[48] is a relationship theory in
which one individual, B, encapsulates the interests of another individual, A, by
making a commitment in regard to A’s interests. This obligation is enforced
through the desire by B to maintain the relationship with A. However the commit-
ment is not a guarantee to fulfill the goals of A. Rather it is a commitment, by B,
to give A’s interests suitable regard in taking action. It is possible, for example,
that fulfilling A’s goal conflicts with other obligations on B, or directly with B’s
own goals. Here a demonstration that B failed to give adequate consideration
to A’s goals, or indeed A’s belief that this was so, leads to the relationship being
damaged. Again this model may be cast into the form above.
of beliefs about beliefs. If I believe that God exists and his wrath will be visited upon me for
immoral acts and you believe that I believe this, then you have an adequate basis to trust me.
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2.5.1. The Subjective Probability Theory of Trust
Trust as subjective probability has been a popular theme in computer science ap-
proaches to trust (see, for example, Jøsang et al. “A survey of trust and reputation
systems for online service provision” [60]). The rise of this view of trust owes much
to the influence of Gambetta’s article “Can We Trust Trust” [40] in which he sum-
marizes the results of a significant workshop on trust[41] by: “In this volume there
is a degree of convergence on the definition of trust which can be summarized as follows:
trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with
which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular
action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to
be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action (see Dasgupta
and Luhmann in particular, this volume).” However no mathematical detail of this
consensus view is presented (although there is a model in Dasgupta’s paper that
uses the subjective probabilities as a given). Two works that do much to set this
right are Coleman in “Foundations of Social Theory”[28] and Marsh, in his 1994
doctoral thesis[68]. Both make good cases for trust as subjective probability. For
an extensive review of the literature of the subjective probability approach we refer
the reader to Marsh. Coleman’s is the simpler presentation, which we will adopt
here as a basis for a discussion of the issues around subjective probability models
of trust.
Coleman proposes that associated with any transaction involving trust there is a
subjective probability p of the trustee fulfilling their trust obligations. The trust
situation is described by a gain of G going to the trustor if the trustee fulfills their
trust obligations and a loss of L occurs to the trustor if the trustee fails to fulfill the
trust obligations. The proposal is then that the trustor should make the decision
to trust or not to trust according to:
to trust if p1−p >
L
G
neutral if p1−p =
L
G
not to trust if p1−p <
L
G
Or, equivalently in terms of expectations:
to trust if p.G > (1− p).L
neutral if p.G = (1− p).L
not to trust if p.G < (1− p).L
Coleman illustrates how this simple model can account for a number of trust
situations, provided that the probability and the levels of potential gain and loss
are known or can be reasonably estimated. However the model is not without its
faults. In many situations we must assume that certain losses are in effect infinite
so no amount of effective gain could tempt us into gambling on absurdly low
probabilities (does a rational person with a good lifestyle bet everything they have
for the remotest of possibilities of winning 10 billion pounds?). The St. Petersburg
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paradox forces us even further. Consider the game in which I am willing to give
you a pound if the toss of a coin comes up heads but if the coin comes up tails
I will repeat the bet with double the reward and I will continue to do so until a
head occurs. To play this game I request you to pay a fair sum. What is a fair
sum? The expected gain of this game is infinite. You should be willing to pay all
of whatever you have to play the game. But no rational person would, because
the most likely outcome is that a head will occur early in the sequence leaving
you with a very small sum compared to what you have given up. This is the
St. Petersburg paradox and has been known since the early days of probability
theory[11]5. It is usually countered by the switch from values to utilities i.e. the
actual worth of the benefit/loss to an individual. The basic assumption of utilities
is that utility tails off as value increases e.g. You may have a high utility for the first
million pounds but it goes down rapidly between £1 million and £10 million to the
point where increases in return become worth nothing. The effect of this switch is
to limit the valuation of the game to something that results from a small number
of plays. However in many respects this is still far from satisfactory. Although
you may have real utility for £1 million you are not willing to pay £1 million to
participate in the game. Your belief is that the game will terminate much earlier
since the termination probability is 12n . So there is only approximately a chance
of 11000 that the game will make it 10 steps. Even if the utility based approach is
taken, as in Marsh, there is still the problem that the St. Petersburg paradox can
be rewritten using utilities rather than values.
If we accept some framework for avoiding these problems we are left with two
questions:
• The subjective probability of what?
• Where do the probabilities come from?
To say that the subjective probability is a measure of how likely another agent
is to carry out a particular action is really to beg the question. It in effect says
that it is a measure of trustworthiness without indicating what would actually
make another agent trustworthy. Without such a definition we cannot answer how
the probabilities would be arrived at. It is difficult to conclude that they can be
acquired by observation alone. How can we generalize a run of observations into
the future? We can only generalize with respect to some theory of motivation
or underlying mechanism6 but this is precisely what the subjective probability
account of trust fails to give us. So although, for example, Coleman says that,
when faced with new situations, we may appeal to similar situations we have
encountered in the past, Coleman fails to tell us how we would recognise those
past situations as similar and applicable.
Perhaps, however, the most significant problem of reducing trust to subjective
probabilities is that it ignores the role of trust in reducing uncertainty. If we
5Original publication dated 1738. Modern translation by Dr. Louise Sommer, The American
University, Washington, D. C., from “Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis,” Commentarii
Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae, Tomus V [Papers of the Imperial Academy of
Sciences in Petersburg, Vol. V], 1738, pp. 175-192
6As Deutsch observes, “ ‘Trust’, involves the notion of motivational relevance as well as the notion of
predictability.”
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cannot act because of uncertainty then what gain do we have in quantifying the
uncertainty? The subjective probability theory of trust gives us a decision criterion
for when we may regard it as profitable over repeated events to trust, but does
not contribute in any way to reducing uncertainty or removing the paralyzing
anxiety that stops us from acting in non-repeated events7. The solution to reducing
uncertainty is additional information. That is, reasons why an individual may be
trustworthy. We will return to this question in the final section of this chapter.
One of the most attractive features of trust as subjective probability is that it
provides the starting point for a mathematical theory of trust but it is not the only
such possible starting point. If we examine the essay by Luhmann referred to
by Gambetta[67], then we may note that Luhmann does not discuss subjective
probability. Rather Luhmann discusses risk as a concept and we have no partic-
ular reason to assume that he is referring to measurable risk, that is probability
(subjective or otherwise) as opposed to uncertainty, that is unmeasurable risk.
Indeed if we compare the discussion to his earlier work[66] we find risk used
in much the same way as uncertainty e.g. “trust is a solution for specific problems
of risk” with the explanation of risk thus: “The distinction between confidence and
trust depends on our ability to distinguish between dangers and risks, whether remote or
a matter of immediate concern. The distinction does not refer to questions of probability
or improbability. The point is whether or not the possibility of disappointment depends
on your own previous behaviour”. That is, risk is something that an actor exposes
himself to by making a choice, risk is the exposure to potential loss and this
exposure generates uncertainty. Trust is the specific solution to that uncertainty.
Whatever one thinks of Luhmann’s actual intentions in the matter it is certainly
the case that there is an alternative to treatment of risk as unmeasurable uncertainty.
Knight[62] proposed a distinction between risk which he regards as measurable
uncertainty and true uncertainty which is not measurable. “It will appear that a
measurable uncertainty, or “risk” proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from
an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly
restrict the term “uncertainty” to cases of the non-quantitative type. It is this “true”
uncertainty, and not risk, as has been argued, which forms the basis of a valid theory
of profit and accounts for the divergence between actual and theoretical competition.”
Knight’s contention is that once risk is measurable it becomes manageable by
the standard approaches of calculating expectations and spreading exposure over
multiple “bets”. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is the realm of knowledge and
judgment.
The theory of decision making under uncertainty offers alternatives to utility
theory. The classic paper “Games Against Nature” by Milnor[75] sets out the
standard approaches to decision under uncertainty and creates an axiomatic
analysis of each. The following descriptions are adapted from Milnor:
Assume that an individual, the player, is faced with making a choice between a
number of options. Each choice results in a different range of possible outcomes.
The choices are arranged in a matrix A with each choice being a row and the
possible outcomes being the row entries. The classical decision procedures are
7Presumably, for repeated events at least, one may argue that knowing that one will gain on average
enables one to act.
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then:
Laplace (Lack of information/Maximum Entropy) Assume all outcomes are equiprob-
able. So the value of the choice of the ith row is the average of the outcomes.
The player should choose the row that maximises the value.
Wald (Minimax principle) Choose the row that minimises the maximum loss. If
there is more than one such row choose between them randomly.
Hurwitze Select a constant 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 which measures the player’s optimism. For
each row i (or probability mixture of rows) let ai denote the smallest compo-
nent and Ai the largest component. Choose a row for which αAi + (1− α)ai
is maximised.
Savage (Minimax Regret) Define the (negative) regret matrix rij by rij = aij −mj
where mj is the maximum of column j. rij measures the difference between
the actual payoff obtained and the payoff that could have been obtained with
perfect information about Nature. Now apply the Wald criteria to the matrix
rij and choose the row that minimizes the highest regret.
These decision procedures are quite distinct from each other, for example Milnor
gives the following matrix with the associated results of the decision procedure.

2 2 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 4 0 0
1 3 0 0

Laplace
Wald
Hurwitze (for α > 14 )
Savage
Clearly the procedures are different and each offers an alternative treatment
of decision making under uncertainty to that of decision making under risk.
It would be possible to build a theory in which different actors had different
policies of uncertainty resolution and chose to trust, or not to trust, based on
minimising potential loss, internal optimism or regret minimisation. Moreover we
might reasonably suppose that, in at least some cases, these are strategies that are
actually used by people in the face of real uncertainty. Choice under uncertainty
gives a model of the situation when A decides to trust B for C. Specifically A
may chose actions with a possible set of outcomes. If A trusts B for C then A is
essentially an optimist with respect to his choices and expects a good result. If
A distrusts B with respect to C then A expects a bad result. When faced with a
number of possible options of who to trust for what, the trustor may apply any of
the strategies for deciding who to trust.
Subjective probability does give an account of certain type of trust situations
but even when it can be used, on its own, it fails to provide a completely adequate
account of trust. This is perhaps not surprising. Each theory of trust necessarily
abstracts from the real world and focusses on some more-or-less tractable issue.
Problems only really arise when we believe these partial theories to be complete
explanations.
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2.5.2. The Cognitive Theory of Trust
The cognitive account of trust states that trust arises out of the knowledge and
beliefs possessed by an individual8. A particular cognitive theory of trust therefore
has to say what knowledge and beliefs contribute to trust. Generally theories of
interpersonal trust are founded on the view that trust judgments are made on
both cognitive and affective grounds[65, 69]. In this light we can see Misztal’s
perspective on trust is that trust is both cognitive and affective (Passion) with the
cognitive aspects being both conscious (Policy) and unconscious (Habitus, at least
in part). Our concern here is with a better understanding of the cognitive aspects
of trust.
One particular cognitive approach is Potter’s virtue theory of trustworthiness [89]
in which trustworthiness is a virtue that can be recognised by others. To trust
“involves an expectation or belief that the trusted person has good intentions with regard
to the care of something we value and the ability to carry through with what is expected
of him or her”. People are trusted because they are trustworthy and we judge
trustworthiness by the person demonstrating the virtues, such as truth telling or
honesty, that must accompany trust in their interaction in society and with intimate
others. Potter discusses the conditions by which someone can become trustworthy
i.e. develop trustworthiness as a virtue. From our perspective she describes a
set of beliefs and knowledge of actions that would lead one to believe another is
trustworthy.
The simplest beliefs we might require to judge an individual trustworthy are:
• That they are well intentioned in the matter at hand. That is, if they say
something, they believe it is true and, in particular, when they promise
something or commit to something, they intend to do it.
• That they are competent in the matter at hand. If they say something, it is
indeed true or, if they commit to something, they have the skills etc. that are
required to do it.
We might also require the additional general beliefs:
• That they do not hide information from us that has a bearing on the matter
at hand. In particular that they do not hide information that, had we known
it, would have caused us to act differently in the matter at hand.
• That they actually know the necessary information relevant to the situation
and their ability to act in it.
8And here, inevitably, we run into the deep problem of “inductive generalization” i.e. the gen-
eralization from a small number of examples to a general truth. Inductive generalization only
has meaning against a background theory that underwrites the generalization by providing
some sort of “continuity” condition. When dealing with people, the continuity condition is
often the understanding of the underlying motivation for the behaviour. This can go awry when
the individual intends to deceive, as in the case of a sleeper (i.e. an individual who invests in
appearing trustworthy, but has a covert agenda that involves taking advantage of the trust they
gain at a later date). Our background theory may rule out such possibilities e.g. on the grounds
that the effort involved in creating the subterfuge is disproportionally high compared to any
possible gain that may result. However, such an assumption must always be examined carefully
since different parties may evaluate the investments required, and gains resulting, differently.
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But on top of these there are many specific, situational, beliefs we might require
e.g. They are of previous good character. They do not associate with “questionable”
characters. They haven’t spent extended periods in countries with regimes of
which we disapprove without sufficient explanation. The time since their last
security vetting has not exceeded the maximum allowed period. And so on.
A given situation may require arbitrary specific beliefs about, or knowledge of,
an individual before they are regarded as trustworthy. In particular in security
applications of the concept of trust these additional aspects can be seen to constitute
a major part of what is called the security policy.
Generally beliefs about trusts are beliefs that apply “in normal situations”.
In times of crisis e.g. in times of war, in economic downturns, when firms go
bankrupt, etc. the beliefs on which trust is based are often undermined. Therefore
theories of trust often add a specific belief in situational normality which explicitly
sanctions the use of the trust supported beliefs[74]. If situational normality does
not hold then the beliefs supporting trust should be individually examined to see
if they hold in the current circumstances9.
2.5.3. Trusting Stance
As well as attitudes of trust towards specific individuals, people also have attitudes
towards groups or even humanity in general[see again 74]. In some circumstances,
for example when we lack specific information, we adopt, either consciously or
unconsciously, an attitude of trust or distrust towards others. This is our stance.
It may be that we have learnt that the best starting place for a relationship is to
start with trust and move to distrust when it is not returned. It may be that we
believe that it is better to start with distrust and give trust when it is earned. Our
actual position will be the result of Habitus, Passion and Policy and it constitutes
a default in our interactions with others.
2.6. Trust and Temporary Systems
In the 1990’s business became concerned with the notion of “virtual organisation”,
teams that come together temporarily for some specific purpose and then dissolve
back into the sea of resources to be used again to form new virtual organisations for
new purposes. Social scientists classify such dynamic formation and dissolution
as temporary systems in which individuals may have no direct experience of one
another before coming together and have no expectation of ever coming together
again.
In “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups”, Meyerson, Weick and Kramer discuss
the problem of temporary systems:
“Temporary systems exhibit behavior that presupposes trust, yet traditional
sources of trust - familiarity, shared experience, reciprocal disclosure, threats
9It should be clear that normal means normal for a given context i.e. what is normal for this situation
may not be normal for that situation. The idea of what is normal therefore changes as background
information changes and so both the nature and the extent of trust may change as the result of
context changes.
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and deterrents, fulfilled promises, and demonstrations of non-exploitation of
vulnerability - are not obvious in such systems. In this respect, temporary
systems act as if trust were present, but their histories seem to preclude its
development.”
This poses the problem of how trust forms in such temporary systems given that
the usual pre-requisites for “classical trust” seem to be missing. The suggested
solution was that a different form of trust, dubbed swift trust, came into play
where “role and category” information became the main determinants in trust
formation. Here role refers to the roles that the members play within the group.
Individuals are trusted for the role they play provided that they do not display
role violations i.e. inappropriate behaviour for the role. Category refers to the
social categorisation performed by group members on other group members and
is presumed to be dominated by “institutional categories that are made salient by the
context in which the systems form”. Members trust one another according to the
sharing of perceived categories that the members inhabit. Categories induce a
stereotyping of individuals and failure of stereotype expectations may lead to
revision of one’s trust assessment.
Changes in business practices and the post 90’s expansion of the internet have
meant that business interest in temporary systems has expanded well beyond
the simple virtual organisations of the 90’s. Business to business and business to
customer interaction are increasingly becoming instances of temporary systems. At
the same time as these changes have been taking place in the business environment,
corresponding changes have been taking place in governmental, educational and
social environments. Consequently, throughout society, increasing numbers of
individuals find themselves interacting as parts of temporary systems. Although
many of these interactions are mediated by the Internet, many are not. Interactions
with institutions, such as banks, governmental bodies and medical practitioners
currently predominantly remain face-to-face. But still they cease to be based on
long term one-to-one relationships between individuals and instead are performed
through an ever changing cast of role holders. In the eyes of many this process,
has resulted in institutions becoming “faceless”, “bureaucratic” and “soulless” as
the “thick relationships” that underwrite “classical trust” become eroded. How
can I trust this pensions adviser that I have only just met? How can I trust this
doctor that I have never seen before? Progressively each of us is forced either to
adopt some new basis for trust or to forgo the advantages offered by co-operation
and role differentiation in society. Swift Trust potentially becomes a major bearer
of uncertainty reduction in our day to day interactions.
We may see Swift Trust is an example of Luhmann’s Generalised Communication
Media or Giddens’ Abstract Systems. The new abstract system engenders Trust
by Role and Category and this is underwritten by systems trust in the Role and
Category assignment system. That is, we trust the role occupier because we believe
that Role assignment has been carried out by some trustworthy system (which is
continually validated by seeking role violations). Similarly Categories are trusted
because category assignment is performed on the basis of category tags so that
membership of shared categories becomes a basis for trust.
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2.7. Trust and Forgiveness
These accounts are somewhat incomplete as they stand, for they fail to account
for the role of trust in forgiveness. In many situations there is scope for discretion
on the part of the trusted in the fulfilment of obligations. As Baier[5] puts it:
“The more extensive the discretionary powers of the trusted, the less clear-cut will be the
answer to the question of when trust is disappointed. The truster, who always needs good
judgment to know whom to trust and how much discretion to give, will also have some
scope for discretion in judging what should count as failing to meet trust, either through
incompetence, negligence, or ill will. In any case of a questionable exercise of discretion
there will be room both for forgiveness of unfortunate outcomes and for tact in treatment
of the question of whether there is anything to forgive.”
Moreover we cannot assume perfect execution of tasks, there will be disappoint-
ment of trust, not because of poor use of discretion on the part of the trustee but
because of failures in understanding and failures in performance. Such failures
introduce noise into the trust monitoring and enforcement systems (whatever they
are). If we regard others as untrustworthy as soon as they fail to meet our expec-
tations then we may expect the set of individuals that we regard as trustworthy
to become very small very quickly. Appropriate forgiveness and toleration of
error provide a noise immunity mechanism for trustworthiness. Camp et al. [24]
observe that there exists a particular asymmetry between forgiveness of failures
of trust in intent and trust in competence “people are ready to forgive harms they may
have suffered due to incompetence far more quickly and readily than harms they perceive
to have been caused by the bad intentions of others.” (Although we must also observe
that there is a limit to the toleration of incompetence. At some point we simply
have to regard incompetence as sufficient grounds for no longer trusting in the
ability to deliver the desired outcome.)
This need for noise toleration seems to go beyond trust and apply to other
aspects of cooperative behaviour. Although a general discussion of this would take
us too far afield at this point, the role of forgiveness has been examined in general
game theoretic terms in the analysis of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma[4] and Noisy
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma[79]. In Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, forgiveness allows
co-operation to be re-established by a TIT-FOR-TAT player after betrayal and
‘punishment’ by a reciprocal betrayal. In Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma, forgiveness
allows GENEROUS-TIT-FOR-TAT to handle acceptable error levels in other players’
execution without excessive losses of co-operation.
Trust must also explain the commonplace observation that we are more likely
to forgive those we trust than those we distrust. That is, the failure to meet a
commitment by someone we trust is often regarded as excusable whereas the same
kind of failure by someone we do not actively trust or someone we actively distrust
will be seen as (further) evidence of their untrustworthiness. Here we might turn
to the theory of social capital popularized in recent years by Robert Putnam’s
article[92] and subsequent book Bowling Alone[91]. Social capital is defined in
analogy to financial capital and is regarded as an investment in social relations
that can be an enabler, allowing an individual (or group) to achieve things that
they could not otherwise achieve. In this sense trustworthiness can be regarded as
social capital that an individual can invest and the possession of social capital can
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allow the individual to do things and act in particular ways that otherwise would
be unacceptable. Although Dasgupta’s paper[29], quoted by Gambetta above, does
not use the term social capital it does discuss a reputation for trustworthiness
as a commodity that may be invested in by an individual. The investment in
reputation pays off by creating conditions which allow him to engage in trust
based interactions more often. A reputation for trustworthiness also provides a
basis for forgiveness. If we recognise that an individual has been trustworthy in
the past, even when it has not been to his immediate advantage, then we are more
willing to believe that a failure is unintentional and forgivable.
2.8. Summary of Trust
McKnight and Chervany have carried out extensive research on how the term
trust is used in trust research literature across disciplines. They have devel-
oped frameworks to categorize the different concepts presented, breaking the
conceptions down into a common set of component concepts used across the
community[71, 72, 73]. Here one of their frameworks[72] is used to summarize
the concepts covered in this review.
Trusting Belief
Competence: means having the ability or power to do for one what one
needs done
Benevolence: means caring and being motivated to act in one’s interest rather
than acting opportunistically
Integrity: means making good faith agreements, telling the truth, and
fulfilling promises
Predictability: means trustee actions (good or bad) that are consistent enough
to be forecasted in a given situation
Dispositional Trust
Faith in Humanity: refers to underlying assumptions about people
Trusting Stance: means that, regardless of what one assumes about other
people generally, one assumes that one will achieve better outcomes by
dealing with people as though they are well-meaning and reliable.
Institutional Trust10
Structural Assurance: means one securely believes that protective structures,
guarantees, contracts, regulations, promises, legal recourse, processes,
or procedures, are in place that are conducive to situational success
Situational Normality: means one securely believes that the situation in a
risky venture is normal or favorable or conducive to situational success.
10On other occasions they have used the term systems trust for this concept
48
2.9. Promises To Keep: A Theory of Trust
Trusting Intentions
Willingness to Depend: means one is volitionally prepared to make oneself
vulnerable to the other person by relying on them, with a feeling of
relative security
Subjective Probability of Depending: means the extent to which one forecasts
or predicts that one will depend on the other person, with a feeling of
relative security
2.9. Promises To Keep: A Theory of Trust
Later in this dissertation, formal reasoning systems are introduced for Knowledge
on Trust and Social Trust. These formal systems need to be grounded in some
particular view of trust which they have some claim to represent.
Here I will offer a simple theory of trust that incorporates a number of the
themes surveyed above. This theory of trust is in the realm of policy, of a conscious
decision to treat others in a particular manner.
We will define trust as the rational belief by an individual, the truster, that another
individual, the trustee, will keep a promise where the truster cares about what results
from the promise and the truster has chosen to rely on the trustee keeping the promise.
When in later chapters we may pause and ask: “What kind of thing is this formal
relation called ‘trust’ meant to represent?”, then the answer is: “the notion of trust
described here”.
We will define trust as the rational belief by an individual, the truster, that another
individual, the trustee, will keep a promise where the truster cares about what results
from the promise and the truster has chosen to rely on the trustee keeping the promise.
To understand this definition we must look closely at its parts:
Rational Belief: Belief is not certain knowledge but rather arises from incomplete
and inconsistent information. Rational Belief is such uncertain knowledge
supported by uncertain facts combined in some manner to give the most
plausible, most coherent description of reality that can be assembled from
the available information.
For example we may base our assessment of whether or not an individual
will keep a promise on a number of factors, such as, the individual’s past
behaviour in similar situations, correlation of the promised behaviour with
the general character of the individual (character), the degree to which the
individual may gain or lose by keeping their promise (circumstance) and the
relationship that exists between us. In general such factors provide neither
complete information, nor consistent information, with which to make a
decision. So for example we may judge that it is often the case that people
break promises when circumstances change in such a manner that they may
pay a high penalty if they keep their promise. Yet we might also believe that
a person of good character may be expected to keep their promises even
in such changed circumstances. Similarly we may hold that the power of
a relationship between ourselves and the promiser is such that even if the
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promiser has a history of breaking promises with other people, we may still
expect them to keep promises to us .
Promise: A promise is a freely given commitment, made in good faith, between
a promiser and a promisee11. Once made a promise can be kept, broken or
retracted, but it can only be retracted with the consent of the promisee,
i.e. the promisee says "I will not hold you to the promise". Autonomously
the promiser can only keep or break the promise. If it is kept only when
convenient to the promiser, and broken when it is inconvenient for the
promiser to keep it, then it is not a promise.
A promise is freely given if it is obtained without coercion. It is made in good
faith if no deception has been practiced in order to obtain the promise. A
promise obtained by coercion or deception is not a promise at all, i.e. it
may be freely retracted when the coercion is removed or the deception is
unmasked.
In general, a promise is a commitment to the truth of some proposition. It is
often a commitment to a future truth i.e. it will be the case that p is true, and
it is often a commitment to an assertion of agency i.e I will ensure that p. So
I will do something is a commitment to eventually it will be true that I did the
thing i.e. it is commitment to a future truth of a proposition about agency.
Generally, a promise implicitly contains that the promiser both intends to
keep the promise and that the promiser has the capabilities required to keep
the promise, although these may be broken out into separate promises. In
general we assume that a promiser is always fully aware of his intentions
but may be unaware of the limits of their capabilities. And as such we may
be willing to forgive a broken promise when it is broken for reason of failure
of capability but we are unwilling to forgive a promise broken for reason of
failure of intention.
A promise may be implicit as well as explicit. If you tell me something
then implicitly there are promises associated with the act of telling. You
promise that you do not lie. This does not mean that what you say is true
but rather it requires that you are stating something you believe. In this
sense you are being honest. Moreover, you are also promising you are not
lying by omission i.e. you are not withholding beliefs which are relevant to
the matter at hand and would lead me to draw different conclusions should
you disclose them. We might call this being disclosing or candid. We may
call these the promises of intention associated with telling. There are also
implicit promises of performance. You implicitly promise to be competent in a
particular domain of knowledge, meaning that if you believe something in
that domain then it is true, and to be knowledgeable in a particular domain
of knowledge, meaning that if something is true in that domain then you
will believe it. The implicit performance promises may be waived according
to circumstance. For example if I know you are not an expert in the subject
11We can extend this to a group of promisers and a group of promisees so that the group of promisers
are individually and collectively responsible for the promise to each and every member of the
group of promisees.
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matter at hand I may waive either or both of the implicit performance
promises (or you may caveat the telling by some indication that waives either
or both of the performance promises).
Similar principles hold for implicit promises to act in a particular way. When
someone offers to act in some way for us we might assume implicitly that
they have competencies i.e. the abilities, resources, etc. required to carry
out the action, or the knowledge, competence etc. required to guarantee the
truth of an assertion.
Moreover, there is no implication of agency on the part of the promiser in
the promise, i.e. the promiser is not necessarily the agent that causes the
promise to be true (or become true). Consider, I promise you the sun will rise
tomorrow! Clearly I will not make this happen but the promise has meaning.
I am not promising to make the sun rise. I am promising that, in some way,
I know the sun will rise tomorrow, even if you doubt it will happen. And if
the sun doesn’t rise you will feel aggrieved. You will feel I have broken my
promise, or at the very least, that I should not have made the promise in the
first place.
Finally we have said that a promise is a commitment. What makes a commit-
ment different from, say, a simple observation, is that commitment implies a
cost. If I am committed to something I am willing to pay the costs entailed
in it being so. There is a big difference between thinking democracy is a good
thing and being committed to democracy. The first is an observation I might
make. If circumstances should be about to change to mean the democracy
I was living in was about to become a dictatorship then you could not
conclude that I would be willing to do anything to oppose it. The second
statement however means that I am willing to pay at least some sort of costs
to ensure that I go on living in a democracy. If I promise that the sun will
rise tomorrow I am making a commitment even if the cost is my reputation
or our relationship. Here we come close to the contractual meaning of a
commitment. If I am contractually committed to something then I am willing,
or at least undertake, to pay a forfeit if I do not meet that commitment.
If there is no promise there is no trust. There is simply a belief that in certain
circumstances someone will do something and in other circumstances they
will not. There may indeed be reliability in this prediction and statistical
or other reasons backing up the belief. But this only means that there is
predictability rather than trust.
Cares: If the potential truster simply doesn’t care about what results from the
promise then there is no need for trust.
Chooses: The potential truster may care about the outcome and believe the trustee
will keep the promise. But the potential truster may choose not to trust
the potential trustee and take other steps to manage the outcome, such
as hedging or insurance. Here we acknowledge that the truster is also
autonomous and that trust, or indeed trusting this particular individual, is not
the only option open to him. The potential truster makes choices between
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alternatives not only on the basis of outcomes but also on other grounds
such as the morality of the situation and the basis of how outcomes are achieved.
For example, I may choose not to trust someone and may take alternative
steps to guarantee an outcome because I do not like the methods that the
potential trustee is likely to employ. I may well believe that they may be
trustworthy and that I may care about the outcome, but I would rather the
outcome was not achieved by their agency. In choosing not to trust you I
decline your offer and reject any reciprocal obligation to you in the matter at
hand.
If the potential truster cares about the outcome and has no choice but to rely
on the trustee then there is no issue of trust i.e trust involves the voluntary
surrender of control to another individual.
An individual regards another as trustworthy if they believe that the other
will keep their promises. The central question of trust and trustworthiness thus
becomes: What is sufficient reason to believe another will keep their promises?
2.9.1. Classical Trust
For classical trust this belief is built from experience of the past behaviour of the
individual and an understanding of their motivations. We might give an account
of this as follows.
The judgment of trustworthiness is based upon specific knowledge of, and
beliefs about, an individual. Part of this is knowledge of past behaviour and
beliefs about the motivations for that behaviour. A sufficient reason to believe an
individual is trustworthy is the belief that the individual behaves in a particular
manner to maintain a chosen property, together with the knowledge of, or belief
about, a particular mechanism that will lead to the property being damaged if the
individual fails to live up to promises they have made.
We will refer to this combination of property and mechanism as the motivation
of the individual to live up to their promises. Additionally systems trust may be
required to support the mechanism, when, for example, the mechanism is an insti-
tutional framework e.g. a professional association whose membership constitutes a
certified body of practitioners. However the mechanism may incorporate a degree
of forgiveness. Not all failures to live up to promises will result in immediate
punishment. Generally the degree of toleration in the mechanism will also be
based on knowledge and beliefs about the trustee, and this knowledge and belief
is updated as a result of failure so that different consequences may occur in the
future. The trustor will also update their beliefs as a result of fulfilment, and failure
of fulfilment of obligations by the trustee. But the trustor will update beliefs about
the motivations of the trustee i.e. beliefs about the property being maintained by
the trustee and beliefs about the mechanisms that damage this property. These
revised beliefs may lead the trustor to make different trust decisions in the future,
both of the particular trustee that caused the update and potential trustees in
general.
Trusting stance enters the model as the choice made for the default motivation
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model when we lack specific information. Figure 2.2 summarises this diagrammat-
ically.
Mechanism Property
promise
Desires to 
maintain
makes
Damages
Monitors
to
A B
Knowledge and Beliefs
Informs
Trusts
Monitors
Figure 2.2.: Classical Trust Model
Subjective probability re-enters the picture as an assessment of the trustor’s
confidence in the supposed motivation of the trustee. That is, it re-enters the picture
as the specific process of evaluating the evidence associated with a particular
explanation of why the trustee is trustworthy.
2.9.2. Swift Trust
But what of the cases where we do not have direct experience of the individual?
What of trust in temporary systems? As indicated in the earlier discussion of
temporary systems, swift trust offers an answer and we may explain trust based
on role and category in terms of a similar model. If a person is in a role, R, then
promises made in that role are regulated by a mechanism, M, that penalises role
holders that fail to fulfil those particular promises. One particular property that
the role holder might wish to maintain is the ability to inhabit the given role in
the future and the enforcement mechanism that might apply is role exclusion
in that individuals that fail to fulfil the promises associated with a role become
excluded from holding that role in the future. Similarly, if a person really is in a
category, C, then there is a mechanism that will penalise them for violations of
the promises associated with C. If we have systems trust in the role and category
assignment mechanisms then we can extend trust to individuals in particular roles
and categories because of the motivations associated with role and category. The
difference between Swift Trust and Classical Trust can be seen by comparing the
Classical Trust diagram, figure 2.2, and the Swift Trust Diagram figure 2.3.
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Mechanism Property
promise
Desires to 
maintain
makes
Damages
Monitors
to
A
B
Knowledge and Beliefs
Informs
Trusts
Monitors
ROLE/
CATEGORY
Inhabits
Figure 2.3.: Swift Trust Model
2.9.3. Social Embeddedness and Indirect Trust
However the above are not the only ways we obtain belief that others will keep
their promises. We are also told things by people we trust. We are told that people
are trustworthy, or untrustworthy. We are told about their circumstances, we are
told about their past behaviour and we are told about their virtues (and failings).
Each and every one of us is embedded in a network of established and long lasting
relationships. These networks allow us to bootstrap initial trust in people we do
not directly know using referrals from our network. Our social embeddedness
offers an alternative and complementary approach to swift trust, giving us another
way to establish trust in temporary systems. I have initial trust in you because of
what I have been told by intermediaries, and this initial trust is underwritten by
my trust in the intermediaries.
This leads to the consideration of two different problems which depend on what
kind of information I am given by intermediaries.
The first problem arises where my social network gives me information about
the circumstances surrounding events and individuals. The information I receive
may be both incomplete and inconsistent, and the sources I receive of information
may not be all equally trustworthy. In this case the problem is to synthesise the
most plausible picture of the situation from the information I have received given
the relative trustworthiness of the sources. This will be called the problem of
Knowledge on Trust. This problem is the subject of Chapter 4.
In the second problem I am given referrals which say whether an individual is
trustworthy or untrustworthy. But the problem is reflexive in that referees may
indicate not just on their beliefs about the individual of concern but also about
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other referees. This will be called the problem of Social Trust.
It should be emphasised that this is not a theory of transitive trust. Rather it is a
theory of piecing together different trust relationships to form an overall picture of
trust by using the promises made by others. I trust A as a referee. A recommends
B as a referee as to whether C is trustworthy for some task. I am willing to
accept the chain because I trust A’s judgement about B and B’s judgement about
C and both have made appropriate promises. If I believed only A trusts B and B
trusts C in the appropriate ways this would not be enough for me to trust C. The
recommendations themselves are an important part of establishing my (initial)
trust in C because they carry the promises implicitly within them.
A central part of the problem is resolving the cancellations that arise when
one distrusts: i.e. if a referee is distrusted then the referee’s distrust of another is
“‘cancelled out”. This does not mean that the other is trusted but that the referee’s
opinion is discounted. The resolution of an opinion synthesised from networks of
referees that trust and distrust one another is the problem is taken up in Chapter 5.
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3. The Mathematical Framework,
including a Primer on Binary
Relations and Galois Connections
3.1. Introduction
The computer scientist approaches problems with a particular outlook and a
particular toolkit. Part of that outlook, shared with other sciences, such as physics,
is to approach problems by creating formal models of them. Formal models allow
us to abstract from the detail of situations and processes and explore how elements
of a problem may interact. Another, and very important, part of the outlook is to
seek out the computational content of a concept. Modelling should not only result
in a description of some information process but also a hypothesis about how the
process may actually be performed effectively.
So far this dissertation has explored the concept of trust in the same manner as
might be pursued in a philosophical or sociological context. This chapter marks a
transition from this approach into one in which we start to use some of the tools
from computer science to explore the concept of trust, or at least aspects of it,
more rigorously. The following chapters will adopt a model building approach
to the concepts of Knowledge-on-Trust and Social-Trust introduced earlier. The
style adopted is to mix informal discussion of ideas with their formalisation in
simple set theory and the development of computational methods to address the
respective concepts.
The use of mathematics becomes more pronounced as the dissertation pro-
gresses, so that in Chapter 4 the mathematical notation is only used to specify the
requirements of a program to compute coherent theories whereas in the following
chapters the formal mathematical framework is used both to specify notions such
as argumentation and trust system and analyse these notions through proofs of
properties.
In subsequent chapters we regard trust as being associated with logical problems,
not in the sense of deductive inference, but rather in the sense of finding solu-
tions under logical constraints. To illustrate, consider a problem from Raymond
Smullyan’s “What is the Name of this Book?” [106].
In Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice Portia had three caskets, gold, silver, and
lead, inside one of which was Portia’s portrait. The suitor was to choose one
of the caskets, and if he was lucky enough (or wise enough) to choose the one
with the portrait, then he could claim Portia as his bride. On the lid of each
casket was an inscription to help the suitor choose wisely.
Now, suppose Portia wished to choose her husband not on the basis of virtue,
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but simply on the basis of intelligence. She had the following inscriptions put
on the caskets.
Gold: The portrait is in this casket.
Silver: The portrait is not in this casket.
Lead: The portrait is not in the Gold casket.
Portia explained to the suitor that of the three statements, at most one was
true.
Which casket should the suitor choose?1
This problem is solved, not by deductive inference, but by determining which
assignments of true and false to statements causes all the conditions to be met.
The problem may be translated into propositional logic in several ways. A fairly
literal translation is given by naming each alternative proposition as to which
casket holds the portrait:
PG is The portrait is in the Gold casket. (3.1)
PS is The portrait is in the Silver casket. (3.2)
PL is The portrait is in the Lead casket. (3.3)
Stating that only one casket can be holding the portrait (i.e. there is only one
portrait):
(PG ∧ ¬ PS ∧ ¬ PL) ∨ (¬ PG ∧ PS ∧ ¬ PL) ∨ (¬ PG ∧ ¬ PS ∧ PL). (3.4)
Naming each of the propositions written on the casket and define what they say
about the portrait location:
G ≡ PG. (3.5)
S ≡ ¬ PS. (3.6)
L ≡ ¬ PG (3.7)
And stating that only one of these statements is true:
(G ∧ ¬ S ∧ ¬ L) ∨ (¬ G ∧ S ∧ ¬ L) ∨ (¬ G ∧ ¬ S ∧ L). (3.8)
The problem thus becomes the problem of assigning the values true and false to
each of the propositions PG, PS, PL, G, S and L in such a manner that the various
formulae are all true. Such an assignment is called a (propositional) model of
the collection of formula. The mechanical approach to this is to use a model
checker such as MACE4 that will systematically search through the assignments
to determine which satisfy all the formulas. In this case, for example, MACE4
results in exactly one possible model being found:
1
Silver.
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G = false G = false L = true
PG = false PS = true PL = false
Below the basic framework of propositional model finding is given. Chapter 4
uses an extended version of propositional model checking to address the problem
of Knowledge-on-Trust and Chapter 5 shows how questions of Social-Trust may
be translated into the propositional model checking framework. In pursuing this
latter goal, binary relations, operators derived from binary relations and Galois
Connections are used.
Binary relations are familiar to many computer scientists as a representation
of non-deterministic programs with operations on binary relations being ways of
combining non-deterministic programs or program fragments2. Similarly operators
derived from binary relations are familiar as predicate transformers such as
weakest (liberal) precondition and strongest postcondition3. The notion of a
Galois Connection arises in the laws that connect predicate transformers. So, for
example, given a program, R, the weakest liberal precondition of R for result
Q, written wlp(R, Q) is the largest set, P, such that if one runs R with input in
P, and R terminates, then the result is in Q. The predicate transformer is the
operator wlp(R) obtained by abstracting over Q. The strongest postcondition,
written sp(R, P), is the dual such that Q is the smallest set such that starting
in P and terminating one is guaranteed to be in Q. The predicate transformer,
of course, being sp(R). In this case, the Galois Connection, written in terms
of the operators, is the law that connects the weakest liberal precondition and
strongest post condition sp(R)P ⊆ Q ≡ P ⊆ wlp(R)Q. The framework of binary
relations, operators and Galois Connections will be used in the development
of argumentation systems and their use as a tool for modelling Social-Trust in
2Exactly when programs were seen as relations, and by whom, seems hard to pin down. Certainly
by the Royal Society workshop in 1984 Tony Hoare could clearly portray programs as predicates
[54], a view he attributes initially to Rick Hehner during Hehner’s extended visit to the PRG.
And from predicates it is but a short step to relations. But this is far from the whole story.
John Sanderson’s monograph “A relational Theory of Computing” [98] was published in 1980
and presents a fully relational semantics for a small language and Sanderson himself was
aware of Andrezej Blikle’s work on using relations in studying program analysis techniques
[15]. Moreover, Blikle subsequently went on to develop MetaSoft, a set based approach to
denotational semantics [16]. Likewise one might say that the relational approach is implicit
in much of Jean-Raymond Abrial’s work on the set theoretic approach to specification that
eventually, after much mutation, became Z. We should also note that at approximately the
same time the world of domain theoretic semantics was also active in the area of the relational
semantics of programming language with, for example, Mike Smyth publishing in 1983 a power
domain approach to continuous multifunctions and predicate transformers [107]. Perhaps the
reality is that there was a gradual movement of ideas from their use as a tool for specifying
programming languages to a tool for specifying programs, and the gradual realisation that
relations and predicates were but two sides of the same coin.
3Predicate Transformers and weakest Preconditions were introduced by Edsger W. Dijkstra and the
canonical references are Dijkstra’s “Guarded commands, nondeterminacy and formal derivation
of programs” [31] and book “A Discipline of Programming” [32], with the more up-to-date, and
more formal, reference being Dijkstra’s and Carl S. Scholten’s “Predicate Calculus and Program
Semantics” [33]. The exact details of how one represents non-termination of a program are
an issue in deciding exactly what is the relational representation of a program. Here we are
intentionally inexact but if the matter is of concern to the reader we may limit the discussion to
always terminating programs
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subsequent chapters.
This chapter next provides a brief review of the main mathematical tools that
are used in subsequent chapters.
3.2. Informal Set Theory
The mathematical discussion in this dissertation is conducted in an informal set
theory with typing4. The set theory can be regarded as a fragment of the Z
specification language (see, for example, Mike Spivey’s “Z Notation - a reference
manual (2. ed.)” [110]). We take as base types a potentially infinite collection of
sorts, named A, B, C etc. and take type constructors power, P τ, and (binary)product
τ × σ for types τ and σ. Each sort corresponds to a non-empty set of the same
name. Power set and the product of two sets are likewise denoted PT and T× S
for sets T and S. Given a type declaration, s : τ we assume the assertion s ∈ T
where T is the obviously corresponding set to τ. Set comprehension is written
{x : S | predicate} or {term | predicate} in the conventional mathematical style.
When we wish to emphasise type membership rather than set membership in a
declaration we will write x : S, rather than x ∈ S, to emphasise that S is a type,
often, however, where the type may be determined implicitly from the context, we
will write neither. Operators such as union (∪), intersection (∩), set difference (\)
and complement ( ) are taken as defined in all appropriate types (complement
being defined with respect to the type i.e. for X : P τ, complement is defined by
X =̂ {x : τ | x 6∈ X}). In future when operations are introduced they will be
available in all appropriate types without explicit comment.
3.3. Propositional Logic and Propositional Models
We now formally discuss propositional model finding. First we discuss proposi-
tional logic as a formal language giving the meaning of collections of propositions
in term of sets of assignments of true or false to basic propositions, which we call
propositional variables (or simple variables). Second we illustrate the process of
model finding by defining a non-deterministic program (relation) for finding a
model5.
The language of propositional logic is that of the connectives “and”, “or”, “not”
and their derivatives. It is concerned with tying together atomic propositions,
which are unanalysed statements, which are either true or false. These atomic
unanalysed statements will be modelled by some suitably large collection of
variables. The language of propositional logic then lets us build propositional
sentences out of these variables according to the following grammar with the
connectives taking their usual meaning:
4Or, if one prefers to so call it, a simple type theory.
5The material in this section is loosely based on Raymond Smullyan’s book “First Order Logic”
[105] with the model finding procedure being in essence a procedure for non-deterministically
finding an open branch of a semantic tableau. Other works presenting a similar, tableaux based,
view of logic include the introductory books by Hodges [55], Priest [90] and Jeffrey [58].
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Proposition ::= Proposition ∧ Proposition |
Proposition ∨ Proposition |
Proposition⇒ Proposition |
Proposition ≡ Proposition |
¬ Proposition |
(Proposition) |
true |
false |
Variable
Given a set, S, of the propositional variables, an assignment for S is a function
from S to {0, 1}. An assignment represents which variables are taken to be
true (assigned 1) and which are taken to be false (assigned 0). The semantics
of propositional logic extends the notion of truth of variables to the notion of
truth of sentences. Given a propositional sentence, P, an assignment for P is an
assignment, m : S→ {0, 1}, such that S includes all the variables mentioned in P.
An assignment a for P, is a model of P, written a |= P if, and only if, it obeys the
following recursive condition:
m |= p ∧ q iff m |= p and m |= q
m |= p ∨ q iff m |= p or m |= q
m |= p⇒ q iff m 6|= p or m |= q
m |= p ≡ q iff m |= p iff m |= q
m |= ¬ p iff m 6|= p
m |= true
m 6|= false
m |= v iff m(v) = 1 for v a variable
where m 6|= x means not m |= x.
Given a set of propositional sentences an assignment is a model for the set if it is
a model of every sentence in the set. Given a set A of propositional sentences the
set of all models of A is Mod(A) =̂ {m | ∀ a ∈ A.m |= a}. The set A is said to be
consistent if Mod(A) is non-empty, otherwise it is said to be inconsistent. The set
A is said to be consistent with a propositional sentence p if there is an assignment
that is simultaneously a model of both A and p, or equivalently, Mod(A∪ {p}) is
non-empty. A propositional sentence, p, is a consequence of the set A if there are
no assignments that are simultaneously a model of ¬ p and A, i.e. Mod(A∪ {¬ p})
is empty6.
Since a set of propositional sentences may have many models, one can impose
extra selection conditions to pick out particular models or sets of models. For
example, we may select models because we prefer certain variables to take on the
value 1 (or 0) over others. Or we may select models that maximise (or minimise)
the number of mentioned variables that take on the value 1. Such additional
constraints will occur when propositional models are used to give computational
semantics in later chapters.
We now turn to the matter of finding models for a set of sentences. There
6That is, it is not possible for everything in A to be true and p not to be true.
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are many possible algorithms for doing this. Here, by way of illustration, we
give a non-deterministic algorithm for finding a model. All models are found by
pursuing all possible choices at choice points rather than a single option.
Let an atomic proposition be a propositional variable or negated propositional
variable. An atomic proposition p is said to be positive occurrence of v if p is
the propositional variable v and said to be a negative occurrence of v if p is the
negation of v. A model set is a set, S, of atomic propositions such that no variable
occurs as both a positive and negative occurrence in S. Model sets are a coding
of assignments to propositional variables with a variable v being assigned 1 if
it occurs positively in the set and assigned 0 if it occurs negatively. Given a
non-empty model set, if a variable does not occur in the model set then it may be
assigned either 1 or 0.
Given a set of propositional sentences S we define the non-deterministic reduc-
tion relation, , on S by:
{α} ∪ Γ  α1 ∪ Γ
{β} ∪ Γ  β1 ∪ Γ
{β} ∪ Γ  β2 ∪ Γ
{v} ∪ {¬ v} ∪ Γ  ∅ for v a variable
{false} ∪ Γ  ∅
where
α α1
a ∧ b {a, b}
¬ (a ∨ b) {¬ a,¬ b}
¬ (a⇒ b) {a,¬ b}
β β1 β2
a ∨ b {a} {b}
¬ (a ∧ b) {¬ a} {¬ b}
(a⇒ b) {¬ a} {b}
(a ≡ b) {a, b} {¬ a,¬ b}
¬ (a ≡ b) {a,¬ b} {¬ a, b}
S is irreducible iff ¬∃X.S X.
M is a model set for S iff S = M or there is a finite sequence of reductions
S = X1  X2  . . .  Xn−1  Xn = M and M is irreducible and non-empty. If
this is the case we will write S ] M.
It is straightforward to show that if X  X′ and m |= X′ then m′ |= X where
m′ is an extension of m7 and so, by induction, that if X  ] X′ and m |= X′ then
m′ |= X.
If one views ] via predicate transformers one can see that sp( ])({p}) is the
set of all models of the proposition p and given a model set m, wlp( ])m is the
set of all propositional sentences that have m as a model set8.
3.4. Binary Relations
Binary relations from A to B are the subsets of A× B. If R is a binary relation we
write R : A ↔ B as an alternative to R : P(A× B) and xRy as an alternative to
7Since the reduction step may throw away a variable that occurred in X, the assignment m may not
fully determine the variables in X and an arbitrary choice must be made for the assignment to
variables so thrown away.
8Of course, in this latter process the β steps can introduce an arbitrary number of new variables
that may be arbitrarily true or false. And even without this potential source of infinity, even the
α steps can introduce semantic duplication of formulas, e.g. p and p ∧ p.
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(x, y) ∈ R. Here we give a brief overview of binary relations and their properties9.
Given a binary relation R : A ↔ B, the derived relations R˘ and R of converse
and complement relations are defined by xR˘y =̂ yRx and xRy =̂ ¬ xRy where x
ranges over A and y over B, and again we emphasise that complementation is
taken relative to A× B. Given two binary relations R : A ↔ B and S : B ↔ C
the operations of intersection and union, inherited from sets, create new binary
relations and the relational composition of R and S, denoted R o9 S is defined by
xR o9 Sy =̂ ∃ z.xRz ∧ zSy (the “generalised functional composition” is defined as
S ◦ R =̂ R o9 S) where x ranges over A, z over B and y over C. The identity relations
I : A↔ A is defined by xIy =̂ x = y, where x and y range over A, and the universal,
or chaos, relation, U : A↔ B, is defined by xUy = true where x ranges over A and
y over B.
The natural domain and natural range of R : A ↔ B are the first and sec-
ond projections of the relation R defined by pr1R = {x : A | ∃ y : B.xRy} and
pr2R = {y : B | ∃ x : A.xRy}.
The language of binary relations is very expressive and many properties of
relations may be stated directly in terms of the algebra of relations without resort
to the underlying set theory. As examples consider the following commonly used
properties of binary relations:
property definition
R : A↔ B is a partial function R˘ o9 R ⊆ IB (3.9)
R : A↔ B is total IA ⊆ R o9 R˘ (3.10)
R : A↔ B is a surjection IB ⊆ R˘ o9 R (3.11)
R : A↔ B is an injection R o9 R˘ ⊆ IA (3.12)
R : A↔ A is reflexive IA ⊆ R (3.13)
R : A↔ A is irreflexive R ⊆ IA (3.14)
R : A↔ A is symmetric R˘ = R (3.15)
R : A↔ A is asymmetric R ⊆ R˘ (3.16)
R : A↔ A is antisymmetric R∩ R˘ ⊆ IA (3.17)
R : A↔ A is transitive R o9 R ⊆ R (3.18)
R : A↔ A is negatively-transitive R o9 R ⊆ R (3.19)
R : A↔ A is connected UA ⊆ R∪ R˘ (3.20)
R : A↔ A is weakly connected IA ⊆ R∪ R˘ (3.21)
R : A↔ A is an equivalence R˘ o9 R = R (3.22)
The operators ∪,∩, ¯ form the usual boolean algebra, inherited from sets, over rela-
tions. The remaining operators interact with these boolean operators and between
themselves in various ways. In later chapters we will use some of these interactions
in proving theorems. The following are some of the useful theorems about the
algebra of binary relations, including how relational composition distributes over
unions and intersections of relations:
9The particular properties being largely taken from Ono’s “some Properties of Binary Relations”
[82] and Riguet’s “Relations binaires, fermetures, correspondances de Galois” [93].
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assumptions theorem
R : A↔ B IA o9 R = R = R o9 IB (3.23)
R : A↔ A R ⊆ IA ⇒ R˘ = R = R o9 R (3.24)
∀ k ∈ K.Rk : A↔ B ˘(⋃k Rk) = ⋃k R˘k (3.25)
∀ k ∈ K.Rk : A↔ B ˘(⋂k Rk) = ⋂k R˘k (3.26)
R, S : A↔ B ˘(R \ S) = R˘ \ S˘ (3.27)
R : A↔ B R = ˘˘R (3.28)
R : A↔ B R = R (3.29)
R, S : A↔ B ˘(R o9 S) = S˘ o9 T˘ (3.30)
R, S, T : A↔ B R o9 (S o9 T) = (R o9 S) o9 T (3.31)
R : A↔ B, ∀ k ∈ K.Sk : A↔ B R o9 (
⋃
k Sk) =
⋃
k(R o9 Sk) (3.32)
∀ k ∈ K.Rk : A↔ B, S : A↔ B (⋃k Rk) o9 S = ⋃k(Rk o9 S) (3.33)
R : A↔ B, ∀ k ∈ K.Sk : A↔ B R o9 (
⋂
k Sk) ⊆
⋂
k(R o9 Sk) (3.34)
∀ k ∈ K.Rk : A↔ B, S : A↔ B (⋂k Rk) o9 S ⊆ ⋂k(Rk o9 S) (3.35)
R, S, T : A↔ B (R \ S) o9 T ⊇ (R o9 T) \ (S o9 T) (3.36)
R, S, T : A↔ B R o9 (S \ T) ⊇ (R o9 S) \ (R o9 T) (3.37)
R : A↔ B R ⊆ R o9 R˘ o9 R (3.38)
R : A↔ B R = R o9 (R˘ o9 R∩ IB) (3.39)
R : A↔ B R = (R o9 R˘∩ IA) o9 R (3.40)
R, S : A↔ B R ⊆ S⇒ R˘ ⊆ S˘ (3.41)
R, S : A↔ B, T : B↔ C R ⊆ S⇒ R o9 T ⊆ S o9 T (3.42)
R, S : A↔ B, T : C↔ A R ⊆ S⇒ T o9 R ⊆ T o9 S (3.43)
If we introduce the notion of the powers, or iterates, of a relation, R : A ↔ A
defined inductively by:
R0 =̂ I (3.44)
R1 =̂ R (3.45)
Rn+1 =̂ R o9 Rn (3.46)
R+ =̂
⋃
i≥1 Ri (3.47)
R∗ =̂
⋃
i≥0 Ri (3.48)
Then we also have:
assumptions theorem
R : A↔ A Rm o9 Rn = Rm+n (3.49)
R, S : A↔ A R ⊆ S⇒ Rn ⊆ Sn (3.50)
R : A↔ A R o9 R∗ = R+ (3.51)
R : A↔ A R∗ o9 R = R+ (3.52)
R : A↔ A R∗ o9 R∗ = R∗ (3.53)
R : A↔ A IA ∪ R+ = R∗ (3.54)
R : A↔ A R∗ o9 Rn ⊆ R∗ (3.55)
R : A↔ A Rn o9 R∗ ⊆ R∗ (3.56)
R : A↔ A R+ is transitive (3.57)
R : A↔ A R∗ is reflexive and transitive (3.58)
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As an example of the notion of iterated relations we see that ]⊆ ∗, and that
 ] is ∗ restricted to (PPropositions↔ PAtomic Propositions).
3.5. Operators
When dealing with binary relations of the form R : A↔ B we will use the term
operator to mean a function f : PA → PB. Certain operators derived from
binary relations provide a very useful alternative way of dealing with relations
by providing what we might call a functional view of relations. In this section and
the next we will introduce the idea of an operator derived from a relation and the
notion of a closure property. In the subsequent section we will formally introduce
Galois Connections and the Galois Connections derived from a relation between
sets10. Given R : A ↔ B we define the evaluation of R at a point, denoted R.x, as
{y | xRy}. Using this evaluation at a point we can readily define two operators
associated with R by:
RΣX =̂
⋃
x∈X
R.x (3.59)
RΠX =̂
⋂
x∈X
R.x (3.60)
The relation is recoverable from each of the operators by:
y ∈ RΣ{x} ≡ xRy ≡ y ∈ RΠ{x} (3.61)
The behaviour of these operators on sets is determined by their behaviour on
points:
RΣ(X ∪ Y) = (RΣX) ∪ (RΣY) (3.62)
RΠ(X ∪ Y) = (RΠX) ∩ (RΠY) (3.63)
and:
X ⊆ Y⇒ RΣX ⊆ RΣY (3.64)
X ⊆ Y⇒ RΠX ⊇ RΠY (3.65)
(3.66)
And since the behaviour of these operators on sets is determined by their
behaviour on points we have:
10The material for these three sections is extensively based on Ore’s paper“Galois Connexions” [83]
and book “Theory of Graphs” [84], Everett’s “Closure Operators and Galois Theory in Lattices”
[38], Erne, Koslowski, Melton and Strecker’s “A Primer on Galois Connections” [37], Erne’s
“Adjunctions and Galois Connections: Origins, History and Development” [36] and Birkhoff’s
book “Lattice Theory” [14].
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(∀ x : A.R.x = S.x)⇒ (∀X : PA.RΣX = SΣX) (3.67)
(∀ x : A.R.x = S.x)⇒ (∀X : PA.RΠX = SΠX) (3.68)
and
(∀X.RΣX = SΣX)⇒ R = S (3.69)
(∀X.RΠX = SΠX)⇒ R = S (3.70)
RΣ and RΠ are readily seen to be dual to one another by:
RΣX = RΠX RΠX = RΣX (3.71)
and we may equivalently express RΣ and RΠ as
RΣX = {y | ∃ x.x ∈ X ∧ xRy} (3.72)
RΠX = {y | ∀ x.x ∈ X⇒ xRy} (3.73)
Some of the useful properties of operators are tabulated below:
Assume X ⊆ A, Y ⊆ A and for all k ∈ K, Xk ⊆ A,
assumptions Σ Π
R, S : A↔ B, R ⊆ S⇒ RΣX ⊆ SΣX R ⊆ S⇒ RΠX ⊆ SΠX (3.74)
R : A↔ B, X ⊆ Y⇒ RΣX ⊆ RΣY X ⊆ Y⇒ RΠX ⊇ RΠY (3.75)
R : A↔ B, RΣ(⋃k Xk) = ⋃k(RΣXk) RΠ(⋃k Xk) = ⋂k(RΠXk) (3.76)
R : A↔ B, RΣ(X1 ∩X2) RΠ(X1 ∩X2) (3.77)
⊆ (RΣX1) ∩ (RΣX2) ⊇ (RΠX1) ∪ (RΠX2) (3.78)
∀ k ∈ K.Rk : A↔ B, (⋃k Rk)ΣX = ⋃k(Rk)ΣX (⋂k Rk)ΠX = ⋂k(Rk)ΠX (3.79)
R : A↔ B, (R∩ S)ΣX ⊆ RΣX ∩ SΣX (R∪ S)ΠX ⊇ RΠX ∪ SΠX (3.80)
R : A↔ B, RΣX = RΠX RΠX = RΣX (3.81)
As examples of operators given:
 ]∈ PPropositions↔ P(Atomic Propositions)
then we may define operators over sets using wlp and sp by:
• wlp( ]) ∈ PP(Atomic Propositions)→ PPPropositions
• sp( ]) ∈ PPPropositions→ PP(Atomic Propositions)
with the meanings:
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wlp( ]): If one starts with a collection of model sets then one gets back a col-
lection of sets that are compatible with all the model sets and not with any
other model set.
sp( ]): If one starts with a collection of sets of propositional sentences then one
gets back all model sets that are derivable from at least one of the starting
sets.
Another interesting pair of operators can be derived from |=: Assignments
↔ Propositions. The first operator takes a collection of assignments and gives
back all the propositions that hold true under all the assignments. This is called
the theory generated by the models. The second operator takes a collection of
propositions and gives back all the models under which all the propositions
hold true. This set is called the set of models generated by the propositions. The
operators are of type:
• Theory : PAssignments→ PPropositions
• Models : PPropositions→ PAssignments
and defined by:
Theory(M) =̂ (|=)Π(M)
Models(S) =̂ ( ˘|=)Π(S)
Expressing these operators in terms of wlp and sp gives:
Theory(M) = sp(R)(M)
Models(S) = wlp(R)(S)
3.6. Closures and Interiors
An often useful property of an operator F : PA→ PB is the fact that it in some
sense takes a set to its ‘completion’ or closure. An operator is said to be a closure
operator when it is:
monotonic: X ⊆ X′ ⇒ FX ⊆ FX′ (3.82)
idempotent: F(FX) = FX (3.83)
increasing: X ⊆ FX (3.84)
For example, given a relation R, the relations R∗ and R+ are a closures of R in this
sense. Moreover, taking ∗ and + as operators on relations ∗, + : (A↔ B)→ (A↔ B),
then both can be seen to be closure operators.
Interior operators are the dual notion to closure operators. The difference is
that rather than being increasing operators, they are decreasing i.e, an operator, G,
obeying GX ⊆ X. That is an operator is an interior operation when it is:
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monotonic: X ⊆ X′ ⇒ GX ⊆ GX′ (3.85)
idempotent: G(GX) = GX (3.86)
decreasing: GX ⊆ X (3.87)
A set X is said to be closed with respect to an operator O if OX ⊆ X. If X is
closed with respect to O and O is monotonic then it is closed with respect to O+
and O∗. For O+ the proof is by induction taking O closure as the base case. The
inductive step is OiX ⊆ X implies Oi+1X ⊆ X by factoring Oi+1X into O(OiX).
By induction OiX ⊆ X, so, by monotonicity, O(OiX) ⊆ O(X) and O(X) ⊆ X.
Yielding Oi+1X ⊆ X. Since all OiX are in X, taking the union over all i now gives
O+X ⊆ X. O∗X ⊆ X follows from adding X ⊆ X.
Since all operators of the form RΣ, for relation R, are monotonic, the result is
quite general.
3.7. Galois Connections and Operators of Relations
It is possible to define other operators from the operators RΣ and RΠ by use of
complement and converse operations. Interestingly, these operators often come
in pairs called Galois Connections. Formally a Galois Connection is a pair of
functions (pi•,pi•) between two partial orders (A,vA) and (B,vB) such that
X vA pi• Y iff pi• X vB Y (3.88)
The function pi• is referred to as the lower adjoint of the connection and pi• as
the upper adjoint.
In our case the partial orders concerned are subset and superset orderings over
the power sets of the domain and range of the underlying relation. The particular
pair of orderings depending on the particular pair of operators involved.
Given a relation R : A↔ B there are four forward Galois Connections in which
the lower connection is of type pi• : PA → PB (and so pi• : PB → PA) and
four backward Galois Connections obtained by using the converse of R so that
the lower connection is of type pi• : PB → PA (and so pi• : PA → PB). In the
following chapters we are particularly concerned with the two connections, the
axiality generated by R and the polarity generated by R11:
Name Upper Lower Law
Axiality R∃X =̂ RΣX R∀Y =̂ R˘ΣY R∃X ⊆ Y ≡ X ⊆ R∀Y (3.89)
Polarity R+X =̂ RΠX R+X =̂ R˘ΠX R+X ⊇ Y ≡ X ⊆ R+Y (3.90)
The principal facts about these operators being:
11There is a potential for confusion between the use of R+ for both an iterated relation and as the
upper adjoint of a relation. The context and implicit typing should normally be sufficient to
determine whether R+ is a binary relation, i.e. an iterate, or an operator, i.e. an upper adjoint.
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Axiality Polarity
R∀ ◦ R∃ is a closure on PA R+ ◦ R+ is a closure on PA
R∃ ◦ R∀ is an interior operator on PB R+ ◦ R+ is a closure on PB
R∃ ◦ R∀ ◦ R∃ = R∃ R+ ◦ R+ ◦ R+ = R+
R∀ ◦ R∃ ◦ R∀ = R∀ R+ ◦ R+ ◦ R+ = R+
Some examples: First let us return to the operators wlp(R) and sp(R).
wlp(R) = R∀
sp(R) = R∃
wlp(R) ◦ sp(R) is a closure operation
sp(R) ◦ wlp(R) is an interior operation
Similarly we may note:
Models = |=+
Theories = |=+
Models ◦ Theories is a closure operation
Theories ◦ Models is a closure operation
We also note that Axialities and Polarities are intimately connected by the
identities:
R+X = R∃X (3.91)
R+X = R∀X (3.92)
these identities allow us to switch back and forth between axiality’s and polarities
whenever the need arises.
Operators derived from binary relations and their Galois Connections often re-
veal interesting relations between well-known functions. Consider the membership
relation of set theory ∈: A↔ PA. First, define set A overlaps set B, written G by
A GB =̂ A∩ B 6= ∅; the collection of sets touching another by: TX =̂ {Y | X G Y};
the collection of sets that contain a particular element x : A, written ↑ x, by
↑x =̂ {y : PA | x ∈ y}; and define UY (for Y : PPA) by UY =̂ {x : A |↑x ⊆ Y}.
Some of the operators derived from ∈ are:
∈∃ X = TX
∈∀ Y = UY
∈˘∃Y =
⋃
Y
∈˘∀X = PX
with the Galois Connections (axialities) being:
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TX ⊆ Y ≡ X ⊆ UY⋃
Y ⊆ X ≡ Y ⊆ PX
Likewise if we introduce the notion of the supersets of a set X of type PA,
written SX, defined by SX =̂ {Y : PA | X ⊆ Y} then the polarities give us:
∈+ X = SX
∈+ Y = ⋂Y
with the Galois Connection:
SX ⊇ Y ≡ X ⊆ ⋂Y
Since we have introduced the overlaps relation for the above example we also
note the rather elegant equivalent definition of R∃ and R∀:
R∃X = {y | X G R˘.y} (3.93)
R∀Y = {x | R.x ⊆ Y} (3.94)
and of R+ and R+:
R+X = {y | X ⊆ R˘.y} (3.95)
R+Y = {x | Y ⊆ R.x} (3.96)
3.8. The Use of Mathematics in Subsequent Chapters
The mathematical tools introduced in this chapter are used in the following manner
in subsequent chapters:
Chapter 4: Simple set theory and the notion of propositional models are used to
formalise the problem of Knowledge on Trust.
Chapter 5: The notions of operators, and Galois connections, derived from binary
relations are used to develope a generalised form of argumentation theory.
This is used in turn to define a theory of Social Trust. Propositions are stated
in the chapter but their proofs are deferred to appendix A.
Appendix A: The proofs of propositions in chapter 5 are given. These proofs rely
on various propositions about operators, Galois connections and reflexive
transitive closures given in the current chapter.
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In which is discussed:
• How obtaining Knowledge on Trust is a process of building a coherent
theory.
• A formal notion of the coherence of a theory.
• How we may reason about coherence.
• Examples of obtaining Knowledge on Trust by coherence based reason-
ing.
4.1. Introduction
This chapter takes up the problem of Knowledge on Trust. The problem of
Knowledge on Trust is pervasive. We gain knowledge by being told things by
others. We gain information from books, newspapers and magazines, from radio
and television and from the Internet. We are told inconsistent things by different
people and when all accounts are in, we are left with an incomplete picture
of situations. Our problem is to make sense out of all this data and arrive at a
consistent account of the world we live in. To do so we must use all the information
at our disposal. We have dispositions with respect to pieces of information and
whether they are intrinsically believable, and we have dispositions towards sources
of information and whether or not they are trustworthy. In this chapter we explore
the use of this latter kind of information to help sort out a consistent account of
the world. Our view of trustworthiness is rarely black and white. More usually
we have some notion of the relativity of trustworthiness. A is more trustworthy than
B but less trustworthy than C and we have no real way of, say, comparing the
trustworthiness of A and D. This chapter considers how we may use the relative
ordering of the trustworthiness of sources to help untangle the inconsistencies we
are presented with and arrive at plausible, consistent, views of the world.
More formally, we consider the general problem of an individual, let us call them
the reasoner, receiving information provided by multiple sources which are held by
the reasoner to have different, possibly incomparable, degrees of trustworthiness.
This relative trustworthiness is represented by a binary relation between sources
that represents the idea that the reasoner holds one source more trustworthy than
another. This relation is not necessarily transitive nor cycle free. The reasoner
wishes to obtain conflict free, maximal, accounts of the world. That is, the reasoner
wishes to incorporate as much information as possible from the sources without
creating inconsistencies. In resolving information conflicts the reasoner casts out
the least preferred information that leads to a conflict, using the relation between
the sources of information.
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Our reasoner strives for coherence in his account of the world. But what exactly
does this mean?
Rather than attempt to develop a new theory of coherence, together with its
justification, this chapter will examine Laurence Bonjour’s model coherence [18].
This theory is then formalised as a mathematical theory and implemented as a
program for coherence based reasoning. The chapter ends with three illustrative
examples of the theory applied to problems of obtaining Knowledge on Trust,
these are:
• Resolving conflicting evidence to arrive at a conclusion in a judicial inquiry.
• Resolving conflicting reports by counter terrorism analysts1.
• Obtaining Knowledge of Identity on Trust within a PKI framework.
This last example serves as bridge into the next chapter.
4.2. A Theory of Coherence
Bonjour proposes that a system of beliefs is coherent if it fulfils five conditions.
First a system of beliefs should be:
1. logically consistent:
That is that it is free from classical logical contradictions.
2. probabilistically consistent:
Probabilistic consistency says that if a reasoner is faced with an inconsistency
that can be avoided by rejecting either one of the observations then the reasoner
will reject the less likely of the two observations. Said differently, the reasoner
has a preference for accepting the more likely observation. This is a special
case of dealing with the relative preferences over relinquishing beliefs to resolve
conflicts. In this case highly probable beliefs are relinquished less willingly
than improbable beliefs. In this work the notion of probability is replaced
by a weaker notion of relative plausibility which is derived from the relative
trustworthiness of the sources.
Further, Bonjour says that the coherence of a system of beliefs is:
3. increased by the presence of inferential connections between its component
beliefs and increased in proportion to the number and strength of such
connections.
4. diminished to the extent to which it is divided into subsystems of beliefs which
are relatively unconnected to each other by inferential connections.
1It should be stressed that these first two examples are completely fictional.
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The notion of “inferential connection” used by Bonjour is intended to capture
an idea of “fitting together” but it is neither deductive entailment, which is
too strong, nor consistency, which is too weak. Rather it captures a correlation
between beliefs such that a reasoner prefers to believe the correlated set of
beliefs whenever this is possible and does not lead to inconsistency. Let us say
that the presence of a belief ϕ leads to or supports a belief ψ, meaning that, if ϕ is
a belief then the reasoner prefers to also believe ψ if that will not cause an incon-
sistency. This is a form of non-monotonic, or default, reasoning. Correlations
are represented as default rules which may be used provided that the particular
use does not introduce an inconsistency. Thus these correlations sit between
laws of deductive entailment and principles of extension by consistency.
Finally Bonjour requires,
5. The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the presence
of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system.
Bonjour illustrates the notion of an anomaly with an example:
“Suppose I am standing three feet from a pole that is four feet high. Next
to my foot is a mouse, and on top of the pole is perched an owl. From these
conditions I may obviously infer, using the Pythagorean theorem, that the
mouse is five feet from the owl. The inference is surely adequate to justify my
belief that the mouse is five feet from the owl, assuming that I am justified in
believing these other propositions. And intuitively speaking, this inferential
connection means that the belief that the mouse is five feet from the owl co-
heres with the rest of my beliefs to quite a significant extent. But none of this
has any apparent connection with explanation. In particular, as Lehere points
out, the inference does not in any way help to explain [Bonjour’s emphasis]
why the mouse is so close to the owl. ”
Perhaps the most significant thing here is the unstated assumption that the
fact that the mouse is five feet from the owl needs explanation. By default we are
required to assume that the mouse is aware of the presence of the owl. That the
mouse prefers not to be in the presence of an owl because of its survival instincts.
That “being in the presence of” is satisfied by “being within five feet of”. And it is
the incoherence of these propositions with our extended belief system that causes
an anomaly. Viewed differently, this little story tells us that there are at least two
belief systems in play, the Pythagorean system about geometry and measurement,
and the Animal Behaviour system about animal behaviours and interactions. The
geometrical part of the story is well supported by the Pythagorean belief system but
the pertaining predator-prey relationship is in conflict with the Animal Behaviour
belief system. This suggests that what is at issue is that we can obtain a logically
consistent theory only at the expense of excluding some highly preferred belief,
in this case the belief that mouse should not be in such an exposed position with
respect to the owl.
An anomaly then arises when to arrive at a consistent set of beliefs we must
exclude something that is at least as preferred as what we believe in the consistent
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set of beliefs. An anomaly may be removed by further information. If we consider
Bonjour’s story of the mouse and owl above then we might suggest the explanation
that the human placed the mouse at his foot, thus placing the mouse near the owl.
The naive observation that the mouse is near the owl causes an anomaly. However
the elaboration that the mouse was placed there by the human provides reasons
why the Animal Behaviour belief system may be inhibited and not come into play
in reasoning about the owl and the mouse.
Below, a formal model is constructed for the fragment consisting of conditions
1, 2 and 5. This system will be called Preferential Coherence. It is then shown
how the “correlation conditions”, 3 and 4, can be interpreted within Preferential
Coherence.
An area that Bonjour does not address is what to do, if after applying all of
the coherence conditions, we are still left in “two (or more) minds” i.e. if rather
than being left with a single coherent system of beliefs, we are left with multiple
alternative equally plausible belief systems (which necessarily must be inconsistent
with one another). Rather than posit further rules to reduce such a set down to a
single belief system the approach taken here adopts the approach used in both non-
monotonic and paraconsistent logics and defines a process of drawing inferences
from alternative collections of beliefs. Given a collection of equally plausible sets
of beliefs, inferences may be drawn either sceptically or credulously. A conclusion
is sceptically true if it follows from every alternative system. A conclusion is
credulously true if it follows from any of the alternative belief systems. A small
refinement can be made to credulous conclusions in that a credulous conclusion
may be arrived at because it is true in some of the alternatives and false in others,
or true in some alternatives and open (i.e. neither true nor false) in others. We
will refer to these two cases, as and when the need arises, as being determined and
undetermined cases (i.e. in the first case the truth value is everywhere determined
by the belief systems, whereas in the latter case it is not).
The sceptical approach represents a very conservative position. We might
say we have “every reason” to accept the conclusion. The credulous position,
by contrast, is very liberal. We might say we have “some reason” to accept the
conclusion.
4.3. The Formal Model
The model is one of propositional reasoning via coherence. In the view taken here,
systems of belief are finite collections of statements about the world that originate
from a finite collection of possible sources of information, each of which makes a
finite collection of observations. Sources are ordered by a preference ordering that
represents their relative trustworthiness. An observation, e.g. Freya: ~DS & ~SLW
is a proposition, in this case ~DS & ~SLW (asserting not DS and not SLW), labelled
by the source, Freya, that asserts the proposition. The same proposition may be
asserted by multiple sources.
Formally we will assume that the sets Label and Prop (propositions) are given
and define an observation as a member of the set of pairs of labels and propositions,
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Obs by:
Obs =̂ Label × Prop (4.1)
That is, an Obs is a labelled proposition. Further we will assume that there is
an inconsistency predicate that can tell us if a set of propositions is inconsistent,
incons : P(Prop)→ {0, 1} (note that throughout we will identify a predicate with
the corresponding characteristic function).
Given a set of observations, S, we now define the projection by a set of labels L,
written SL as:
SL =̂ {ϕ | l ∈ L ∧ (l, ϕ) ∈ S} (4.2)
A set of labels, L, is said to be inconsistent with respect to S, written inconsS(L)
when the set of projected propositions is inconsistent i.e. :
inconsS(L) =̂ incons(SL) (4.3)
From here we can define the set of maximally consistent subsets of labels with
respect to some set of observations S.
max S =̂ {X ⊆ Label | ¬ inconsS(X) ∧ ∀Y ⊆ Label.X ⊂ Y⇒ inconsS(Y)} (4.4)
4.3.1. Consistency
Our first coherence condition is that given a set of observations, S, a coherent
belief system, B, should arise from a maximally consistent set of sources:
∃T ∈ max S.B = ST (4.5)
We may visualise this by figure 4.1.
We next consider the two conditions, preference ordering and anomaly freeness,
to potentially reduce the number of acceptable maximally consistent sets.
4.3.2. Preference
Every maximally consistent set is a potential theory. Assuming that our labels
come equipped with a relation  representing a preference ordering between
sources, the preferred theories will be maximally consistent theories that do the
least damage in the preference structure in the sense that holes left by omission of
elements occur as far down the order relation as possible. This notion is captured
by extending the relation  over sets by:
Let us say that one set, X, is a complement cover of another, Y, written X A Y,
when the set of elements of the complement of X cover the elements of the
complement of Y in the sense that:
X w Y =̂ ∀ x ∈ X. ∃ y ∈ Y. y  x (4.6)
X A Y =̂ X w Y ∧ ¬ Y w X (4.7)
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Figure 4.1.: Maximal Source Consistency
where x  y =̂ x  y ∨ x = y.
That is, every time we find something missing from X there is something more
preferred missing from Y but not vice versa.
So, for example, given the ordering z  y1  x2, z  y2  x1 with inconsisten-
cies arising between x1 and y1 and between x2 and y2 the maximal set {z, y1, y2} is
preferred to {z, x1, x2}.
Then we select the A-maximal sets from the maximally consistent sets of labels:
max(S) =̂ {X ∈ max(S) | ¬ ∃Y ∈ max(S). Y A X} (4.8)
4.3.3. Anomalies
Given the apparatus we have already developed, the lack of anomalies is the
requirement that a maximally consistent set of beliefs does not exclude some more
preferred set of beliefs. Such situations can arise with cyclic preferences.
Consider the two examples of a 2-cycle and a 3-cycle illustrated below. In the
2-cycle assume that A and B contradict one another. The maximally consistent
sets are then {A} and {B}. If we select {A} and reject {B} then we do not reject
anything more preferred than {A}.
In the 3-cycle assume that A contradicts B, B contradicts C and C contradicts
A, so again the maximally consistent sets are singletons, {A}, {B} and {C}. Now
however accepting one of them, say {A}, means rejecting a more preferred item C.
Yet, of course, accepting {C} leads to the same problem with B.
76
4.3. The Formal Model
!"
!"
#"
!"
!"
$"#%&'(" )"#%&'("
Figure 4.2.: Cycles
Such anomalies are avoided by filtering theories to exclude those which have
elements outside of the theory which are more preferred than those in the theory.
Specifically, we require the additional condition on theories X that X w X
4.3.4. Correlations
Let ϕ  ψ mean that ϕ leads to or supports ψ. As discussed above, we wish
this to have the meaning that there is a correlation between ϕ and ψ, such that
whenever there is no reason to the contrary, the belief ϕ leads to the belief of ψ by
the reasoner.
Let us now consider a reasoner being supplied with information from a number
of external sources S1, . . . , Sn. The correlation, ϕ  ψ, can be represented by a
labelled conditional D : ϕ⇒ ψ where the label D is chosen to be less than any of
the external sources, i.e. ∀ i.Si  D. Note when ϕ is simply true we are left with
an unconditional default belief, i.e. ψ is assumed whenever it is not contradictory
to do so.
There is considerable freedom for the reasoner to place correlations anywhere
in the source ordering, so the reasoner is free to regard them as less trustworthy
guides than some external sources but more trustworthy than others.
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4.4. A Simple Program
Overview
The theory of coherence reasoning presented above can be effectively automated.
The program which does so is presented in Appendix H.
The program accepts input described by the following syntax:
Description ::= Preference Relation Definition "|"
Source Assertions
hypothesis
List of Hypotheses
Preference Relation Definition ::= (simple | transitive) [List of Chains]
List of Chains ::= Chain ["," Chain]+
Chain ::= Source (> Source)+
Source Assertions ::= Source : Formula
List of Hypotheses ::= Formula ["," Formula]+
with Sources being simple names and Formula being propositional formula with
the usual operator precedence.
So, for example, consider the simple problem of trying to determine the com-
poser of a piece of music using oneself and one’s friends as sources of information.
Suppose I have heard a piece of classical music played on classical guitar. I have
limited knowledge of classical music but I am fairly sure it is either Bach, D.
Scarlatti or S. L. Weiss. If it is Bach I do not know whether it is J.S., C.P.E. or W. F.
Bach but, by default, I would assume it is C.P.E. because of some similarities with
other C.P.E. works I have heard played on other instruments.
I describe the music to friends that have varying degrees of expertise in music.
Let us call the friends Efran, Freya, Gabbo and Hebe with Efran > Gabbo, Freya >
Gabbo, Efran > Hebe, Efran > Hebe. As I talk to them in turn my opinion on who
composed the music evolves as I receive new information.
If we use the initials of the possible composers to stand for the predicate that
the composer wrote the work, then the initial problem description before we have
any input from our friends is:
transitive
Certain > Efran, Certain > Freya,
Gabbo > Default, Hebe > Default,
Efran > Gabbo, Freya > Gabbo, Efran > Hebe, Efran > Hebe |
Certain: JSB & ~ CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & WFB & ~DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & SLW ,
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Default: CPEB
hypothesis
JSB,
CPEB,
WFB,
DS,
SLW
The keyword transitive, at the beginning of the problem description, means
that the preference relation between sources is taken to be transitive and the
transitive closure should be taken of the given preference relation (otherwise we
would use the keyword simple to indicate that the relation is to be taken simply
as specified without taking the transitive closure of given preference relation).
The sources Certain and default capture what I am certain of and my default
assumption about the composer. My preference over sources is transitive and
I prefer my certainty to any other information but my default is weaker than
any other source of information. This results in the overall preference ordering
displayed in figure 4.3. My hypotheses list is a list of simple propositions that one
of the composers wrote the music. Since my default is CPEB and nothing stronger
is known the program finds this sceptically true and, because of the exclusivity
clause, that all other conclusions are sceptically false.
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Figure 4.3.: Music Example Ordering
As outputs the program produces a summary of the input, in the form of a
description of the ordering relation and the assumptions of each source, and a list
of the maximal sets of sources, the “core beliefs” which are the source assertions
which hold in every maximal set (if any) and the status of the hypotheses. For this
example these look like:
Ordering
Certain > Efran,
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Certain > Freya,
Gabbo > Default,
Hebe > Default,
Efran > Gabbo,
Freya > Gabbo,
Efran > Hebe,
Certain > Gabbo,
Certain > Hebe,
Efran > Default,
Freya > Default,
Certain > Default
Maximal Sets
{Certain,Default}
Assertions
Certain: JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~SLW +
~JSB & CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & WFB & ~DS & ~SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & DS & ~SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & SLW
Default: CPEB
Core Beliefs
Certain: JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~SLW +
~JSB & CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & WFB & ~DS & ~SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & DS & ~SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & SLW
Default: CPEB
Hypothesis
scep ~JSB
scep CPEB
scep ~WFB
scep ~DS
scep ~SLW
The output hypotheses are formulas with a prefix indicating whether they
are sceptically true, credulously true and determined or credulously true and
undetermined (see 4.2 above). In this case all hypothesis have the prefix scep,
indicating they are all sceptically true.
If we continue the example with:
• Freya saying that it is neither Scarlatti nor Weiss.
• Gabbo saying it is W.F. Bach.
• Efran saying he can rule out Weiss, and if it is Bach then it is definitely not
W. F. Bach.
• And Hebe saying it is definitely J. S. Bach or Scarlatti.
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then input becomes
transitive
Certain > Efran, Certain > Freya,
Gabbo > Default, Hebe > Default,
Efran > Gabbo, Freya > Gabbo, Efran > Hebe, Efran > Gabbo |
Certain: JSB & ~ CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & WFB & ~DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & SLW ,
Freya: ~DS & ~SLW,
Gabbo: WFB,
Efran: ~SLW & ~WFB,
Hebe: JSB + DS,
Default: CPEB
hypothesis
JSB,
CPEB,
WFB,
DS,
SLW
and the significant parts of the output:
Maximal Sets
{Certain,Freya,Efran,Hebe}
Core Beliefs
Certain: JSB & ~ CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & WFB & ~DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & DS & ~ SLW +
~JSB & ~CPEB & ~WFB & ~DS & SLW ,
Freya: ~DS &
~SLW
Efran: ~SLW &
~WFB
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Hebe: JSB + DS
Hypothesis
scep JSB
scep ~CPEB
scep ~WFB
scep ~DS
scep ~SLW
That is I conclude the piece is by J. S. Bach. In doing so I have discarded both
my default assertion and Gabbo’s assertions.
The Workings
The program is written as a functional program in Haskell. It calculates the
maximally consistent sets using a simple tableaux theorem prover to derive the
inconsistency of sets of theorems associated with sets of sources and then filters
the maximal consistent sets of sources by the complement cover relation and the
anomaly freeness condition calculated from the preference relation definition. The
keyword transitive in the relation definition causes the transitive closure of the
source preference relation to be built before it is used to produce the complement
cover relation.
The truth status of the hypotheses is calculated by again using tableaux to
derive the status of each hypothesis in each maximal set and labelling the output
accordingly i.e.
• Sceptically true if the hypothesis follows from every maximal set.
• Sceptically false (indicated by negation of the hypothesis) if its negation
follows from every maximal set.
• Credulously Determined (Credulous D) if its truth follows from some maxi-
mal sets and its falsehood follows from all others.
• Credulously Not Determined (Credulous N) if its truth follows from some
maximal sets but it is not determined by some maximal sets.
• Non Determined (ND) if every maximal set fails to determine the hypothe-
sis2.
2Subsequently a more refined analysis has suggested itself. The weakness of the current analysis
is that credulously true does not convey sufficient information about what is known from the
analysis. An alternative analysis reflecting a more refined analysis is given by:
– Everywhere true if the hypothesis follows from every maximal set.
– Everywhere false (indicated by negation of the hypothesis) if its negation follows from every
maximal set.
– Partially true if the hypothesis is either true in some sets and undetermined in all others.
– Partially false if the hypothesis is either false in some sets and undetermined in all others.
– Conflicted if there are some sets in which the hypothesis is true and others in which it is false.
Note in this case there may be sets where it is undetermined, but the distinction between true
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The limits on the complexity of the program is determined by the complexity
of finding propositional models, and so the program is NP-complete. However
this is not the whole of the complexity story. The program uses a very simple
technique of model finding and proof based on propositional tableaux. Using a
modern SAT solver for these tasks would vastly improve the practical scalability
of the coherence reasoning process (an overview and empirical study of modern
SAT solvers can be found in Sakallah and Marques-Silva [97]).
The program listing is given in appendix H.
4.5. Knowledge on Trust Reasoning Examples
We consider three examples in which Knowledge on Trust plays a central role.
The first is a judicial inquiry. In this problem the reasoner is a judge that must
weigh evidence from various sources and arrive at a conclusion. The testimony is
given by people of various standing, and support by various degrees of evidence.
The second is reasoning in the Intelligence Community in which the reasoner is
an Intelligence Analyst trying to draw conclusions about a possible terrorist plot.
The example illustrates how Preferential coherence can be used to formalise aspects
of Heuer’s Alternative Competing Hypothesis model of intelligence Reasoning
[61].
The third example addresses the problem of reasoning about identity and, in
particular, to reasoning about identity online.
4.5.1. A Judicial Inquiry
Our first example is driven by formalising Safety Cases as used in the public
domain i.e. the kinds of argument that one finds taking place at public inquiries
into the safety of a proposed new facility such as a Nuclear Power Station or, more
mundanely, the placement of a radio mast. In such examples both experts and
members of the public produce testimony in relation to the facility, its effects on
the environment and its effects on people. Generally there is no clear cut correct
decision. Rather, there are a number of possible outcomes which are determined
by how the testimony is weighed by the assessor. In this case the notion of trust
in the testimony is usually not a question as to whether individuals are being
truthful, but rather a matter of how qualified they are to produce their opinions.
Here there is a promise by the testifiers to be honest and disclosing, not only given
implicitly, but given explicitly, often by oath, and under the force of law. The
judgements to be made are about the respective degrees to which each witness
in the proceedings is competent and knowledgeable on the subjects on which they
testify3.
Turning to the example:
or false everywhere and true, false or undetermined does not suggest a useful distinction.
– Undetermined everywhere.
3This is not to say that honesty and candidness may not become an issue in some proceedings, but
rather by-and-large these are not normally the primary issues of such enquiries.
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A company intends to place a radio transmitter mast in a location near a
school. Legislation permits the company to operate in one of two bands, Band
X and Band Y. Recent medical opinion from extensive experimentation on
mice is that Band X is unsafe. An expert biophysicist believes that if Band
X is unsafe then the same is true of Band Y. Although he has no explicit
experimental evidence to back this up, he has great experience in assessing
biological impacts of electromagnetic emissions. A technical expert is willing
to testify that the company operates in Band Y.
We might consider the ordering of plausibility of this evidence as: legislation is
the most definite fact, the medical expertise and the technical expertise are on a
par and that the biophysicist is expressing an opinion which is less well founded
i.e. legislation > medicalExpertise, legislation > technicalExpertise, legislation >
biophysicist, medicalExpertise > biophysicist, technicalExpertise > biophysicist4
(see figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4.: Judicial Enquiry Ordering
The conclusion we arrive at is that it is unsafe to place the transmitter mast
given the best evidence available. If now, however, additional evidence:
A new medical expert produces evidence to the effect that the same experi-
ments, that were performed on mice using Band X, were performed on mice
using Band Y and that there were no ill effects.
then we would revise our conclusion, even if the biophysicist still holds the same
opinion about the relation between Band X and Band Y. The reason we revise
our assessment is that the new medical claim is stronger than the biophysicist’s
opinion because it is backed by experimental evidence.
In essence the overall safety case can be expressed as the hypothesis ‘safe’
follows from the most plausible theory we can construct given the available
sources of evidence and our relative evaluations of the plausibility, reliability or
trustworthiness of the evidence.
Using the formalism of the Preferential Coherence Calculator, the first version
of the overall safety case can be expressed as:
4This may be simplified by taking the relation as transitive.
84
4.5. Knowledge on Trust Reasoning Examples
transitive
legislation > medicalExpertise, legislation > technicalExpertise,
medicalExpertise > biophysicist, technicalExpertise > biophysicist |
legislation: (BandX & ~BandY) + (~BandX & BandY),
medicalExpertise: BandX => ~safe,
biophysicist: (BandX => ~safe) => (BandY => ~safe),
technicalExpertise: ~BandX
hypothesis
safe
which leads to the conclusions:
Maximal Sets
{legislation
,medicalExpertise
,biophysicist
,technicalExpertise}
Hypothesis
scep ~safe
and the second by the same facts with the medical evidence for Band Y added:
transitive
legislation > medicalExpertise, legislation > technicalExpertise,
medicalExpertise > biophysicist, technicalExpertise > biophysicist |
legislation: (BandX & ~BandY) + (~BandX & BandY),
medicalExpertise: BandX => ~safe,
medicalExpertise: BandY => safe,
biophysicist: (BandX => ~safe) => (BandY => ~safe),
technicalExpertise: ~BandX
hypothesis
safe
which leads to the conclusions:
Maximal Sets
{legislation
,medicalExpertise
,technicalExpertise}
Hypothesis
scep safe
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4.5.2. Intelligence Analysis
The second example is taken from the more complex problem of reasoning about
Intelligence data. This domain is more complex because, unlike the case above, we
are concerned with making judgements about the honesty and candidness of our
sources, as well as their degree of competence and knowledge.
It is an attempt to formalise part of a proposed systematic approach to Intelli-
gence data analysis set forth by Richard Heuer in his book “The Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis" [61]. Heuer, as the book title suggests, is primarily con-
cerned with the psychology of Intelligence Analysts and how analysts can become
trapped into seeking evidence to support preconceived conclusions rather than
finding the best conclusion that fits the facts available. As part of his solution to
the problem Heuer sets out an approach to Intelligence Analysis based on compar-
ing Alternative Competing Hypotheses (ACH). Jack Davis, in the introduction to
Heuer’s book [61, page xxiii ], describes ACH succinctly:
At the core of ACH is the notion of competition among a series of plausible
hypotheses to see which ones survive a gauntlet of testing for compatibility
with available information. The surviving hypotheses - those that have not
been disproved - are subjected to further testing. ACH, Heuer concedes, will
not always yield the right answer. But it can help analysts overcome the
cognitive limitations discussed in his book.
For our purposes we may split Heuer’s analysis into hypothesis formation,
which inherently relies on the analyst’s experience to form “good” alternative
hypotheses, and the evaluation of the consistency of those hypotheses with various
reports. It is the latter part of the process for which we use coherence based
reasoning. Heuer uses an informal logic for performing this process. Other authors
have formalised Heuer’s approach in a probabilistic setting. The problem with
this is that whereas certain sources of information have well ascribed probabilities,
other sources do not and the assignment of probabilities is performed to rank
the relative credence one should place in the sources. This forces a total order
on sources that may be inappropriate. The alternative taken here is the use of
transitive binary relation to “order” the sources by relative trustworthiness.
The essence of the proposal here is that sources of information, including the
agent’s own insights and experience, can be ordered according to trustworthiness,
and the maximum amount of information should be used that is compatible with
the avoidance of contradictions. In the case of contradictions, information should
be discarded in a manner that does least damage to the preference ordering.
As an example, we consider a situation in which an analyst has various sources
of information about a possible terrorist attack. Firstly, she has specific knowledge
of attacks acquired over the years which places bounds on her expectations of the
terrorist activities. This knowledge is incomplete and may be incorrect but it is the
most certain knowledge she has. Then there is information that she may obtain
from sources such as telephone intercepts, police reports, sightings at transit points
and informers. This information has various degrees of credibility and can be
arranged in a hierarchy. The general rule is that she will consider all information
as true unless a conflict arises between sources. In such cases she will discard the
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less credible sources involved in the conflict in order to gain consistency. Note that
this will mean a single conflict causes all the information provided by the least
credible sources to be disregarded. If this is an issue for a particular source, e.g.
the source is regarded as more credible for certain types of information than for
others, this is handled by splitting the source into multiple independent sources,
each providing a part of the source’s information.
Our analyst has a set of background assumptions built up from experience:
• That potential terrorists fall into two categories, Professional and Ama-
teur. Professionals are further divided into Career terrorists and Disposable
terrorists. Career terrorists carry out repeated acts of terrorism whereas Dis-
posable terrorists carry out suicide missions. Professionals tend to operate
with support teams and the identification of the presence of a support team
is sufficient to indicate an attack will be professional.
• The modes of attack that are available are Sniper, Bomb and Mortar, with
Bomb divided into Placeable, Car Bomb and Suicide Bomb. A career terrorist
may attack as a Sniper, with a Placeable Bomb or with a Mortar.
• A Disposable terrorist will attack with a Suicide Bomb or a Car Bomb (which
is often regarded as a form of Suicide Bomb). And an Amateur will act as a
Sniper or use a Suicide Bomb.
• The only true distance attack option is the Mortar and this is only used by
Career terrorists.
• Amateurs will use homemade explosives, whereas professionals will steal
or purchase explosives, or purchase explosive precursors (not necessarily
legally).
• The quantity of materials involved will indicate the likely size of an explosive
device. So reports of theft or purchase of small quantities of explosive will
indicate Placeable or Suicide Bombs, whereas large quantities will indicate
Car Bombs. Purchase of large quantities of precursors will indicate a Car
Bomb but purchase of small quantities of precursors is likely to go unnoticed
and also is unlikely to be indicative (since by their very nature they can be
purchased for legitimate ends).
• Career terrorists always have an escape plan, Amateur and Disposable ones
do not need one.
For this particular example we will assume that the analyst believes there will
only be a single attack (as opposed to the possibility of multiple simultaneous
attacks).
In addition to these background assumptions, the analyst also has some weak
default assumptions that, given no evidence to the contrary, the analyst takes as
good working hypotheses. In this case:
• The attack will be carried out by an amateur.
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The analyst partially orders the information sources by reliability and trustwor-
thiness. In doing so she must also assess where her own assumptions sit with
respect to other sources of information. For example, she may regard intercepts
and police reports as definite pieces of information that are more reliable than her
own assumptions, whereas she may regard sightings as less reliable, and informers
as simply less trustworthy than her own background assumptions (but as a more
reliable guide than her default assumptions). In examining her own background
assumptions she might find that they fit into logical groupings such that, if any
item in the grouping was to be contradicted by a preferred source, then she would
give up the entire group of assumptions. In this example we divide the analyst’s
background assumptions up into assumptions about the weapons that might
be used in an attack (WEAPONS), assumptions about the type of attacker (AT-
TACKER TYPE), assumptions about the preferred weapons associated with a type
of attacker (ATTACKER PREFERENCES) and assumptions about whether there is
a single or multiple attack (SINGLE ATTACK) and, if the attack uses explosives,
whether or not there is a single type of bomb involved (SINGLE BOMB TYPE).
The preference ordering is illustrated in figure 4.5 (there may also be a set of
definitions which is taken as trustworthy, one might say, by definition).
The analyst also forms a collection of hypotheses of interest, in this case:
• Type of attacker:
– Amateur,
– Professional:
* Career,
* Disposable
• Type of attack:
– Bomb:
* Placeable Bomb,
* Suicide Bomb,
* Car Bomb
– Sniper,
– Mortar
The Preferential Coherence model of the situation is:
transitive
DEF > INTERCEPT,
DEF > POLICE,
INTERCEPT > RULESW,
INTERCEPT> RULEST,
INTERCEPT > RULESP,
INTERCEPT > RULESE1,
INTERCEPT > RULESB,
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ATTACKER_PREFERENCES 
INTERCEPTS  POLICE REPORTS 
SIGHTINGS 
INFORMER1  INFORMER2 
DEFAULT_ASSUMPTIONS 
WEAPONS  ATTACKER_TYPE  SINGLE_ATTACK  SINGLE_BOMB_TYPE 
DEFINITIONS 
Figure 4.5.: Information Source Ordering
INTERCEPT > RULESE2,
POLICE > RULESW,
POLICE > RULEST,
POLICE > RULESP,
POLICE > RULESE1,
POLICE > RULESB,
POLICE > RULESE2,
RULESW > SIGHTINGS,
RULEST > SIGHTINGS,
RULESP > SIGHTINGS,
RULESE1 > SIGHTINGS,
RULESB > SIGHTINGS,
RULESE2 > SIGHTINGS,
SIGHTINGS > INFORMER1,
SIGHTINGS > INFORMER2,
INFORMER1 > ASSUMPTIONS,
INFORMER2 > ASSUMPTIONS |
DEF: Professional <=> Career + Disposable,
DEF: BombThreat <=> PlaceableBomb + CarBomb + SuicideBomb,
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RULESW: QuantityTheftExplosive + QuantityPurchasedPrecursors
=> CarBomb,
RULESW: SmuggledRifle + PurchasedRifle => Sniper,
RULESW: DistanceAttack => Mortar,
RULESW: SmallTheftExplosive + SmallPurchaseExplosive
=> PlaceableBomb + SuicideBomb,
RULESW: QuantityTheftExplosive + SmallTheftExplosive
=> Professional,
RULEST: Support => Professional,
RULEST: QuantityPurchasedPrecursors => Career,
RULEST: EscapePlan => Career,
RULEST: ~ EscapePlan => Disposable + Amateur,
RULESP: Disposable => SuicideBomb + CarBomb,
RULESP: Career => PlaceableBomb + Mortar,
RULESP: Amateur => SuicideBomb + CarBomb + Sniper,
RULESP: Mortar => Professional,
RULESE1: (Career & ~ Disposable & ~ Amateur) +
(~ Career & Disposable & ~ Amateur) +
(~ Career & ~ Disposable & Amateur),
RULESB: BombThreat =>
(PlaceableBomb & ~CarBomb & ~SuicideBomb) +
(~ PlaceableBomb & CarBomb & ~SuicideBomb) +
(~ PlaceableBomb & ~CarBomb & SuicideBomb),
RULESE2: (Sniper & ~ Mortar & ~ BombThreat) +
(~ Sniper & Mortar & ~BombThreat) +
(~ Sniper & ~ Mortar & BombThreat),
ASSUMPTIONS: Amateur,
INTERCEPT: BombThreat,
SIGHTINGS: Support,
POLICE: SmallTheftExplosive,
INFORMER1: Sniper,
INFORMER2: ~ EscapePlan,
INTERCEPT: EscapePlan,
INTERCEPT: PlaceableBomb & Sniper
90
4.5. Knowledge on Trust Reasoning Examples
hypothesis
Amateur,
Professional,
Career,
Disposable,
PlaceableBomb,
SuicideBomb,
Sniper,
CarBomb,
Mortar
The conclusion obtained from this input is
Maximal Sets
{DEF, RULESW, RULEST, RULESP, RULESE1,
RULESB, INTERCEPT, SIGHTINGS, POLICE
,INFORMER1}
Hypothesis
scep ~Amateur
scep Professional
scep Career
scep ~Disposable
scep PlaceableBomb
scep ~SuicideBomb
scep Sniper
scep ~CarBomb
ND Mortar
That is, the analyst concludes that the information sceptically supports the
hypothesis that she is dealing with a career terrorist, who will mount an attack by
using a placeable bomb and combined with a sniper attack. The analysis leaves
the question of a mortar attack undetermined.
The example, as presented here, is static. A dynamic version is presented in
the author’s paper “Boolean Coherence and the ACH method” [53], in which
information is acquired dynamically and the best estimate of the situation changes
non-monotonically in response to each additional piece of information.
In the dynamic version the source assertions are added incrementally with a
step in the calculation being a source making a report. The result is a changing
pattern of assessments with hypotheses switching between confirmed (sceptically
true), denied (sceptically false) and undetermined as each new update occurs. The
resulting output table is reproduced here as table 4.1. This table highlights the
difficulty of taking actions in many situations. Not only must one choose an action
that is appropriate for the situation as currently perceived, but one must choose
an action that minimises one’s regret should that perception be in error due to
lack of crucial information.
91
4. Knowledge on Trust
TIME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SOURCE INTERCEPT SIGHTINGS POLICE INFORMER INFORMER INTERCEPT INTERCEPT
REPORTS 1 2
REPORT Bomb Support Small Theft Sniper No Escape Escape Plan also Sniper
Threat Explosive Plan
Amateur + - - - - - -
Professional - + + + + + +
Career - +/- +/- +/- - + +
Disposable - +/- +/- +/- + - -
Bomb Threat + + + + + + +
Placeable Bomb - +/- +/- +/- - + +
Suicide Bomb +/- +/- +/- +/- + - -
Car Bomb +/- +/- - - - - -
Sniper - - - - - - +
Mortar - - - - - - +/-
Table 4.1.: Evolution of Hypotheses
4.5.3. Reasoning about Identity and Certificate Authorities
The problem of finding sufficient grounds for establishing identity has a long
pedigree in both fact and fiction. For example, the perennial plot of the long lost
heir that appears to claim an inheritance, or the sixteenth century story of Martin
Guerre5.
5The basic story of Martin Guerre is well known and has been dramatised in books, film and on
stage, as well as being document in historical accounts. The basic outline of the story is:
1538 Aged 14, Martin married Bertrande de Rols.
1546 After 8 years Bertrande bears Martin their first child, a son.
1548 Martin disappears after his father accuses him of theft.
1556 A man claiming to be Martin returns to Bertrande. Martin’s farther is dead and Bertrande,
Martin’s uncle Pierre and Martin’s 4 sisters all accept the man as Martin.‘Martin’ lives with
Bertrande for 3 years. Bertrande bears him 2 children. He also claims his inheritance from his
father’s estate
1559 A soldier passing through the village claims that ‘Martin’ is an impostor and the real Martin
lost a leg during the wars. Pierre and his sons-in-law attack ‘Martin’ but Bertrande intervenes.
A trial ensues in which ‘Martin’ is accused of being an impostor. He is acquitted.
1560 Pierre discovers witnesses as to the true identity of the impostor. A second trial ensues and
this time ‘Martin’ loses and is sentenced to death. ‘Martin’ appeals against the verdict. The
appeal is going well and the appeal judge favours ‘Martin’s’ account that Pierre has bribed
witnesses to perjure themselves. At this point a man with a wooden leg appears and claims
to be the real Martin Guerre. Pierre, Bertrande and Martin’s 4 sisters agree that the newcomer
is the real Martin Guerre and the impostor is found guilty. In September 1560 the impostor is
sentenced to death. At some point after sentencing the impostor confesses and explains how
one day he was mistaken for the long vanished Martin by two people and how these two
helped him learn details of Martin’s life.
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Once continuity of presence is lost and time has passed, establishing identity
rapidly becomes difficult. Taking the problem to a further level, is the novel
“WHO” by Algis Budrys. Set against a cold war background, Budrys considers
what happens when both continuity of contact and the identifying features of
an individual are lost. All that is left is what the individual can recount and, to
some extent, what the individual can do. In the novel the central character, cannot
re-establish his identity, and is forced to build a new life and a new identity.
But all this begs the question as to what we mean by identity?
Our interest in identity is not an interest in identity for itself. Rather, we are
interested in identity because it gives us access to other information about people.
If I know the identity of someone, then I may know, perhaps because I have been
told by others, where they live, or what their credit rating is, or whether, or not,
they are honest. In this sense, identity is quite a practical matter. Our interest is in
the information that we can derive from identity and in the use of that information
to make various judgements about others6.
The practical problem of identity is that of tying some token, or some indicator
of identity, to some information the token is intended to guarantee. Thus practical
identity is not a fixed notion but varies according to context. For example, from
the point of issuing an ATM card, the only real concern of the bank is that you are
the account holder. From the point of view of using an ATM, the only concern of
the bank is that the right combination of card and PIN have been presented, there
being a contract in place between you and the bank that the PIN has not been
disclosed to others and so can stand in lieu of your identity. From the point of
view of creating an account, the bank is required, by law, to use a stronger notion
of identity, usually multiple pieces of documentary proof of identity, as part of
governmental measures against money laundering and organised crime.
The general pattern of establishing identities is illustrated by the ATM example.
An identity is established by carrying out some checks. Some token of identity
is then established and this token can be used in place of performing the checks
on future occasions. As the tokens stand in lieu of checks they may themselves
be used as part of the process of establishing further tokens for other contexts.
This includes using multiple tokens to cross validate identity before a new token
is established, as required, for example, to open a bank account7.
Tokens themselves are of two forms. They may be natural tokens which exist
in some natural correspondence to the property concerned so that association, once
established, is undeniable, or unfakable. In this case the issue is one of the safety
of the recording of the association. Alternatively it may be an artificial token which
exists in some artificially maintained correspondence with the property, which is to say
it is a matter of convention, in which case it is underwritten by some mechanism
that maintains the convention. At issue here is both the safety of the recording of
6Identity is therefore a social phenomenon. Identity exists only in relation to others and tokens
of identity carry the meaning of one group guaranteeing some property or behaviour of an
individual to another group.
7Note that the notion of token here includes such measures as a person recognising a face, the
scanning of a fingerprint, the taking of a DNA sample, as well as the issuing of a card, documents,
PIN, digital certificate or password.
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the correspondence and the safety of the maintenance of the convention8.
As the web of tokens around an individual becomes dense the individual’s
position in society becomes more defined and the individual finds it increasingly
easy to establish yet more tokens for different purposes. This rich web of tokens
corresponds to a rich set of abstract mechanisms for trust, each underwritten by
the processes of establishing the token and maintaining the token’s validity over
time.
The exemplar of identity in the online world is Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Much has been written about PKI from the point of view of cryptography and
security. And the exemplar of its failure is that of DigiNotar as discussed in the
thesis introduction. Here we address the trust aspects of PKI and see how local
failures undermine trust in identities. Since we are concerned with the trust model
rather than engineering we may elide many technical details and describe matters
simply.
The security of the PKI model is based on the idea that it is possible to pass
documents around in some manner, such that their contents are private, that it is
not possible to tamper with their contents, and that the documents can be signed
in such a way that the signature is unforgeable and uniquely identifies the signer.
Within this framework it is possible for an individual to produce a document to
attest to the identity of the signer of another document. Generally documents are
used to make claims about the trustworthiness of individuals for some purpose
or role. We will elide this latter detail in our treatment since, although it is of
practical importance, it adds little to the discussion of identity on trust. We will
call a signed document making an identity claim a certificate. More specifically
a certificate makes a conditional identity claim of the form if A is Trustworthy for
identity then B is Trustworthy for identity where A is the signer of the certificate and
B is some other individual. So the certificate is essentially a message from the
signer saying, if you trust in my identity and you trust me to make claims about
the identity of others then you can trust this other. Clearly it is possible to build
chains of these certificates, leading from trust in the signer at the beginning of the
chain to trust in an individual at the end of the chain, provided, of course, we
have trust in the intermediaries to make claims about the identity of others.
Here we see a pattern. We trust someone because there is a believable claim that
they are trustworthy and we wish to trust them, as captured by the conditional
assertion on our part that trustworthiness implies trust9. The trustworthiness
assertions are generally also conditional since, to believe them, we need to trust
the source of the assertion. So there must be some licensing assertion to convert
the conditional assertion into a simple fact.
A typical real world situation is where an organisation takes on the role of a
Public Certificate Authority which will issue certificates for the identity of some
Company Certificate authority, which will in turn issue certificates for the identity
of the Company Websites. Reasoning about the validity of a website identity then
8Traditional systems and cryptographic security are concerned with the mechanisms by which
tokens are bound to the properties and how the binding is recorded. Economic and game theoretic
views of security can be seen as addressing aspects of how the conventions are maintained.
9Without this assertion on our part then an individual can be as trustworthy as we like without us
actually trusting them.
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has the following pattern:
• I am willing to trust the Company Website if the Company Certificate
Authority has issued a certificate for the website and I trust the Company
Certificate Authority.
• I am willing to trust the Company Certificate Authority if a Public Certificate
Authority has issued a certificate for the Company Certificate Authority and
I trust the Public Certificate Authority.
• The Company Certificate Authority has issued a certificate for the website.
• Generally, unless there are reasons to the contrary, I am willing to believe
the company issues its certificates responsibly.
• A Public Certificate Authority has issued a certificate for the Company
Certificate Authority.
• A licensing body says the Public Certificate Authority is trustworthy in the
matter of issuing company certificates
• Generally, unless there are reasons to the contrary, the assertions of the
licensing body about trustworthiness are to be believed.
Let License be the licensing body CA be the public certificate authority, CompanyAuth
be the company certificate authority, CompanyWeb be the company web site and let
• TrustCompanyWeb stand for “I trust the company website”.
• TrustworthyCompanyWeb stand for “The company website is trustworthy”.
• TrustworthyCompanyAuth stand for “The company certificate authority is
trustworthy”.
• TrustworthyCA stand for “The public certificate authority is trustworthy”.
simple |
Me: TrustworthyCompanyWeb => TrustCompanyWeb,
CompanyAuth: TrustworthyCompanyAuth => TrustworthyCompanyWeb,
CA: TrustworthyCA => TrustworthyCompanyAuth,
License: TrustworthyCA
hypothesis
TrustCompanyWeb
From which we draw the conclusion that the hypothesis is sceptically true and we
can sceptically trust the company website. If now we see a story in a newspaper
to the effect that CA is untrustworthy because of a failure of internal procedures i.e.
adding the condition:
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News: ~ TrustworthyCA
then the hypothesis becomes non-defined, i.e we cannot conclude trust nor lack of
trust in the website, because the claim of the licensing body has been undermined
by News. Indeed there are two possible interpretations of the world, one in which
News is correct and one in which License is correct. If we order the information
sources News and License, with News > License, then we can conclude that CA is
not trustworthy, but this still means that we can only conclude that we cannot
determine whether or not to trust the company website. However if we had the
preference order the other way around i.e. License > News, then the trust in the
licensing body would not be undermined and we could establish sceptical trust in
the website.
In this case we have modelled the idea that the newspaper attacks the claims
of the licensing body that CA is trustworthy. But the paper might also attack the
claims of the CA directly by saying the certificates content cannot be trusted i.e. the
claim TrustworthyCA => TrustworthyCompanyAuth is untrustworthy. Again trust
in the website collapses as the chain of inferences supporting that trustworthiness
of the website is undermined.
Elaborating the example to consider multiple Public Certificate Authorities
allows us to examine issues around cross signing between Public Authorities10.
In this case we will assume two Public Certificate Authorities, two Company
Certificate Authority and two Company Websites.
simple |
Me: TrustworthyCompanyWeb1 => TrustCompanyWeb1,
CompanyAuth1: TrustworthyCompanyAuth1 => TrustworthyCompanyWeb1,
CA1: TrustworthyCA1 => TrustworthyCompanyAuth1,
License: TrustworthyCA1,
Me: TrustworthyCompanyWeb2 => TrustCompanyWeb2,
CompanyAuth2: TrustworthyCompanyAuth2 => TrustworthyCompanyWeb2,
CA2: TrustworthyCA2 => TrustworthyCompanyAuth2,
License: TrustworthyCA2
hypothesis
TrustCompanyWeb1,
TrustCompanyWeb2
In the first instance we model the situation in which I wish to visit the websites
of two different companies, we regard the licensing body as licensing trust in both
10The original 1978 certificate PKI model of Loren Kohnfelder [63] envisaged a single “root”
Public Certificate Authority at the start of all certificate chains. When certificate systems were
implemented commercially this did not happen and many distinct Public Certificate Authorities
emerged. The practical problem then arose of trusting certificates signed by different authorities
leading to a proliferation of root certificates on computers. To ease the problem authorities
adopted a cross signing approach where each authority asserted the trustworthiness of the other
authorities. So the chain up to an authority could be continued by another authority.
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Public Certificate Authorities and there is no cross signing. If nothing else is added
then I trust both Company Websites.
If we prefer News over License and the source News undermines the licensing
assertion, TrustworthyCA1, made by License, i.e.
News: ~ TrustworthyCA1
then all the assertions of the licensing body are regarded as suspect. As a result it
is not possible to establish trust in either website.
Now this may be an appropriate reaction when, for example, we first hear of the
shortcomings of a CA’s behaviour. The licensing body did not detect a particular
CA’s failures, so why should it be trusted to have made the right calls in other
cases?
If, however, the reporting had been different and News had reported that the
assertion of CA1 was false:
News: ~ (TrustworthyCA1 => TrustworthyCompanyAuth1)
(with News > CA1), then trust is lost in the Website of Company1 but not in the
Website of Company2. This might arise, for example, because a weakness in the
cryptography used by CA1 leads to it being possible for a third party to forge
certificates for CA1. Moreover any other sites whose trustworthiness depends on
CA1 also lose trust (that is unless there is an independent route to establishing their
trustworthiness).
Returning to the undermining of License, suppose that there are two licensing
bodies, or two independently trusted acts of licensing by the same body that can
be viewed as independent so that failures of one do not contaminate the other.
Further, we have each CA independently licensed, i.e.
simple News > License1 |
Me: TrustworthyCompanyWeb1 => TrustCompanyWeb1,
CompanyAuth1: TrustworthyCompanyAuth1 => TrustworthyCompanyWeb1,
CA1: TrustworthyCA1 => TrustworthyCompanyAuth1,
License1: TrustworthyCA1,
Me: TrustworthyCompanyWeb2 => TrustCompanyWeb2,
CompanyAuth2: TrustworthyCompanyAuth2 => TrustworthyCompanyWeb2,
CA2: TrustworthyCA2 => TrustworthyCompanyAuth2,
License2: TrustworthyCA2,
News: ~ (TrustworthyCA1)
hypothesis
TrustworthyCA1,
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TrustworthyCA2,
TrustCompanyWeb1,
TrustCompanyWeb2
Clearly if News undermines CA1 this has no effect on CA2. But if we add cross-
signing:
CA1: TrustworthyCA1 => TrustworthyCA2,
CA2: TrustworthyCA2 => TrustworthyCA1,
then we see that CA2’s assertion leads to a contradiction which undermines CA2
leading to neither website being regarded as trusted. So with cross-signing the
trustworthiness of a collection of certificate authorities becomes susceptible to an
attack on one of them. That is, because we know one claim of trustworthiness that
ensues from combination of licensing and cross-signing is false then all similar
claims are suspect.
Also of note is that the status of the trustworthiness of CA1 and CA2 depends on
how News stands in relation to License1 and License2. If News is preferred over
both CA’s then both CA’s are sceptically not trustworthy. But if either licensing
body is preferred over News then both CA’s are sceptically trustworthy (and the
websites trusted). Any other arrangement leads to a lack of determination of the
trustworthiness of the CA’s.
In this example we have become less concerned with the content provided by
sources and more concerned with how sources undermine, or attack, one another’s
positions. In the next chapter we will turn to considering systems in which the
content is stripped away, or rather specified implicitly, and the notion of attack,
and also support are studied in their own right.
4.6. Conclusions
This chapter has introduced Bonjour’s theory of coherence and formalised it as
a mathematical theory and discussed its implementation as a program. It has
illustrated how this theory may be used to reason in three very different example
domains where the problem of Knowledge on Trust arises. The program has then
been used in three examples to calculate a plausible view of the state of the world.
The final example illustrates how knowledge on trust connects the notions of trust,
trustworthiness and the licensed belief in both.
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Theory
In which is discussed:
• How social trust can be modelled by Argumentation Systems.
• How Argumentation Theory may be formalised via Galois Connections.
• How argumentation systems may be evaluated using model checking.
• And finally how privacy is an application of social trust.
5.1. Introduction
Trust acts to remove the uncertainty in social transactions. Indirect trust does this
by using opinions gathered from the social network in which we are embedded.
Indirect trust acts in lieu of classical trust allowing us to form initial trust im-
pressions of individuals socially remote in our network. This allows social life to
continue without the extensive costs of insurance and hedging of every potentially
risky transaction.
The essence of the problem considered here is: given I do not have personal,
direct and specific evidence that someone, say Sam, is trustworthy, how am I going
to establish enough initial trust to interact with him? Suppose Sam is a butcher
I have not used previously. On what basis might I gain initial trust in him to
buy my meat from him? Living as I do in a small village, I would consult other
villagers as to Sam’s reliability and trustworthiness as a butcher. In doing this I
would be looking for recommendations but, those recommendations may not be
direct. My neighbours are vegetarian, although tolerant of omnivores, such as
myself. Although they cannot recommend Sam directly, they can tell me that Mrs.
Johnston swears by Sam’s prime cuts. Other sources, directly and indirectly, tell
me that Sam is honest and straightforward, keeps clean premises and regularly
wins awards for food quality and hygiene. In assessing this testimony I assess
whether, or not, I have reason to doubt any of it. Are my informants reliable? Is
their testimony coherent overall? If there are detractors from Sam’s good name as
a butcher, are the detractors’ opinions worth listening to or do my informants as a
body rebut such negative appraisals?
What seems to be going on in such an assessment is that I am picking out
a particular community or club that presents a coherent position on Sam as a
butcher. The members of this club implicitly trust and agree with one another in
that they do not contradict one another and overall they do not rebut other views.
Moreover both I and Sam are members of this club and there is an explicit path
of trustworthy recommendations that connect me to Sam. If it is possible to find
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such a club and such an explicit path then I am willing to trust Sam (at least until
I get direct evidence to the contrary through personal experience) and try him as
my meat supplier. We might say that the essence of this approach to initial trust
is that Sam and I are socially connected within a societal matrix in which I have
implicit trust. The problem of gaining initial trust is determining the existence of
an implicitly trusted social matrix that supports trust referral between myself and
other individuals.
The club that forms the implicitly trusted social matrix should obey some
“reasonableness conditions” which ensure some degree of consistency of outlook
between the club members. It should be composed of individuals which do not
distrust one another. The club overall should defend itself against outside distrust
in that, if an outsider distrusts some member of the group, then some member of
the group should provide reasons for distrusting the outsider’s opinion. Moreover,
no one in the group should trust an outsider that distrusts a group member (for if
they did then they trust the opinion that someone in the group is untrustworthy).
More generally still, the opinions of members of the group about outsiders should
have some level of agreement e.g. they should not be in direct conflict with one
another, so that one club member trusts an outsider and another distrusts them.
Generally clubs will vary in which of these external conditions they adopt.
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Figure 5.1.: Examples of Club Conditions
The model developed in this chapter is built from two relations that can directly
connect individuals, direct trust and direct distrust.
This gives rise to four possible directed relationships between any pair of
individuals, A and B.
• A may trust B.
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• A may distrust B.
• A may be neutral towards B by neither trusting nor distrusting B.
• A may be paradoxical towards B by both trusting and distrusting B.
Individuals may give referrals to one another in the context of some particular
enquiry. By giving a referral, an individual transfers trust, for a particular topic, to
another. Referrals may be either positive or negative. A positive referral means
that there is reason to trust the referee, and a negative referral means that there
is reason to distrust the referee. The most basic logical process with referrals is
the cancellation effect of negative referrals i.e. if person A tells you that person B
is to be distrusted and person C tell you person A is to be distrusted, then you
may decide that you distrust person A’s distrust of person B (if you accept C’s
testimony).
The process of giving referrals extends these relations from direct to indirect
connections, leading to the development of indirect trust between individuals.
Indirect trust is here regarded as a trust stance. If I have indirect trust of another
individual then I am biased towards trusting them. However, this stance may be
overturned by direct evidence to the contrary.
From the point of view of trust, our first consideration is defining which groups
of individuals have no reason to distrust one another. If we assume that individuals
have a trusting stance we may equally describe this as the group implicitly trusting
one another. If we first consider the distrust relationship (negative referrals) then
we want groups in which no member distrusts another member. A stronger
condition on the group is that it defends itself against outside attacks on the
trustworthiness of its members by attacking the trustworthiness of anyone outside
the group that attacks the trustworthiness of a member of the group. Such defence
does not require that the entire group be able to rebut the attack but merely
that some members within the group can rebut the attack. The abstract form
of such structures i.e. of a set, referred to as a set of arguments, with binary
relations defining attacks and supports between members of the set and the
extraction of consistent and self-defending subsets, has been studied as the subject
of Argumentation Theory, a subject to which we now turn before resuming our
consideration of the process of gaining initial trust.
The following sections develop an account of argumentation theory and develop
it via the use of Galois Connections. Where it is useful to recall a definition or
equation from chapter 3, a back reference, of the form [equation number], is given
in the text1. A novel approach is then developed to the evaluation of finite
argumentation systems by compiling the argumentation systems into Boolean
Networks that can be evaluated by model checking using standard model checking
tools2.
Argumentation theory is presented first as the standard formulation of Dung
[17, 34], which considers a single relation of attack (or in our interpretation distrust)
1Few such links are required in this chapter since the majority of the actual uses of the equations
of chapter 3 are in the proofs which are to be found in appendix A. There we adopt a different
style of assuming familiarity with the framework and giving hints for key steps.
2In particular MACE4.
101
5. Social Trust and Argumentation Theory
over the set of arguments, and then as extended by Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex
to a theory of bipolar argumentation, which adds a second relation of support
[2, 26, 27] (or in our interpretation explicit trust) over the set of arguments. For
each style of argumentation we show how to translate the argumentation scheme
into a Boolean Network.
We then return to the theme of gaining initial trust and argue that the Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex conditions for bipolar networks are too strong for our application
because they require an unreasonable degree of foresight of individuals making
up the social matrix. To avoid this problem we provide a weaker set of conditions
for bipolar networks that are aligned with a more limited degree of foresight.
The resulting system provides a notion of social connection or logical reputation that
aligns with our informal discussion above.
As a further development of this theory of initial trust, an aspect of the theory
of privacy is developed as an example. The significance of privacy in modern,
everyday, life is amply discussed by Wolfgang Sofsky in his book ‘Privacy: A
Manifesto” [108]. The technical view of privacy adopted for this example roughly
follows the line taken in Helen Nissenbaum’s “Privacy in Context” [78] and Daniel
J. Solove’s “Understanding Privacy” [109]. That is, privacy is contextual and
governed by social norms that depend upon the context. The particular aspect
of privacy chosen is that of making the judgement to disclose information. We
will disclose private information to an individual only if there is a need to do so;
only if we judge it safe to do so, in that the individual will handle the information
appropriately according to the social norms for handling such information; and
only if we believe the information will only be used for the purpose for which it is
disclosed. Moreover part of the safety requirement is that the individual to whom
we disclose the private information will apply the same rules in disclosing that
information to third parties. We may assess the trustworthiness for disclosure
by the Social Trust process discussed above. But we may also assess, given
transparent access to the required information, how our private information could
possibly flow from the individual to whom it is disclosed, to other members of
the clubs to which that individual belongs. Since we assume the individual will
follow the appropriate social norms in handling the information, and will only
pass information on to those that are believed to follow the same social norms
as determined by his club membership (i.e. the club distrust and explicit trust
relations reflect the norm following behaviour), our assessment of appropriate
privacy maintenance, as disclosers of the information, becomes whether, under
these social norms, there is any possibility of an individual that we distrust
becoming a recipient of the information. By changing terminology and labelling
individuals who are not distrusted, as individuals that are implicitly trusted, the
condition becomes simply that we implicitly trust everyone who may possibly
handle the information.
5.2. Basic Abstract Argumentation Theory
Dung [34] introduces the idea that the important thing about arguments is how a
collection of arguments work together to define what might be called a position. A
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Figure 5.2.: Privacy
position is a set of arguments that do not attack one another and defend themselves
against attacks by other arguments, in the sense that if any argument attacks an
argument which is part of the position, then some argument of the position counter
attacks the attacker.
An argumentation system is a collection of arguments and a binary relation
of attack between arguments. A semantics for an argumentation system is a
prescription for how to resolve attacks between arguments to pick out viable
positions. The meaning of an argumentation system, under a given semantics, is
the set of all viable positions that one might adopt.
A Dungian argumentation system is formally modelled as a pair (Args, att)
where Args is a set of arguments and att is a binary attack relation over Args such
that x att y is read as x attacks y. Positions are formally modelled by the notion
of an Admissible set which is defined as the conjunction of two other properties,
that of being a Conflict Free set and that of being an Acceptable set. To define these
notions it is convenient to define a derived relation of a set attacking an argument,
written S Att x, for a set S attacking an argument x, with the meaning that some
member y of S attacks x (i.e. ∃ y ∈ S. y att x). The properties may then be stated as:
• Conflict free: A set of arguments S ⊆ Args is conflict free iff there is no pair of
arguments x ∈ S and y ∈ S such that x att y.
• Acceptable: An argument x ∈ Args is acceptable with respect to S iff for ev-
ery argument y ∈ Args if y att x then S Att y. Following [12] we will
also say that S defends x when x is acceptable with respect to S. Define
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D(X) = {y | X defends y}.
• Admissible: A set S ⊆ Args is admissible iff S is conflict free and each argument
in S is acceptable with respect to S.
These conditions are illustrated in the following diagram:
!!
"#"$%!
&!
'!
(!
)!
*+!,-,.-/!+0!12-!
3-1!)!"#"$%3!"4'!
+12-/!,-,.-/!+0!)!
50!3+,-!,-,.-/6!&6!!
+0!)!73!"#"$%-8!
7487978:";6!'6!
<+:1378-!+0!)=!12-4!!
3+,-!,-,.-/6!(6!+0!
)!"#"$%3!'>!
Figure 5.3.: Conflict Free and Acceptable
Given a semantics, the positions generated by a given semantics are called the
extensions of the argumentation system under the semantics.
In addition to Dung’s original admissibility semantics, other semantics have
been defined by adding additional constraints on what constitutes an extension.
These include:
• complete extensions: an admissible set, S, is a complete extension if it includes
all arguments it defends i.e. D(S) ⊆ S.
• grounded extensions: an admissible set, S, is a ground extension if it is a
minimal complete extension i.e. S is a complete extension and no complete
extension is a proper subset of S.
• preferred extensions: an admissible set, S, is a preferred extension if it is a
maximal complete extension i.e. S is a complete extension and no complete
extension is a proper superset of S.
• semi-stable extensions: an admissible set, S, is a semi-stable extension if it is a
preferred extension such that S∪ att(S) is maximal i.e. there is no preferred
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extension, say T, such that (S∪ att(S)) ⊂ (T∪ att(T)) (let us call this ordering
the coverage ordering for future reference).
• stable extensions: an admissible set, S, is a stable extension if it is a semi-stable
extension such that S∪ att(S) = Args.
Formal accounts of the semantics of Dungian argumentation systems may
be found in the book by Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter “Elements of
Argumentation” [13], or in the paper “Characterization of Semantics for Argument
Systems” by Besnard and Sylvie Doutre [12]. Additional insight may be gained
by consulting Dung’s original papers [34], the subsequent joint paper [17], and
Leila Amgoud and Claudette Cayrol’s “On the Acceptability of Arguments in
Preference-based Argumentation” [1].
5.3. Abstract Argumentation Theory and Galois
Connections
It is quite apparent, even in the limited context of Dung’s framework, that there are
many alternative semantics for argumentation systems. And the possible variety
increases as we move to bipolar systems and beyond. Potentially this variety
complicates the study of both theoretical and practical aspects of argumentation.
Theoretically it gives rise to questions of how the various semantics correspond
to one another. Practically it gives rise to the need for a variety of evaluation
algorithms to find solution sets (sets of positions) for particular argumentation sys-
tems against given semantics. To help address these issues a systematic approach
to the semantics is presented that allows many semantics to be expressed in a
standard form and an evaluation strategy is presented that allows us to evaluate
argumentation systems against a semantics written in this standard form.
The ideas are first illustrated for Dung-style systems and then defined for a
class of generalised argumentation systems. Later these generalised systems are
used to express the semantics of standard bipolar argumentation systems and of
trust systems, a variation on the theme of bipolar systems.
Firstly we rewrite the various semantics for Dung’s systems into relational
operator style using the axiality (R∃, R∀)[3.89]. Following [12], conflict freeness and
acceptability may be phrased as:
• Conflict Free: R∃S ⊆ S
• Acceptable: R˘∃S ⊆ R∃S
and, D(S), the set of items defended by a set S may be phrased as:
• D(S) =̂ {y | R˘∃{y} ⊆ R∃S}
Using this Galois Connection we phrase equivalents of acceptability and com-
pleteness (proof for this chapter are supplied in appendix A):
PROPOSITION 1
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• Acceptability - defined as R˘∃S ⊆ R∃S is equivalently expressed as S ⊆ R˘∀R∃S.
• Completness - defined as D(S) ⊆ S, is equivalently expressed as R˘∀R∃S ⊆ S.
Hence S is acceptable and complete if, and only if, R˘∀R∃S = S.
PROPOSITION 2 S is conflict free is equivalent to R˘∃S ⊆ S
We next turn to stable extensions. A stable extension fulfils the condition
S∪ R∃S = Args. We show this is equivalent to S ⊆ R∃S.
PROPOSITION 3 S∪ R∃S = Args is equivalent to S ⊆ R∃S.
Moreover, if S is admissible and satisfies S∪ R∃S = Args, then it is preferred and
semi-stable:
PROPOSITION 4 If S is admissible and S ∪ R∃S = Args then it is preferred and
semi-stable.
Hence if S is admissible and S ⊆ R∃S then S is a stable extension.
Thus we see a pleasing symmetry in the conditions used to define extensions:
conflict free R∃S ⊆ S
acceptable S ⊆ R˘∀R∃S
complete R˘∀R∃S ⊆ S
stable S ⊆ R∃S
That is, an admissible set of an argumentation systems is any set S ⊆ Args sat-
isfying conflict free and acceptable i.e. the set of conditions {R∃S ⊆ S, S ⊆ R˘∀R∃S}.
Similarly S satisfies a complete semantics if it satisfies conflict free, acceptable
and complete, i.e. the set of conditions {R∃S ⊆ S, S ⊆ R˘∀R∃S, R˘∀R∃S ⊆ S}. And
finally, S satisfies stable semantics if it satisfies conflict free, acceptable, complete
and stable i.e. {R∃S ⊆ S, S ⊆ R˘∀R∃S, R˘∀R∃S ⊆ S, S ⊆ R∃S}.
Some simplification is possible in this last case since:
PROPOSITION 5 If S is conflict free and stable then it is acceptable and complete.
That is, S satisfies stable semantics if, and only if, S satisfies conflict free and
stable i.e. it satisfies the conditions {R∃S ⊆ S, S ⊆ R∃S}.
The Ground, Preferred and Semi-Stable semantics are derived from these four
conditions by the use of minimisation and maximisation.
Given an argumentation system (A, R), the set of complete positions is defined
by:
• Complete(A) =̂ {S ⊆ A | S = R˘∀R∃S ∧ R∃S ⊆ S}
then the sets of ground and preferred positions are defined by:
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• Ground(A) =̂ {S ∈ Complete(A) | ¬ ∃ S′ ∈ Complete(A).S′ ⊂ S}
• Preferred(A) =̂ {S ∈ Complete(A) | ¬ ∃ S′ ∈ Complete(A).S ⊂ S′}
and defining the coverage ordering, b by:
• A b B =̂ A∪ R∃A ⊂ B∪ R∃B
the Semi-Stable sets are given by:
• SemiStable(A) =̂ {S ∈ Preferred(A) | ¬ ∃ S′ ∈ Preferred(A).S b S′}
Thus, in the case of Dung’s systems, many forms of semantics can be given
by specifying a set of constraints on solution sets and performing minimisation
or maximisation with respect to an ordering. The semantics so expressed makes
plain much of the correspondence between the various semantics.
We next consider how to evaluate such systems.
5.4. Boolean Network Approach to Argumentation
Theory
In this section a notion of generalised argumentation system is defined, along
with a translation, from an argumentation system into a system of propositional
variables and propositional axioms, which is guided by the semantics. The propo-
sitional axioms may be thought of as defining a Boolean Network in which the
propositional variables represent the “state” of nodes and the propositional axioms
represent how the nodes are wired together via boolean functions. In particular
this network incorporates feedback i.e. it may contain cyclic linkages. A model of a
boolean network is a propositional model that satisfies the axioms. The translation
from the argumentation is such that models of the Boolean Network correspond
to positions of the argumentation system.
To briefly motivate the approach, consider the simple Dungian argumentation
system depicted in figure 5.4(i) and take admissibility semantics.
In the translation, the arguments will be replaced by Boolean variables a, b
and c. The truth value of the boolean variables represents whether or not the
corresponding argument is part of a given position. So a true, and both b and
c false, represents the position {A}, and a and c true and b false represents the
position {A, C}. Conflict between arguments corresponds to inhibition between
boolean variables, where by inhibition we mean x inhibits y if x being true implies
y is false.
The example argument structure may be represented as a network of boolean
variables connected by inhibition (as shown in figure 5.4(ii)).
In addition to inhibition between variables, Dungian argumentation adds the
acceptability condition which requires a position to defend itself. Translating
the acceptability condition to a constraint on truth values results in the defence
condition that if a boolean variable x is true then each potential inhibitor yi of x
must be inhibited by some inhibitor zij of yi i.e.
∧
i
∨
j zij must be true.
Applied to the above this requires that
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Figure 5.4.: Argumentation and Boolean Networks
• if c is true then a is true,
• if b is true then
∧
i
∨
j ∅, which is false, so b is false,
• if a is true then
∧
i ∅, which is true
These additional constraints are depicted in figure 5.4(iii).
An assignment of truth values to the network is valid provided that it meets the
inhibition conditions and the Dungian defence conditions of the network. Valid
assignments correspond to admissible positions of the argumentation system.
It is perhaps worth noting that the backward constraint c ⇒ a can always be
converted to a forward constraint using the NOR connective (x NOR y meaning
neither of x or y is true) to derive an inhibition network. This is illustrated using
a slightly more complicated argumentation system in which, B, of the previous
example, is given two attackers A1 and A2. This is illustrated in figure 5.5 starting
with the translation into the initial system of boolean variables 5.5(i) and then
continuing with the addition of the defence constraints 5.5(ii). Figure 5.5(iii)
illustrates the network with NOR’s and figure 5.5(iv) illustrates the simplification,
in which it is seen that neither a1 nor a2 are ever inhibited and b is always inhibited.
This means that a1 and a2 may freely take on values true or false, b must always
take the value false and c may take the value true only if either, or both, of a1 and
a2 take the value true.
The simple translation process illustrated here generalises over semantics de-
fined by relational operator inequalities (subset inclusions). This is true not only
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Figure 5.5.: Boolean Networks and Forward Constraints
for Dungian argumentation systems but for a wider class of systems, called here,
generalised argumentation systems.
After defining the generalised argumentation system we give a compilation
of the various semantics for Dung’s systems and illustrate the process of finding
solution sets by taking some example Dung style argumentation systems under
the various semantics.
The distinction between semantics which only require constraint satisfaction
versus those which require a maximisation (minimisation) step occurs again
in finding models for the Boolean Networks. If a semantics does not require
maximisation or minimisation we will call it a local semantics, otherwise we will
call it global. With local semantics models are defined without reference to other
models. In the semantics for Dung’s systems, these semantics are also local in
another sense, in that the acceptability of an argument in a set of arguments can
be calculated from nearby arguments.
The basic tool we use is a recursive translation of the argumentation conditions
into boolean expressions.
A generalised argumentation system is a tuple (Args, J1, . . . , Jn) where Args
is some set of arguments and each Ji is a binary relation. A semantics for an
argumentation system is a collection of set inclusions conditions C = {Ci | i ∈ I},
where each Ci is of the form A = B or A ⊆ B where the sets A and B are defined
by free variables, set operators and relational operators as in the examples of the
semantics of Dung’ systems. The complete form is given in figure 5.6.
A solution is a collection of subsets of Args, Sx, one for each set variable x
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A set is one of:
• The empty set ∅.
• The set of all arguments Args.
• Some set variable, e.g. x.
• The union of sets e.g. X ∪ Y.
• The intersection of sets e.g. X ∩ Y.
• The complement of a set e.g. X.
• The image of a set under the operator R∃ for some binary
relation R.
• The image of a set under the operator R∀ for some binary
relation R.
And a binary relation is one of:
• a binary relation Ji from the argumentation system.
• union, e.g. R1 ∪ R2.
• intersection, e.g. R1 ∩ R2.
• complementation e.g. R.
• converse e.g. R˘.
Figure 5.6.: Sets and Relations
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mentioned in C, that simultaneously meet all the conditions in C. We will refer to
the solutions as the meanings of (Args, J1, . . . , Jn) assigned by C.
Given a solution S, a full model for the argumentation system is a set of charac-
teristic functions for the solution i.e. a set of functions fx : Args→ {0, 1}, one for
each variable x mentioned in the semantics, such that, ∀ y ∈ Args . (fx(y) = 1) ≡
y ∈ Sx.
Usually we are interested in only a single free variable that represents the
positions of the argumentation system under the semantics, other variables being
auxiliary, construction, variables. By convention we will reserve the set variable
X for the set of positions in the semantics. This means that each solution set for
this variable corresponds to a possible position of the argumentation system. A
model for an argumentation system will be the characteristic function for X , i.e.
a function mapping each argument to the Booleans 1 (i.e. true) and 0 (i.e. false),
with 1 indicating that the argument is part of the position and 0 indicating it is no
part of the position.
Given an argumentation system (Args, J1, . . . , Jn) we associate a propositional
system (P, Ax), where P is a set of propositional variables containing a variable
xa for each free variable x in C and each argument a ∈ Args, and Ax is a set of
axioms derived from the particular semantics C under consideration. The essence
of the correspondence is that each propositional variable Sa, of the propositional
system, corresponds to the assertion a ∈ S of the argumentation system. Each
semantic condition is ultimately expanded out into propositional connections
between these elementary membership propositions. The recursive transformation
of the conditions, C, of the argumentation system’s semantics into the set of axioms,
Ax, of the propositional system is given in figure 5.7.
If S is a set variable of C then φS : Args → PropVar is the injection between
Args and the propositional variables, so that, φS(a) = Sa means that Sa is the
propositional variable corresponding to argument a being in the set S.
PROPOSITION 6 A (propositional) model m of CT defines a full model of C by
fS =̂ m ◦ φS for each set variable S mentioned in C.
This follows directly from the construction by use of the equivalences.
Non-local semantics requires minimising or maximising of solution sets with
respect to one or more relations. The process is carried out sequentially i.e. first
optimising the solution sets with respect to one relation and then optimising the
remaining solution sets with respect to the next. To this end a non-local semantics
is given by a set of local conditions and a sequence of optimisation conditions
read as maximising conditions3. Optimisation is performed over the solution
set X . Thus, for example, preferential semantics is defined by the tuple (C,⊆)
with C, the conditions for conflict free and complete solutions, maximised for
set inclusion. And semi-stable theories being given by (C,⊆,≺) where ≺ is the
stability ordering4, which is used to select maximum sets from the preferred
extensions.
3Minimisation is performed by using the complementary ordering.
4i.e. f ≺ g ≡ {x | f ◦ φX (x) = 1} ⊂ {x | g ◦ φX (x) = 1}.
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(X = Y)T =̂
∧
x
((x ∈ X)T ≡ (x ∈ Y)T) (5.1)
(X ⊆ Y)T =̂ ∧
x
((x ∈ X)T ⇒ (x ∈ Y)T) (5.2)
(x ∈ ∅)T =̂ false (5.3)
(x ∈ Args)T =̂ true (5.4)
(x ∈ X ∪ Y)T =̂ (x ∈ X)T ∨ (x ∈ Y)T (5.5)
(x ∈ X ∩ Y)T =̂ (x ∈ X)T ∧ (x ∈ Y)T (5.6)
(x ∈ X)T =̂ ¬ (x ∈ X)T (5.7)
(x ∈ J∃X)T =̂
∨
((y,x)∈J)T
(y ∈ X)T (5.8)
(x ∈ J∀X)T =̂ ∧
((y,x)∈J˘)T
(y ∈ X)T (5.9)
(x ∈ S)T =̂ Sx for S a set variable (5.10)
where ((y, x) ∈ J)T, for J a compound relation is defined by:
((y, x) ∈ J1 ∪ J2)T =̂ ((y, x) ∈ J1)T ∨ ((y, x) ∈ J2)T (5.11)
((y, x) ∈ J1 ∩ J2)T =̂ ((y, x) ∈ J1)T ∧ ((y, x) ∈ J2)T (5.12)
((y, x) ∈ J)T =̂ (y, x) 6∈ J (5.13)
((y, x) ∈ J˘)T =̂ (x, y) ∈ J (5.14)
and define
{Ci | i ∈ I}T =̂ {CTi | i ∈ I} (5.15)
Figure 5.7.: Translation
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These maximisations are performed by selecting the model that maximises the
required set of assignments in the boolean model.
5.5. Modelling Dungian Systems
We now look at the translation of the semantics for Dung’s systems into their
propositional system equivalents.
Dungian systems are defined as argumentation systems with a single rela-
tion of attack between arguments i.e. (Args, att) with the basic semantics being
admissibility semantics defined by:
Cadmissable = {att∃ X ⊆ X , a˘tt∃X ⊆ att∃ X} (5.16)
which corresponds to:
∧
x∈Args
(
∨
(y,x)∈A
Xy ⇒ ¬ Xx) (5.17)
∧
x∈Args
(
∨
(x,y)∈A
Xy ⇒
∨
(z,x)∈A
Xz) (5.18)
or, since we can write acceptability as X ⊆ a˘tt∀ att∃ X , we can translate the
semantics equivalently as:
∧
x∈Args
(
∨
(y,x)∈A
Xy ⇒ ¬ Xx) (5.19)
∧
x∈Args
(Xx ⇒
∧
(y,x)∈A
∨
(z,y)∈A
Xz) (5.20)
(which, of course, we may also derive via propositional reasoning from the former
by “moving the disjunction to the other side of the implication”).
As we saw above, complete extensions are obtained by adding the dual condi-
tion to acceptability which turns the acceptability condition into an equivalence
i.e.
Ccomplete = {att∃ X ⊆ X ,X = a˘tt
∀ att∃ X} (5.21)
yielding the Boolean conditions:
∧
x∈Args
(
∨
(y,x)∈A
Xy ⇒ ¬ Xx) (5.22)
∧
x∈Args
(Xx ≡
∧
(y,x)∈A
∨
(z,y)∈A
Xz) (5.23)
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and stable extensions are obtained by adding the dual of the conflict freeness
condition turning this into an equivalence:
Cstable = {att∃ X = X ,X = a˘tt
∀ att∃ X} (5.24)
yielding:
∧
x∈Args
(
∨
(y,x)∈A
Xy ≡ ¬ Xx) (5.25)
∧
x∈Args
(Xx ≡
∧
(y,x)∈A
∨
(z,y)∈A
Xz) (5.26)
Moreover since above it was shown that conflict free and stable sets are accept-
able and complete then the only required condition is:
∧
x∈Args
(
∨
(y,x)∈A
Xy ≡ ¬ Xx) (5.27)
Using the extended notion of a semantics, the ground extensions and preferred
extensions are defined by maximisation of complete semantics with respect to
X and X respectively i.e. (Ccomplete, {X }) and (Ccomplete, {X }). The semi-
stable semantics is defined by maximising with respect to the set att∃ X ∪ X i.e.
(Ccomplete, {att∃ X ∪X}).
5.6. Computing Some Dungian Examples
We will describe models by giving the set of propositional letters assigned true
by the assignment i.e. for a set of letters {A, B, C, D}, the set {A, C} represents the
model that assigns A and C true, and B and D false.
If we take a classic set of argumentation examples, such as shown in figure 5.8
(i) - (iv), the extended implication network codings are:
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Figure 5.8.: Example Argumentation Structures
sub-figure Conflict free Acceptable Models
(i) false⇒ ¬ A C⇒ A ∅, {A}, {A, C}
A⇒ ¬ B B⇒ false
B⇒ ¬ C
(ii) A⇒ ¬ B B⇒ B ∅, {A}, {B}
B⇒ ¬ A A⇒ A
(iii) A⇒ ¬ B B⇒ C ∅
B⇒ ¬ C C⇒ A
C⇒ ¬ A A⇒ B
(iv) false⇒ ¬ A C⇒ (A ∨ E) ∅, {A}, {A, C},
A⇒ ¬ B B⇒ false {C, E}, {A, C, E}
B⇒ ¬ C B⇒ D
C⇒ ¬ D E⇒ C
D⇒ ¬ E D⇒ E
E⇒ ¬ B
(v) false⇒ ¬ A B⇒ false ∅, {A}, {C}, {D},
A⇒ ¬ B B⇒ D {A, C}, {A, D}
C⇒ ¬ B C⇒ C
C⇒ ¬ D D⇒ D
D⇒ ¬ C E⇒ C
D⇒ ¬ E E⇒ E
E⇒ ¬ E
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sub-figure Complete Models Stable Models
(i) true⇒ A {A, C} ¬ A⇒ false {A, C}
A⇒ C ¬ A⇒ B
¬ B⇒ C
(ii) A⇒ A ∅, {A}, {B} ¬ A⇒ B {A}, {B}
B⇒ B ¬ B⇒ A
(iii) B⇒ A ∅ ¬ A⇒ B -no model-
C⇒ B ¬ B⇒ C
A⇒ C ¬ C⇒ A
(iv) true⇒ A {A, C, E} ¬ A⇒ false {A, C, E}
A⇒ C ¬ (A ∨ E)⇒ B
B⇒ D ¬ B⇒ C
D⇒ B ¬ C⇒ D
E⇒ C ¬ D⇒ E
(v) true⇒ A {A}, {A, C}, ¬ A⇒ false {A, D}
(false ∧ D)⇒ B {A, D} ¬ (A ∨ C)⇒ B
C⇒ C ¬ D⇒ C
D⇒ D ¬ C⇒ D
(C ∧ D ∧ E)⇒ E ¬ (D ∨ E)⇒ E
5.7. A Note on the Generalised Argumentation Systems
Above, argumentation systems were generalised to allow multiple relations. Below
this generalisation will be used for Bipolar argumentation systems. However, to
illustrate some of the potential for such generalisation consider the following form
of argumentation. An argument may attack another argument either factually
or morally. An argument may both attack some arguments factually and other
arguments morally. A collection of arguments is regarded as a plausible position
if it defends itself against factual arguments by factual counter attacks and moral
arguments by moral counter attacks. The formulation of this system is quite
straightforward: a plausible position is required to be both factually and morally
conflict free and that any argument which is factually attacked is factually defended
and any argument which is morally attacked is morally defended. Let (Args, F, M)
be the generalised argumentation system with semantics:
F∃X ⊆ X (5.28)
M∃X ⊆ X (5.29)
X ⊆ F˘∀F∃X (5.30)
X ⊆ M˘∀M∃X (5.31)
If, however, we wanted to allow a different notion of defence then we could, for
example, allow factual attacks to be either morally or factually refuted but require
moral attacks to be morally refuted. The resulting semantics is:
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F∃X ⊆ X (5.32)
M∃X ⊆ X (5.33)
X ⊆ F˘∀(F∃X ∪M∃X ) (5.34)
X ⊆ M˘∀M∃X (5.35)
(5.36)
5.8. Adding Priority between Arguments
A straightforward extension of Dung’s argumentation system is to add a simple
priority relation between arguments.
Priority between arguments expresses the notion that one argument is stronger
than another. The idea is that if one argument attacks another then it is the stronger
argument that wins. This may be expressed as a generalised argumentation system
obtained by adding a second binary relation to a Dungian system to represent
the relative strength between arguments i.e. (Args, att,). The semantics are
essentially those of Dungian systems with the semantic attack relation being taken
as the conjunction with the two given relations and so is equivalent to the Dungian
system (Args, att∩ ) (i.e. an attack succeeds if the attacker is stronger than the
argument attacked).
In some systems it is possible to separate out the constraints and express them
as constraints on the individual given relations. However, in this case, without
further constraints on att and/or , no further simplification is possible since we
have (att∩ )∃X ⊆ att∃ X ∩ ()∃X.
5.9. Bipolar Argumentation Systems
Bipolar argumentation systems are generalised argumentation systems with two
binary relations, representing attack and support between arguments of the system
i.e. they are triples (Args, att, Support). They were originally introduced by Cayrol
and Lagasquie-Schiex as a tool for modelling real world argumentation processes
involving both positive and negative preferences over arguments.
In a later section, 5.12, our goal is to use bipolar argumentation systems as
a basis for a theory of trust and distrust between individuals. In line with this
end we will develop the theory of bipolar argumentation using the terms (explicit)
distrust for the attack relation and (explicit) trust for the support relation. This
should not cause too much disruption when thinking about abstract argumentation
and, indeed, one can phrase the attack relation between arguments A and B as, A
causes one to distrust B, and the support relation as A causes one to trust B.
The general approach to bipolar argumentation is illustrated by a simple ex-
ample. Consider the set of argument X = {A, B} where A trusts some argument
Z and B distrusts Z. One may regard X as internally consistent because A and B
do not distrust each other and, although they do not explicitly trust each other we
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might say, because of the lack of explicit distrust, that they implicitly trust each
other. However, if one considers A and B in relation to Z, one might say X is exter-
nally inconsistent in that members of X have differing views on the trustworthiness
of individuals not in X. External inconsistency indicates a lack of agreement on
trust and distrust relationships by the members of X.
There are many, different, possible notions of internal and external consistency.
The differences in their definitions can be intuitively thought of as involving some
idea of range of effect. For example, internal consistency could simply mean Conflict
Free i.e. no direct contradictions. But it could also mean, for example, that no
member of the set indirectly trusts some non-member (i.e. via a chain of trust
connections between non-members) that distrusts a member of the set. The subject
of bipolar argumentation is really a matter of defining suitable notions of internal
and external consistency.
We start by developing Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex’s bipolar argumentation
theory using Galois Connections and then define a new system that is more fully
aligned to use in discussing trust and distrust. We will refer to the Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex bipolar framework as the standard system and the new system
we introduce as trust systems.
In formulae we will still use A for the distrust relation, to avoid confusion with
D(S), the set of arguments defended by S, and use T to denote the trust relation.
First recall that for a relation, R, R∗ is the reflexive, transitive closure of R[3.48].
For standard systems we introduce the definitions:
• trust closed: A set is trust closed if, and only if, T∗∃X ⊆ X.
Recall that a set X is conflict free if, and only if, A∃X ⊆ X. Bipolar systems have
the potential for additional consistency constraints between a set X and the trust
closure of X.
• internally trust consistent: A set is internally trust consistent if, and only if,
(A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ X.
That is, nothing in the trust closure of X attacks X.
• externally trust consistent: A set is externally trust consistent if, and only if,
(A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ T∗∃X.
That is, the trust closure of X does not attack itself (and so also does not attack X,
which follows from the next proposition).
These conditions are illustrated in figure 5.9. The following propositions
formalise a number of ‘obvious’ diagrammatic conclusions.
PROPOSITION 7 X ⊆ T∗∃X
We now give a series of propositions which characterise the relationship between
simple consistency (conflict freeness), internal consistency and external consistency.
PROPOSITION 8 X is internally trust consistent is equivalent to: the attackers of X
are in the complement of the trust closure of X i.e. A˘∃X ⊆ T∗∃X.
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Figure 5.9.: Bipolar Conditions
PROPOSITION 9 X is externally trust consistent is equivalent to: the attackers of the
trust closure of X are in the complement of the trust closure i.e. A˘∃(T∗∃X) ⊆ T∗∃X.
PROPOSITION 10 A set X is externally trust consistent if its trust closure is conflict
free, i.e. A∃(T∗∃X) ⊆ T∗∃X.
PROPOSITION 11 If a set is externally trust consistent then it is internally trust con-
sistent.
PROPOSITION 12 If a set is internally trust consistent then it is conflict free.
PROPOSITION 13 If X is trust closed and internally trust consistent then it is exter-
nally trust consistent.
PROPOSITION 14 X is externally trust consistent is equivalent to:
A: X ⊆ T∗∀A˘∀ ◦ T˘∗∀X and hence to
B: T˘∗∃A˘∃T∗∃X ⊆ X and
C: T∗∃A∃T˘∗∃X ⊆ X
The semantics of the standard system is given by modifying the definition
of admissibility from Dung’s system by taking different consistency conditions
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and either basing acceptability on Dung’s definition, i.e. A˘∃X ⊆ A∃X, or basing
acceptability on the trust closure of a set i.e. A˘∃(T∗∃X) ⊆ A∃(T∗∃X).
These semantics differ in how they treat arguments that support arguments that
are ultimately rejected. Internal consistency simply requires that the set of trusted
arguments have no conflicts between themselves, either directly or through some
chain of trusting other arguments. Whereas external consistency means that any
argument that would come into conflict by following chains of trust is regarded
as itself being in conflict i.e. backers of ultimately untrusted arguments become
untrusted.
We next define various notions of admissibility and show how they relate to
one another.
• Basic Dungian admissibility: Dungian Conflict Free and Dungian Acceptable
i.e. admissibleD X ≡ A∃X ⊆ X ∧ A˘∃X ⊆ A∃X.
• Internal admissibility: Internally Consistent and Dungian Acceptable i.e.
admissibleI X ≡ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ X ∧ A˘∃X ⊆ A∃X.
• External admissibility: Externally Consistent and Dungian Acceptable i.e.
admissibleE X ≡ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X ∧ A˘∃X ⊆ A∃X.
• Trust Closed admissibility: Trust Closed and Dungian Admissable i.e.
admissibleT X ≡ T∗∃X ⊆ X ∧ admissibleD X.
• Trust Extended admissibility: Dungian Admissibility of the Trust Closure i.e.
admissibleX X ≡ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X ∧ A˘∃T∗∃X ⊆ A∃T∗∃X.
From the above propositions on consistency we see: External admissibility⇒
Internal admissibility⇒ Basic Dungian admissibility, and Trust Closed admissibil-
ity⇒ Trust Extended admissibility. Also, trivially,
admissibleX X ≡ admissibleD T∗∃X. Moreover any Trust Extended Admissible set
extends to a Trust Closed Admissible set.
PROPOSITION 15 If X is a Trust Extended admissible set then it is a subset of some
Y which is a Trust Closed admissible set, i.e. :
admissibleX X⇒ ∃Y ⊇ X. admissibleT Y.
5.10. Boolean Networks for Bipolar Argumentation
The boolean network could be obtained directly by compiling the semantics for
the argumentation system. However, the presence of the transitive closure, T∗, in
conditions presents an issue in that it requires considering connections between
arguments at unbounded separation. Fortunately some simple transformation on
the conditions avoids this problem.
PROPOSITION 16 Trust Closed admissible is equivalent to T∃X ⊆ X and admissibleD X.
This follows immediately from T∃X ⊆ X⇒ T∗∃X ⊆ X.
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PROPOSITION 17 X is Externally Consistent is equivalent to there exists some Y
subset of X such that Y is T-closed and conflict free.
PROPOSITION 18 X is Internally Consistent is equivalent to there exists some Y sub-
set of X such that Y is T-closed and Y is not in conflict with X.
So we may rewrite the axioms for the propositional system into a set of axioms
involving the free variable Y, find models for the new system and extract the X
component of the solution sets as positions of the bipolar systems.
5.11. The Other Side of Arguments
So far, setting aside the use of trust terminology, the development of argumentation
theory in terms of Galois Connections has been in terms that should be recognisable
to most argumentation theorists. But there is another way of interpreting these
systems. We may consider the complement of the distrust relation and call the
complement implicit trust. That is, if I do not distrust you, then I implicitly trust you.
Such a change of perspective shifts the emphasis of the social relationships from
an active (“I distrust”) to the passive (“I implicitly trust”). The Bipolar systems
are now systems with two positive relations, implicit trust and explicit trust. This
change in perspective provides a useful tool in discussing social interaction such
as (logical) reputation and privacy, and is accompanied by a matching change in
the expression of the formal model. The change to the formal model is to translate
the conditions on argument systems from the axiality (R∃, R∀), which express
conditions in terms of a relation R, to conditions using the polarity (R+, R+)[3.90]
which are expressed in terms of R using the identities between polarities and
axialities[3.91, 3.92].
The Dungian conditions are readily re-expressed in terms of the complement of
the attack relation and the new connection:
conflict free S ⊆ R+S
acceptable S ⊆ R+R+S
complete R+R+S ⊆ S
stable R+S ⊆ S
We may read the expressions R+X and R
+Y as, “the set of things implicitly
trusted by everything in X” and “the set of things that implicitly trust everything
in Y”, respectively. So the expression Z ⊆ R+X corresponds to “(everything in) Z is
implicitly trusted by (everything in) X” and Z ⊆ R+Y corresponds to “ (everything
in) Z implicitly trusts (everything in) Y”.
The internal and external consistency conditions for the standard bipolar sys-
tems may be similarly re-expressed using the complement of the distrust relation,
implicit trust:
internally consistent S ⊆ A+T∗∃S
externally consistent T∗∃S ⊆ A+T∗∃S
121
5. Social Trust and Argumentation Theory
That is, a set, S, is internally consistent if S is implicitly trusted by the trust closure
of S and a set, S, is externally consistent if the trust closure of S is implicitly trusted
by the trust closure of S (i.e. the trust closure is conflict free).
5.12. Trust Systems
Trust systems are a tool for formalising social trust, that is, formalising the acquisi-
tion of initial trust through referrals. A trust system can be thought of as defining
a community of individuals that express a consistent view about judgements of
trust and distrust. An individual has grounds to initially trust another if both the
individual and the potential trustee both belong to such a community and there is
a path of explicit referrals connecting the individual to the trustee. When these
conditions arise between two individuals we say that they are socially connected by
the community. Bipolar argumentation systems are used to model the notion of
consistency of view with respect to trust and distrust judgements. Bipolar systems
vary in the consistency conditions used. The consistency conditions of the standard
system are “long range” because they use the transitive closure of the trust relation.
While this is appropriate for pure argumentation it has untoward consequences
when we consider trust and distrust as representing states of knowledge or belief
of individuals.
Before continuing further let us introduce some terminology. Previously we
called sets of arguments that satisfied the semantics positions. Now that we are
switching to considering sets of individuals, let us call sets of individuals that
satisfy the semantics clubs i.e. a club is a community that satisfies some contextually
defined set of conditions.
Given a club, C, social connectedness via C can be formalised straightforwardly.
First define TC (the trust relation T relativised to the club C):
TC =̂ {(x, y) ∈ T | x ∈ C ∧ y ∈ C}. (5.37)
Social connectivity via C is now the relation T∗C.
Different consistency conditions define different ideas of coherence of referrals
made by a club. If we consider the standard bipolar system the consistency
conditions express the following constraints on clubs:
• Simple consistency requires that clubs do not contain members that distrust
one another.
• Internal consistency requires that clubs do not contain members that transi-
tively trust individuals outside of the club that distrust some member of the
club.
• External consistency requires that the club does not contain members that
trust individuals outside the club that distrust one another.
One might say that these latter conditions are conditions on the reliability of
judgements made by members of the club. Internal consistency requires that the
judgements made by members about individuals outside the club align with one
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another. External consistency requires that transitive trust in individuals outside
the club leads to a coherent policy of trusting beyond the club and that the club
should be limited to a group that can make such coherent judgements.
However, these conditions are very strong in that they involve the consequences
of following transitive relations (referrals). That is, an individual must be able to
foresee conflicts arising arbitrarily far down the trust relation. From the point of
view of individuals trusting, and distrusting, one another, this is too strong. So,
in keeping with the idea that individuals have limited foresight, we consider an
alternative notion of consistency which only requires avoiding immediate conflict
conditions i.e. those conflicts arising after one step. Let us call the set T∃X the
(immediate) trust extension of X. Then we will say that a set X is opinion consistent
if:
1. X is conflict free (i.e. A∃X ⊆ X).
2. X does not attack its own trust extension (i.e. A∃X ⊆ T∃X).
3. Nothing in the trust extension of X attacks X (i.e. A˘∃X ⊆ T∃X).
4. The trust extension of X is conflict free (i.e. A∃T∃X ⊆ T∃X).
Or, adopting the phrasing of implicit trust:
1. The club implicitly trusts itself (i.e. X ⊆ A+X).
2. The club implicitly trusts its own trust extension (i.e. T∃X ⊆ A+X).
3. The club is implicitly trusted by its own trust extension (i.e. T∃X ⊆ A+X).
4. The trust extension of the club implicitly trusts itself (i.e. T∃X ⊆ A+T∃X).
If a club is opinion consistent then its members have a coherent view of how
members and non-members are trusted: its members implicitly trust one another;
if any member of the club explicitly trusts an individual outside the club then the
rest of the club, at least implicitly, trusts the individual; any individual outside
the club that is trusted by a member of the club implicitly trusts the whole club;
if individuals outside the club are trusted by some member of the club they do
not attack other individuals trusted by the club. In particular if the club does not
have such coherency in its view of non-members one might reasonably call into
question its view of members. For example, club members x and y both explicitly
trust club member z but disagree over non-member w. In which case can we really
be sure of their assessment of z?
Opinion consistency gives us a more bounded view of social connectedness.
We will use the term society to mean simply a collection of interacting individuals.
Given that we exist in a society, the question arises as to which opinion consistent
clubs we belong to in that society and hence what social connections exist between
ourselves and others.
Any opinion consistent club can be extended to one or more maximal opinion
consistent clubs. Following the argumentation terminology we will refer to these
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as preferred clubs. Given that a pair of individuals may be socially connected in
some such maximal clubs and not in others, the question arises as to how and
when to form initial trust. If some club is preferred over others, e.g. members of
my family, the friends I socialise with in the village pub, or the people I work
with, then the process of determining the existence, or otherwise, of the social
connection is straightforward. If, however, we have no preferred club in mind,
then we have to decide how on aggregate to determine whether or not social
connectivity exists.
Following the terminology introduced in the discussion of coherence in Chap-
ter 4, we have the option of taking a sceptical stance, in which initial trust exists if
all maximal clubs provide the required social connection; or a credulous stance, in
which only some maximal clubs provide the required connection. That is, if we
are very conservative, i.e. sceptical, in our trust stance, we will only extend initial
trust to an individual who would be regarded as trustworthy in all the clubs we
can construct from our society. If we are less conservative, i.e. credulous, we will
extend trust to an individual with whom we have a social connection via at least
one of the clubs we can construct from our society. We might feel that the credu-
lous position is untenable as a basis for initial trust since there are both reasons
to trust (social connections) and reasons not to trust (lack of social connections).
However each club of which we are member is composed of individuals that we
have no reason not to trust (by definition). In particular, we have no reason to
distrust any of the individuals involved in the referral path connecting us to the
individual with whom we are seeking to establish initial trust.
In practice we tend to use specific clubs for different purposes. I use the club
composed of my peer group within the firm for which I work to resolve initial
trust issues within the firm. I use the club of academic referral to resolve trust
issues around published articles within my discipline. I use a club of friends
whose opinion I respect for many day-to-day judgements for which I have no
particular expertise.
Specific clubs may be formed for specific reasons. They may be bounded by
social or contractual conditions that impose limits on the notion of trust beyond
the club. For example, employees of a firm are expected not to discuss future
business plans with individuals outside the firm5. In this context individuals
outside the firm are regarded as uniformly distrusted by people inside the firm.
If there are no readily identifiable clubs, I look at the clubs constructible from
a suitable slice of my society e.g. individuals whose opinions I have relied upon
in matters with some relation to the issue at hand; or close friends who I believe
would be concerned for my interests. Depending on the issue at hand I may
seek simply to increase my confidence in the face of uncertainties, which may be
improved by the presence of some social connection, or I may seek a high degree
of assurance which can arise from all such clubs supporting a social connection.
5This in part applies because of insider trading legislation, as well as the general need for not
leaking advanced information to the competition.
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5.13. Certificate Authorities Again
In the previous chapter we considered the example of certificate authorities. We
return to the example again to examine it from the point of view of social trust.
Consider the Trust system in figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10.: Single Certificate Authority
The individual “Me” trusts both “License”, the licensing body, and “News”,
the source of news reports about the certificate authority. Computing opinion
consistent maximal clubs6 we see that, although we may implicitly trust the
‘Company Website”in both cases, that, if the “CA” is not a member of the club
then there is no social connection between “Me” and the “Company Website”.
Whether “CA” is a member of the club depends on whether we prefer “News”
over “License” or vice versa.
Figure 5.11 illustrates the second case of the example with two Public Certificate
Authorities and cross-signing.
Again, examining the maximal clubs, we see that in both of the maximal
sets that both company websites are implicitly trusted. However, if one believes
“News”, and so adopts the position set out by maximal set B, then there is no path
between “Me” and either of the company websites in that set. So, in this context,
no social connection exists and therefore there is insufficient grounds for social
trust.
6We are interested in the existence of any opinion consistent club in which“Me” is socially connected
to the “Company Website”. If they are socially connected it will be connected in a maximally
consistent set.
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Figure 5.11.: Cross-signing
5.14. Privacy: An Application of Argumentation and
Trust
Privacy is important to us. It is a shield that we stand behind. It protects us from
exploitation and manipulation by those who do not have our interests at heart.
What makes information private information is that it is information about
us that we feel we have the right to control, or it is about us and others and we
jointly feel we have the right to control; or, to put it rather more bluntly, private
information is information which we feel it is nobody else’s business to know. What
legitimises this notion of privacy is the general consensus of society that such-and-
such information is, indeed, nobody else’s business, and that the acquisition of, or
general publishing of, such information by another party would, in one way or
another, diminish the lives of those concerned. There is a moral dimension to the
judgement by society that information is private. Privacy cannot legitimately be
invoked to hide moral turpitude or hide a crime. Since we may clearly attempt to
place information into this category of privacy that does not belong there, society
concedes that there is a notion of public interest that overrides considerations of
privacy.
Keeping information private reduces the scope for intrusion and interference in
our lives. Privacy of information permits us to lead a life of relative freedom. And
yet we must balance privacy against necessary disclosure which permits others to
act on our behalf and in our interest.
When we disclose information that we regard as private, it is to enable another
individual to act as our agent, making decisions in our stead and in our interest.
Our trust is that the agent will not use this information to his advantage and our
disadvantage.
Privacy is contextual and governed by a contextually dependent collection of
social norms that define how particular kinds of information should, and should not,
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be handled in each social context. Generally we disclose information to people
provided that we believe that they will follow the appropriate social norms for the
context and kind of information.
The undertaking to maintain privacy is a promise, implicit or explicit, not to
disclose information without need (the promise of need); not to disclose information
to those who will not maintain the social norms governing the privacy of the
particular kind of information disclosed (the promise of safety) and the promise
of only disclosing the information for the purpose for which it was originally
provided (the promise of purpose).
Rarely is disclosing private information a matter of sharing a secret with another
individual. Often the information is not secret in that no particular measures have
been taken to protect it, and it is often discoverable by other means. Also it is rare
that the information is to be shared with an individual. Usually disclosure means
that some group of individuals, or some organisation, will have access to the
information for some specified purpose. Let us call such a group or organisation
a community. Communities come equipped with practices, procedures or processes
that cause information to be transferred between individuals. We will call these
community processes, or simply processes for short. Processes represent the known
modes of information transfer within the community. For example, an insurance
firm may have a procedure for handling a claim that requires the claim to be
passed between individuals in certain roles, e.g. a Loss Assessor and a Payment
Authority. But we should be aware that there are also be other processes, including
accidental transfer e.g. a document left on a shared printer or an overheard office
conversation. We may think of these as official community processes and unofficial
community processes. In discussing privacy we must be aware of these unofficial
community processes lest we deceive ourselves into a misplaced feeling of safety.
When disclosing information to a community in the first instance we often
disclose information to an individual (as opposed to in a broadcast to the whole
community). In such cases part of the trust that is placed in the initial recipient
of the information is that, even within the community, the information will not
be shared without need. Indeed, even within the community, we reasonably
expect the three promises of need, safety and purpose to be met as information is
passed around the community. And one reason we may decide not to disclose
information is that, although we believe the primary recipient will follow the
appropriate norms, we do not share the primary recipient’s beliefs about various
third parties to whom the primary recipient may further disclose the information.
We may think of this as assessing sources of potential leakage.
This leads us to two ways of assessing the trustworthiness of a community in
handling private information. We may assess this trustworthiness by the referral
process we discussed above. But we may also, if we have access to the appropriate
information, assess how information might flow within the community. We expect
information to be passed between individuals who are socially connected by
explicit trust relationships. If we have a map of the referral process within the
community then we may predict which individuals in the community may end
up in possession of the information and determine whether or not we feel that
this is acceptable. More precisely we require that we at least implicitly trust
every possible recipient of our private information. One might consider these two
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approaches as “black box” analysis of trustworthiness and “white box” analysis of
trustworthiness in handling private information.
The white box condition is simply formalised as, if x discloses to y and y belongs
to club C then:
(T∗C)∃{y} ⊆ A+{x} (5.38)
Analogous to the problem of deciding to whom we should disclose information
is the problem of who should be granted access to information by some access
control system. Here policy fulfils the role of social norms and the leakage
condition corresponds to the notion that even if an individual has, as an individual,
appropriate access privileges, they may still not be granted access if there are
potential leakage routes from that individual to other, less privileged individuals.
For example, consider an individual who shares an office with some less privileged
individual. If information is disclosed to the privileged individual it is not
unreasonable to suspect that some information may leak to the less privileged
individual. In judging whether or not to grant access to the information we
may consider consulting both a clearance database and an office accommodation
database to decide whether or not to grant access (or to determine what form of
access to grant e.g. access granted in a secure reading room).
To set up the analogy formally we introduce a prototype individual at each
clearance level, say cl for each level l and an implicit trust relation C between cl
and all individuals cleared at level l (or, if we wish, l or higher). We will treat
the organisation as an opinion consistent club and people who share offices will
be regarded as having explicit trust in one another (there may be other explicit
trust relationships). The explicit trust relations will be called E. To disclose
information at level l to an individual i we require both i to be cleared to level
l, and everyone explicitly trusted by i in the organisation is cleared to level l (or
above), i.e. (E∗)∃{i} ⊆ C+{cl}. In the terminology introduced earlier we have an
official community process of disclosing and an unofficial community process of
(potential) information transfer by office sharing. We may contrast this discussion
of privacy with the discussion of confidentiality7 in computer system security. The
difference is one of perspective. With confidentiality we tend to concern ourselves
with the technical structure of the non-disclosure/non-leakage condition. With
privacy, at least as conceived here, we are concerned with the social processes
around disclosures.
5.15. Conclusion
This chapter has created an approach to reasoning about Social Trust based on
adapting the techniques of argumentation theory. The essence of the adaptation
has been to switch from considering how abstract arguments attack and support
one another to considering how individuals in a community attack and support
one another in the matter of trust. The resulting theory has then been applied to the
7See appendix C for a discussion information security using Galois Connections
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analysis of trust placed in certificates authorities within Public Key Infrastructures
and in the role of trust in privacy. The underlying reasoning technique in this and
the previous chapter is propositional model based reasoning. The next chapter
explores the connection between the techniques used in these two chapters.
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6. Coherence and Argumentation
Theory
In which is discussed:
• How Preferential Coherence is connected to Argumentation Theory.
• The semantics of Coalition argumentation systems.
6.1. Introduction
The principal difference between the techniques of Preferential Coherence and
argumentation theory is that preferential coherence deals with the case of conflict
between two sets of sources, whereas argumentation theory only deals with sources
being in pairwise conflict. In other respects the systems are remarkably similar
and, within the limits circumscribed by the ‘set’ versus ‘pairwise’ interaction, the
systems can simulate one another. This should not be particularly surprising given
that both are extensions of reasoning by classical consistency checking.
In this chapter we examine some of the connections between Preferential
Coherence and argumentation theory. We consider both how maximally consistent
sets of labelled propositions are connected to argumentation theory, and how
maximally preferred sets of propositions are connected to argumentation theory.
The examination of maximally consistent sets leads to the consideration of an
extended class of Dungian argumentation systems in which the attack relation is
between sets of arguments rather than individual arguments.
6.2. Argumentation with a Symmetric Attack Relation
First let us consider a Dungian argumentation system (Args, R) with R symmetric,
i.e. R = R˘. Let S be a conflict free set. Immediately we see S is acceptable since
R˘∃S = R∃S. Moreover, this also means S is complete. If S is maximally consistent
then S is preferred and since R is symmetric and S maximal, everything not in S is
attacked by S and so S is stable (i.e. S∪ R∃S = Args).
Examples of such argumentation systems can be constructed using the labelled
propositional system introduced in Chapter 4. Let sources be a set of labels and
propositions be a set of propositional letters in one-to-one correspondence with the
sources. If A is a source name, let A be the corresponding propositional letter. Let
Args be a set of observations (a set of labelled propositions), containing:
• For each source A, the assertion A : A;
• For each source A, and each source B, optionally A : ¬ B;
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• and no other assertions.
A Dungian argumentation system is constructed by taking the sources as a
set of arguments, Args, and the (symmetric) attack relation, R, as A attacks B if,
and only if, inconsArgs{A, B}. Trivially, the maximally consistent theories for this
construction are the preferentially coherent theories obtained with the empty order
relation and coincide with stable positions in the argumentation theory semantics.
6.3. Breaking Symmetry
Continuing with the example of propositional systems, we next consider what
happens when we break the symmetry of the attack relation by introducing an
ordering between sources. Attacks will be oriented from the most preferred to
the least preferred source. If no preference is expressed between A and B, then
they will be regarded as mutually attacking. That is A attacks B if, and only if, the
sources are inconsistent with one another and A is preferred to B or there is no
expressed preference between A and B.
If we examine an arbitrary maximally consistent set, say S, under this additional
condition, we may note that an item may be in S either because S attacks it or
it attacks S. In the argumentation theory semantics, the acceptability condition
guarantees that a conflict free set counter attacks all its attackers but leaves open
the possibility of self inconsistent elements being present (these cannot be in S but
do not necessarily attack S). In the propositional semantics, such a self inconsistent
element, e.g. {A : A, A,¬ A}, is inconsistent with every other element and so
either attacks, or is attacked by, every other element (or both), depending on
the preference order between elements. So, if acceptability holds for S (that is
R˘∃S ⊆ R∃S), then S is stable.
Continuing the example, if we now require further that: A  B if, and only if,
A asserts ¬ B, then there is a correspondence between the preferential coherence
semantics and the Dungian semantics. A solution set S under the preferential
coherence semantics is also a position under the stable semantics for the corre-
sponding argumentation system.
By definition, a preferentially coherent set is maximally consistent and anomaly
free. A maximal consistent set under the propositional semantics is clearly a maxi-
mal conflict free set in the argumentation semantics. We now show that anomaly
freeness is sufficient to guarantee stability of the corresponding argumentation
system (and by proposition 5 is therefore acceptable and complete).
PROPOSITION 19 If the set S is anomaly free then each point in S is below some point
in S (i.e. S ⊆ ()∃S).
def S w S
≡ ∀ x ∈ S. ∃ y ∈ S.y  x
≡ S ⊆ ()∃S
≡ S ⊆ ()∃S∪ (=)∃S
132
6.4. Discussion
≡ S ⊆ ()∃S∪ S
hint S∩ S = ∅
≡ S ⊆ ()∃S
PROPOSITION 20 S is stable.
By construction the attack relation is  and by proposition 19: S ⊆ ()∃S.
We can also simulate preferential and stable semantics for argumentation
systems in the coherence semantics. Indeed we have already done most of the
work in giving the Boolean Network translation of argumentation systems by:
• taking the set of sources to be the set of arguments, Args, of the argumenta-
tion system;
• taking the set of propositional letters to be in one-to-one correspondence
with the set of labels, so that if A is a source then A is the corresponding
propositional letter;
• for each source A making the assertion A : A;
• for each source A making the assertion A : θ, where θ is the whole of the
Boolean Network translation for the argumentation system;
• taking the universal relation1 as the preference relation.
If θ is the translation for admissible or complete semantics then the solution
sets of the coherence system correspond to preferred positions, whereas if the
translation is for stable semantics then the solutions sets correspond to stable
positions. This is because preferential coherence finds the maximal consistent sets
and then filters these by the conditions on the ordering relation. By taking the
ordering relation as the universal relation this filtering is trivialised leaving the
maximally consistent sets.
6.4. Discussion
The above correspondence shows that when we limit consideration to labelled
propositional systems in which all conflicts arise directly between pairs of sources
then the preferential coherence semantics can be mimicked by an argumentation
system, and any argumentation system with preferential or stable semantics can
be mimicked by a preferential coherence system.
This begs the question of whether there is an argumentation system with a
more general correspondence to preferential coherence? The essential problem
with argumentation systems is that conflict is between pairs of arguments, hence
situations such as a three way mutual incompatibility cannot be represented.
The simplest solution to this seems to be to abstract directly over the labelled
1A.K.A. Chaos.
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propositional systems to create a new form of argumentation system that deals
with the situation directly.
In labelled propositional systems sets of labels are connected by a symmetric
inconsistency relation. A set of labels is consistent if none of its subsets are
inconsistent with any other (i.e. if its subsets are only inconsistent with sets that
are not its subsets). A set of labels is maximally consistent if it is consistent and it
is inconsistent with every other set (i.e. its subsets are inconsistent with every set
that is not a subset of itself).
We define a symmetric coalition system as a pair (Args, 6↔) where Args is a set
of arguments and 6↔ is a symmetric relation over sets of Args, P(Args).
• Consistent: A subset S of Args is consistent if, and only if,
( 6↔)∃PS ⊆ PS;
• Complete: A subset S of Args is complete if, and only if,
PS ⊆ ( 6↔)∃PS;
• Maximally Consistent: A subset S of Args is maximally consistent if, and only
if, it is consistent and complete.2
Next we extend symmetric coalition systems to preferential coalition systems by
adding an order relation, 3, over subsets of Args. A preferential coalition system
is a triple (Args, 6↔,3) such that (Args, 6↔) is a symmetric coalition system and
3 is a binary relation over subsets of Args:
• preferentially acceptable: A subset S of Args is preferentially acceptable if, and
only if, ˘(3)∃{S} ⊆ (3)∃{S};
• preferentially stable: A subset S of Args is preferentially stable if, and only if,
{S} ⊆ (3)∃{S}.
A preferential coalition system has preferential coherence semantics when its
solution sets are required to be maximally consistent, preferentially acceptable
and preferentially stable. It is not difficult to see that if we take a preferential
coherence system with set of observations Obs and translate it into a preferential
coalition system by taking the consistency relation between sets of labels to be
2These conditions can equally be phrased in terms of the consistency relation between sets↔=̂ 6↔
and the + Galois operator. They become:
– Consistent: A subset S of Args is consistent if, and only if, PS ⊆ (↔)+ PS, i.e. the set
consistent with every member of PS includes the members of PS;
– Complete: A subset S of Args is complete if, and only if, (↔)+ PS ⊆ PS, i.e. PS contains all
the sets consistent with every member of PS;
– Maximally Consistent: A subset S of Args is maximally consistent if, and only if, it is consistent
and complete, i.e. the sets that are consistent with every member of P S are exactly the sets in
PS.
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A 6↔ B =̂ inconsObs(A ∪ B) and order relation w then the two systems have the
same solution sets.
Although this gives an operator semantics, unfortunately, the presence of the
unit set operator, { }, and power set operator, P , mean that we cannot evaluate
the system using the Boolean Network translation.
If we consider symmetric coalition systems and consider going in the other
direction i.e. from a symmetric coalition system to a labelled propositional system,
then it is clear that not all systems will correspond to labelled propositional
systems because the inconsistency relation of the labelled propositional system
is both left and right monotonic i.e. where for a binary relation over sets R we
define:
• left monotonic: if whenever xRy and x ⊆ x′ then x′Ry;
• right monotonic: if whenever xRy and y ⊆ y′ then xRy′;
which we might equivalently express as:
• left monotonic: R∃ ◦ (⊇)∃ = R∃;
• right monotonic: (⊆)∃ ◦ R∃ = R∃ .
If we require the symmetric coalition systems to be both left and right monotonic
then we can interpret the system by a labelled propositional system by a coding
similar to the above Boolean Network coding i.e.
• taking the set of sources to be the set of arguments, Args, of the argumenta-
tion system;
• taking the set of propositional letters to be in one-to-one correspondence
with the set of labels, so that if A is a source then A is the corresponding
propositional letter;
• for each source A making the assertion A : A;
• for each source A making the assertion A : θ, where θ is the attack re-
lation given as A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ≡ ¬ (B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bm) for each attack
{A1, . . . , An} 6↔ {B1, . . . , Bm};
• taking the universal relation as the preference relation.
For this reason we call the left and right monotonic symmetric coalition systems,
the symmetric conjunctive coalition systems.
6.5. Another Approach to Argumentation
It would be clearly useful to have a form of argumentation theory that could ad-
dress amalgamation of information. Here we briefly consider a possible candidate
for such an approach to argumentation.
Taking a purely formal approach to the problem we extend Dungian semantics
to deal with sets of arguments i.e. the attack relation is over sets of arguments
rather than individual arguments. We then require the conditions:
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• collections of arguments can collectively attack a collection of arguments
• a solution set, X, is a set of arguments
– such that no subset of X attacks a subset of X
– such that any set of arguments, Z, which attacks a subset of X is itself
attacked by some subset of X
If the attack relation is R : PArgs ↔ PArgs then we are seeking solutions X
such that:
R∃Y ⊆ Y (6.1)
R˘∃Y ⊆ R∃Y (6.2)
and such that
X =
⋃
Y. (6.3)
It is easily seen that if the first condition is to guarantee that no subset of X is
attacked by a subset of X then Y must be PX. Similarly, if the second condition
is to guarantee that X defends itself then again Y must be PX. That is we seek
solutions X such that:
R∃(PX) ⊆ (PX) (6.4)
R˘∃(PX) ⊆ R∃(PX) (6.5)
We might call this the free coalition system in that no constraints hold between
sets of arguments. In particular there are no monotonicity conditions, meaning, for
example, that {a} may attack {b}, but {a, c} may not attack {b}, or more concretely,
“if it is hot, I will not go running”, and “if it is raining, I will not go running” does
not necessarily entail, “if it is raining and it is hot, I will not go running”3.
However, if we decide that there are additional internal consistencies that
should hold between sets of arguments then these are representable as constraints
between propositional variables representing coalitions. The extreme case is to
require the argumentation to be monotonic i.e. that the attack relation is closed
under super sets on the left and the right. That is, let R# =̂⊇ o9 R o9 ⊆, then R is
left and right monotonic if, and only if, R = R#, i.e. if {a} attacks {b} then {a, c}
attacks {b}, and also, {a} attacks {b, c}. In between these free semantics and the
monotonic semantics there are many other possibilities. For example, we may
take the attack relation as left monotonic but not right monotonic, which might
be interpreted as additional information may rebut an attack. Similarly we may
consider an attack relation which is right monotonic but not left monotonic, or
3This example is due to Professor Tim Norman, who claims not to run when it is hot, or when it is
raining, but has gone running in Hawaii when it was both hot and raining.
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adopt other, more ad hoc, relations between antecedent sets and conclusion sets of
the attacks relation.
Although we do not explore this topic further here, the non-monotonic ar-
gumentation system offers interesting possibilities when we consider trust and
distrust relations. For example, if we think of attacks in terms of a distrust relation,
then “Jill distrusts John” and “Jill distrusts Jeremy” does not imply “Jill distrusts
John and Jeremy” (for example, Jill’s distrust may arise from concerns over com-
petency in a particular area of expertise but John and Jeremy’s competencies
may be complementary, so together they are trusted). This requires at least right
non-monotonicity.
To evaluate a free system we can use similar techniques to those used in
Chapter 5 to evaluate such a system. Clearly, if sets of arguments are considered as
fully independent of one another then we may represent these sets by propositional
variables and follow much the same scheme as before. That is, we may take a
set of 2|Args| propositional variables to represent all subsets of arguments (aka
Coalitions) and define:
∧
x∈Coalitions
(
∨
(y,x)∈R
Xy ⇒ ¬ Xx) (6.6)
∧
x∈Coalitions
(Xx ⇒
∧
(y,x)∈R
∨
(z,y)∈R
Xz) (6.7)
i.e. we just have a version of our earlier semantics using a bigger set of propositional
variables.
Additional constraints, such as monotonicity, expand the attack relation. In the
case of monotonicity the expansion significantly increases the number of clauses in
the boolean expression used for model finding. However many of these additional
clauses, at least in this specific case, are redundant, which raises the possibility
of seeking minimal codings, which, however, must be left as a topic for future
research.
6.6. Conclusion
This chapter has explored the connection between the techniques of propositional
model based reasoning used in Chapters 4 and 5, i.e. the techniques for reasoning
about Knowledge on Trust and Social Trust. As a result of the analysis, an approach
to argumentation has been proposed that generalises Dungian argumentation
systems from attack relations between arguments, to attack relations between sets
of arguments. The resulting free system is non-monotonic; however, the system
permits the addition of further constraints on attacks between sets of arguments
to recover monotonicity if required. Finding solutions by propositional model
finding is still possible in such a system but the possibilities for compact coding
of monotonicity constraints as appropriate axioms, or axiom schemes, still needs
to be investigated. That said, the generalised Dungian system suggests itself as a
framework within which the reasoning techniques for Knowledge on Trust and
137
6. Coherence and Argumentation Theory
Social Trust might be unified in future work. This subject is further discussed in
the next chapter (see section 7.3).
The next chapter examines a number of topics around Knowledge on Trust and
Social Trust and indicates possible future directions for their development.
138
7. Discussion
In which is discussed:
• The barriers to Application.
• Deduction Systems for Generalised Argumentation.
• The Risk of Trust.
• Making Promises Formal.
• Trust and Balance.
• The Dynamics of Trust.
• Social Science and Signed Graphs.
7.1. Introduction
In this chapter, before a final conclusion, we turn to examine the prospects for a few
of the possible topics for further development. First we briefly examine some of
the issues around deploying the concepts as a technology. Next we turn to examine
one of the directions in which we might take the logic, that of proof systems for
generalised argumentation systems. This is followed by a brief consideration of
one of the connections between trust as a logical notion and the risk associated with
the act of trust, which is followed by a discussion of work involved in formalising
the logic of promises. We then briefly turn to the discussion of the notion of the
dynamics of trust and an outline of a lately realised connection with mathematical
sociology.
7.2. Prospects for Application
One area where we might expect to seek application for reasoning about trust
is the Web, and, perhaps even more so, the nascent Semantic Web. Today, web
security is based on preserving the integrity of trust decisions made by the user.
Unfortunately, users are often ill equipped to make informed decisions, lacking
both the technical expertise to truly understand what is being asked of them, and
the specific, contextual, knowledge required to make an informed decision. Asking
the user is, in practice, simply a way for a system provider to evade responsibility
for subsequent ills a user may suffer. It is tempting to provide a better solution
by providing some form of trust reasoning that can either make the decision on
behalf of the user, or, at the very least, provide a user with options on how to
proceed, backed by rational, and understandable, arguments. Desirable as this
may be there are never the less real barriers to the adoption of such a strategy
which must be considered.
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There are essentially four problems: Coding, Complexity, Disclosure and Liabil-
ity.
Coding: Logic applies to formal systems, that is, to systems where a sufficient
level of coding has taken place to reduce the semantic problem to a syntactic one.
Unfortunately, although there are vast resources of information on the Web, the
majority of it is “uncoded” and requires significant effort to formalise both it and
its context.
Complexity: Even when we deal with finite cases, logical methods usually
do not scale well. For example, Thomas Schaefer showed that there are exactly
six forms of propositional theory whose satisfaction problem is polynomial time
decidable, all others being NP1[100]. Clearly Preferential Coherence is NP and it
is not difficult to see that, in general, a generalised argumentation system will be
NP. Indeed one can show that even the basic Dungian system is NP complete by
embedding the satisfaction problem for propositional logic2.
These first two problems are quite general and apply to a wide range of
possible uses of semantic processing on the web and are potential barriers to the
development of the Semantic Web3,4.
1Briefly, Schaefer defines a logical relation as a relation over {0, 1}k for k ≥ 1 and, given a set of
logical relations S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, defines an S-formula to be a conjunction of clauses of the
form R(η1, . . . , ηk) where η, . . . , ηk are variables. The S-satisfiability problem is then defined as
the problem of deciding whether a particular S-formula is satisfiable. The set of all satisfiable S-
formulas is called SAT(S). Schaefer then shows the class SAT(S) to be polynomial time satisfiable
if, and only if, the class S is such that:
1. Every relation in S is satisfied when all variables are 0;
2. Every relation in S is satisfied when all variables are 1;
3. Every relation in S is definable by a CNF formula in which each conjunct has at most one
negated variable;
4. Every relation in S is definable by a CNF formula in which each conjunct has at most one
un-negated variable;
5. Every relation in S is definable by a CNF formula having at most 2 literals in each conjunct;
6. Every relation in S is the set of solutions of a system of linear equations over the two element
field {0, 1}.
Otherwise the class is NP time satisfiable.
2Briefly define the system:
• The set of arguments is a1, . . . , an, a′1, . . . , a′n, c1, . . . , cm and d.
• For each ai, ai attacks a′i and a
′
i attacks ai.
• Given a satisfaction problem in conjunctive normal form in variables a1, . . . , an, define for
each clause Cj = η1 ∨ . . . ∨ ηk of the CNF, if ηi = al then there is are mutual attacks betweenai
and cj and if ηi = a′l then there is are mutual attacks between a
′
l and cj.
• For each cj there are mutual attacks between cj and d.
After simplification we can derive d =
∧
k
∨
i η
k
i where each η
k
i is either a
k
i or a
′k
i . The satisfaction
problem is then equivalent to asking the question: “Is there an admissible set that contains d”.
That is, if we have an algorithm to find all admissible sets, then by inspecting these sets we have
an algorithm to solve the satisfaction problem.
3Particularly when one reflects that some proposed Semantic Web tools include languages based
on Description Logic which is almost identical to the language of generalised argumentation
systems.
4These are not the only form of barrier to the development of the semantic web. Another is general
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The coding problem can be addressed in one of two ways. We may either restrict
applications to areas which require little coding, or we may hope for at least the
partial success of the semantic Web project to provide suitably coded domains.
Likewise the complexity constraint may be approached in one of two ways. We may
either limit the size of problem that we address to suitably small domains (where
small may be of the order of a hundred propositional variables with reasonable
time limits and the right sat-solver), or we might adopt an approximation approach
to sat-solving, in which we accept that solution sets have an error probability but
at the gain of getting a polynomial time approximate solution.
Disclosure: Are people are willing to make the appropriate information avail-
able (and are they are willing to be associated with that information)? It is not hard
to imagine circumstances in which making one’s relative assessments of trustwor-
thiness available for public scrutiny could lead to unpleasant consequences. It is
probable that if we disclose such information it is likely to be on a limited basis (e.g.
to some of those we trust), or done anonymously. If the latter then there is the prob-
lem of the honesty of the disclosure. The three circumstances in which disclosure
might be reasonable are when the information is expected to be truly private, e.g. I
build a trust model on my computer that is used by my browser to make decisions
on my behalf; when the disclosing body is openly fulfilling self interest by disclos-
ing information, e.g. Barbour’s site, www.barbour.com/counterfeit-education,
publishes a list of url’s of companies that sell fake Barbour merchandise; and when
the disclosing body is acting openly and in the public interest (but possibly as a
commercial venture) e.g. publishing reliable url blacklists.
Liability: Where does the liability lay for bad decisions? This is particularly a
problem where we deal with an algorithm and multiple sources of information.
In practice, where there is no issue of fraud or other criminal intent, we might
assume that a trust reasoner is a “reasonable effort” tool in the sense that it
takes all reasonable precautions in reaching a conclusion from the information
available, and that information suppliers take reasonable precautions to ensure the
appropriateness of their information5 (this is in explicit contrast with a licensing
economic considerations. Although the Semantic Web may offer significant benefits if developed,
it may not offer the necessary incremental incentives to fuel its progressive development. A
major part of the success of the Web was due to its openness. But an even greater part was due
to the advantages that the Web offered businesses and individuals, which was primarily due
to it being an effective publishing medium allowing it to become an information and catalogue
shopping phenomenon. Individuals, businesses and non-profit organisations could immediately
see how to take advantage of the new medium. There seems to be a lack of this second factor for
the Semantic Web. The Semantic Web is not rapidly colonising our meme space as did the web.
Industry is not rushing to put semantic coding into sites, nor are individuals finding they need
to reach out to interact semantically with web agents. Though there are potential rewards to be
gained from the Semantic Web, they appear to be rewards that cannot be reaped by progressive
investment and evolution and therefore are not susceptible to the same kind of evolution as took
place with the Web. A second point that may restrict its development is that, unlike the web,
it has been conceived of as a totality rather than as a work in progress. The web grew from
many independent efforts which both provided an enabling platform for the first http/html
protocol exchanges and subsequently as the repertoire of protocols and languages were revised
and expanded under a conjunction of independent experimentation and advantage seeking.
These factors seem missing from the world of the Semantic Web.
5Here we merely say appropriate because some information may well be opinion rather than fact.
This is appropriate provided it is portrayed as opinion rather than fact. Opinion masquerading
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arrangement that accepts no liability for the conclusions of the reasoning). Phrasing
this slightly differently, a user may expect the trust reasoner to draw reasonable
conclusions from the data available and neither tool provider, nor the information
providers have liability if this is the case. Without such a commitment the user has
no reason to accept the conclusions of the tool nor have the providers reason to
accept the risk of providing either information or tool. However, this itself needs
to be underwritten by a social or legal framework which ensures that all parties
meet their obligations.
If we can overcome each of these problems then one might build useful trust
enhancing technology for the Web. An example of such a technology would be a
trust service that provides trust advice about websites that uses a limited number
of information sources. These sources may cross comment on the trustworthiness
of one another and upon other web sites. Complexity is a major issue in such an
application. One route out of this particular problem is for the user to nominate
particular trust communities, i.e. clubs, that form an acceptable basis for social
connection. The computational problem then reduces to (a) checking that the club
conditions are maintained, and (b) checking there is a social connection within the
club. Significant work is required to explore the feasibility of such an approach.
7.3. Prospects for Direct Proof Systems for Generalised
Argumentation Systems
The logic of argumentation has been portrayed as a process of finding possible
positions against a given semantics. However the Boolean Network translations
can be viewed in a different light. Given a finite generalised argumentation
system, (Args, R1, . . . , Rn), the Boolean Network translation into a corresponding
propositional system (P, Ax) provides an axiomatisation of the argumentation
system, provided that minimisation/maximisation is not used in the semantics,
and may be used to prove that various properties follow from the system. This
raises two interesting questions. Firstly can we produce some direct reasoning
system for generalised argumentation systems when minimisation/maximisation
is not used, and secondly, can we produce a direct reasoning system when it is
used? Here we will briefly outline a system that addresses the first question and
speculate on how we might address the second.
(There are, of course, a number of other alternative approaches one could
consider. The two most obvious are either to adapt Brink’s algebra of Boolean
Modules[21]6, or to take an approach based on a (multi) modal logic view of
as fact is inappropriate.
6A Boolean Module combines a Boolean Algebra, which, in our application, we may think of
as capturing the idea of sets of arguments, with a relation algebra, which we may think of as
capturing the various attack and support relations. These algebras are joined to one another by a
product operation that applies a ‘relation’ to a ‘set’ (i.e. an element of the relation algebra to an
element of the set algebra). Brink defines a left Boolean Module by taking this product to be the
Pierce Product (co-image) and the right Boolean Module by taking this product to be the image
operator. Since the relational operators include converse these two operators are inter-definable.
A boolean algebra is always isomorphic to a field of sets and so boolean algebras can be said
to precisely capture the notion of intersection, union and complementation over a field of sets.
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argumentation systems in which each relation corresponds to a new modality, in
essence generalising Grossi’s work on Dungian semantics [44]. )
The relational language for generalised argumentation systems can be viewed
as expressing a particular fragment of first order logic in which unary predicates
play the role of sets and binary predicates play the role of relations (after all, this
is their interpretation in the model theory of first order logic). Solution sets are
therefore modelled as unary predicates which, given a definition of the set of
arguments and the relations of the argumentation system, make the semantic
conditions true. This approach is similar to Ewa Orlowska’s approach to relational
systems based on Dual Tableaux [85]. We will briefly elaborate the idea assuming
some familiarity with Genzen’s two-sided sequent formalism (see, for example
Goran Sundholm’s, “Systems of Deduction” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic.
Vol. I [111], or the translations of Gerhard Gentzen’s original papers by Szabo in
“The collected papers of Gerhard Gentzen” [112]).
Given a generalised argumentation system, (Args, R1, . . . , Rn), with seman-
tic conditions, Sem(X1, . . . , Xm)7, axiomatised by the set of axioms Axarg, then
S1, . . . , Sm, axiomatised by the axioms AxSol, is a solution if, and only if, Axargs, AxSol
` CT, where CT is the first order translation of each condition C in Sem(S1, . . . , Sm).
This translation is given in figure 7.1. Note that Axargs contains the axiom
∀ x.x ∈ Args to ensure that every term corresponds to an argument.
It is however generally desirable to reason directly in the language of generalised
argumentation systems, or in first order logic augmented with this language,
rather than detouring through a translation. Given the first order translation it is
possible to create derived rules of inference for each operator in the language of
generalised argumentation systems. This will be briefly illustrated by giving two
sided Gentzen rules for the language8. In order to allow the use of relation symbols
as abbreviations, and to reason about particular finite systems in the language, the
language is extended with relational equality and finite explicit displays of sets,
binary relation and constants, so that, for example, {a1, . . . , an} is an explicit set of
n constants and {a1 7→ b1, . . . , an 7→ bn} is an explicit relation between constants.
The empty set, and the empty relation, are represented by {} and the universal set
is represented by Args. The universal relation is represented by ∞ and corresponds
to the relation Args×Args. Identity is added as the relation I, which obeys the
However, relation algebras do not have a similar correspondence to binary relations as defined as
sets of pairs, and Boolean Modules likewise do not precisely capture the set theoretic interactions
of sets and relations. As a result axiomatising generalised argumentation systems using Boolean
Modules is sound but not complete.
It is possible to use extensions of Boolean Modules to axiomatise generalised argumentation
systems. Pierce Algebras are the next natural candidate which extend Boolean Modules by
one operation [22]. However Relation Algebras are inter-definability with Pierce Algebras [103]
(essentially sets can be represented by special elements of the relation algebra), leading to a
further sound but incomplete set of axioms.
Renate Schimdt studies the conditions under which Peirce algebras are representable, i.e. under
which they behave like set theoretic binary relations [102]. The goal of an algebraic proof system
would be to find suitable additional schemata or rules to augment Boolean Modules or Pierce
algebras to provide a complete inference system.
7where the variables X1 to Xm are the free variables defining solution sets
8Equally one could give any of the tableaux systems: tableaux, dual tableaux, signed tableaux; or
give natural deduction rules.
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For X and Y sets and J a relation
(X = Y)T =̂ ∀ x.((x ∈ X)T ≡ (x ∈ Y)T) (7.1)
(X ⊆ Y)T =̂ ∀ x.((x ∈ X)T ⇒ (x ∈ Y)T) (7.2)
(x ∈ ∅)T =̂ false (7.3)
(x ∈ Args)T =̂ true (7.4)
(x ∈ X ∪ Y)T =̂ (x ∈ X)T ∨ (x ∈ Y)T (7.5)
(x ∈ X ∩ Y)T =̂ (x ∈ X)T ∧ (x ∈ Y)T (7.6)
(x ∈ X)T =̂ ¬ (x ∈ X)T (7.7)
(x ∈ J∃X)T =̂ ∃ y.((y, x) ∈ J)T ∧ (y ∈ X)T (7.8)
(x ∈ J∀X)T =̂ ∀ y.((y, x) ∈ J˘)T ⇒ (y ∈ X)T (7.9)
(x ∈ S)T =̂ S(x) for S a set variable (7.10)
(7.11)
where ((y, x) ∈ J)T, for J a relation, is defined by:
((y, x) ∈ J1 ∪ J2)T =̂ ((y, x) ∈ J1)T ∨ ((y, x) ∈ J2)T (7.12)
((y, x) ∈ J1 ∩ J2)T =̂ ((y, x) ∈ J1)T ∧ ((y, x) ∈ J2)T (7.13)
((y, x) ∈ J)T =̂ ¬ ((y, x) ∈ J) (7.14)
((y, x) ∈ J˘)T =̂ (x, y) ∈ J (7.15)
((y, x) ∈ J)T =̂ J(x, y) for J a relation constant (7.16)
Figure 7.1.: First Order Translation
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For relations J1 and J2
J1 = J2 =̂ ∀ x, y.(x, y) ∈ J1 ≡ (x, y) ∈ J2 (7.17)
(x ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , an})T =̂ x = a1 ∨ x = a2 . . . ∨ x = an (7.18)
((x, y) ∈{a1 7→ b1, . . . , an 7→ bn})T =̂
(x = a1 ∧ y = b1) ∨ (x = a2 ∧ y = b2) . . . ∨ (x = an ∧ y = bn)
(7.19)
x∞ y =̂ true (7.20)
Figure 7.2.: Constant Sets and Relations
usual conditions of reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity and substitution.
Thus we may specify a finite system by writing axioms of the form:
Args = {a1, . . . , an},
R1 = {a1 7→ b1, . . . , am 7→ bm}, R2 = {. . .}, . . . Rk = {. . .},
S1 = {. . .}, . . . , Sl = {. . .}
The additional translation rules are given by figure 7.2.
We adopt the standard structural rules for two-sided Gentzen systems which
are given in figure 7.3
In writing the remaining Gentzen rules we will adopt the convention of leaving
the context of the rule implicit. For example, if we take the left and right rules for
disjunction, in which we normally write the context as the lists of formulas Γ and
∆, the rules that would be written with explicit context as:
Γ, φ ` ∆ Γ,ψ ` ∆
Γ, φ ∨ ψ ` ∆ ∨ -left
Γ ` φ,ψ,∆
Γ ` φ ∨ ψ,∆ ∨ -right
will be written instead as:
φ ` ψ `
φ ∨ ψ ` ∨ -left
` φ,ψ
` φ ∨ ψ ∨ -right
The derived rules for the language of generalised argumentation systems are
given in figures 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7. Throughout we use the convention that an
undecorated variable (e.g. x) introduced “above the line” stands for any term and
a decorated variable (e.g. x∗) stands for a new variable (also known as an arbitrary
variable) that does not occur in any formula below the line.
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Structural Rules:
Γ ` ∆
Γ, A ` ∆ Weaken-left
Γ ` ∆
Γ ` A,∆ Weaken-right
Γ, A, A ` ∆
Γ, A ` ∆ Contract-left
Γ ` A, A,∆
Γ ` A,∆ Contract-right
Γ1, B, Γ2, A, Γ3 ` ∆
Γ1, A, Γ2, B, Γ3 ` ∆ Permute-left
Γ ` ∆1, B,∆2, A,∆3
Γ ` ∆1, A,∆2, B,∆3 Permute-right
Figure 7.3.: Gentzen Structural Rules
This deduction system is a definitional extension of the usual system for first
order predicate logic with equality (note: here equality on objects is formalised via
the I-rules, the =-rules are really logical equivalence rules) and can either be used
on its own or mixed with first order assertions and usual first order Gentzen rules.
Considered as a system in its own right, the soundness and completeness of the
proof system are inherited from the soundness and completeness of the Gentzen
system for first order logic with equality9. Note that the sets and relations used
here cannot be quantified over but that it is still possible to carry out schematic
proofs i.e. proof for arbitrary sets and relations obeying some axioms.
Proofs of general properties about argumentation systems can be carried out in
this formal system (for example, the proof of R∃S ⊆ S implies that R˘∃S ⊆ R∃S);
equally, given a particular finite argumentation systems, the formal system can
be used to prove that a particular set is a solution set under a given semantics
(for example, given that with Args = {a, b, c} and R = {a 7→ b, b 7→ c} then the set
S = {a, b} is conflict free and acceptable i.e. that R∃S ⊆ S and R˘∃S ⊆ R∃S).
This answers the first question above. The second question, of what to do
when minimisation/maximisation is used in the semantics raises the issue of
quantifying over sets to express the relative “size” with respect to some ordering.
This suggests that the first order translation, as used to derive the above rules, will
be inadequate and that we must resort to a higher order logic, if we are to follow
a similar approach. Two possibilities present themselves for investigation. The
first is to see if the higher order aspect can be limited to monadic logic since we
are only maximising (or minimising) sets, and these may be translated as unary
predicates, with the ordering being implication. In this case one might derive
additional sequent rules from weak second order monadic logic. Alternatively, if
9Here completeness means that if a property holds semantically then there is a proof of it. This is
established by showing that if a backward proof search fails to terminate in an axiom because
some branch of the backward search fails to close after all possible rules have been fairly applied
then the resulting branch can be used to build a counter-model to the goal. This property is
maintained provided that our proof rules extract all the “logical content” of the formula.
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Top level relations:
x ∈ B ` ` x ∈ A
A ⊆ B ` ⊆1 -left
x∗ ∈ A ` x∗ ∈ B
` A ⊆ B ⊆1 -right
xSy ` ` xRy
R ⊆ S ` ⊆2 -left
x∗Ry∗ ` x∗Sy∗
` R ⊆ S ⊆2 -right
x ∈A, x ∈B ` ` x ∈A, x ∈B
A = B ` =1 -left
x∗ ∈A ` x∗ ∈B x∗ ∈B ` x∗ ∈A
` A = B =1 -right
x R y, x S y ` ` x R y, x S y
R = S ` =2 -left
x∗ R y∗ ` x∗ S y∗ x∗ S y∗ ` x∗ R y∗
` R = S =2 -right
Boolean Operations on Sets:
x ∈ A, x ∈ B `
x ∈ A∩ B ` ∩-left
` x ∈ A ` x ∈ B
` x ∈ A∩ B ∩-right
x ∈ A ` x ∈ B `
x ∈ A∪ B ` ∪-left
` x ∈ A, x ∈ B
` x ∈ A∪ B ∪-right
` x ∈ A
x ∈ A ` -left
x ∈ A `
` x ∈ A -right
Operators on Sets:
y∗ ∈ A, y∗Rx `
x ∈ R∃A ` ∃
-left
` y ∈ A ` yRx
` x ∈ R∃A ∃
-right
y ∈ A ` ` xRy
x ∈ R∀A `
∀-left
xRy∗ ` y∗ ∈ A
` x ∈ R∀A
∀-right
Figure 7.4.: Gentzen Rules for Sets
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Boolean Operations for Relations:
xRy ` xSy `
x (R∪ S) y ` ∪-left
` xRy, xSy
` x (R∪ S) y ∪-right
xRy, xSy `
x (R∩ S) y ` ∩-left
` xRy ` xSy
` x (R∩ S) y ∩-right
` xRy
x R y ` -left
xRy `
` x R y -right
Relational Algebra Operators on Relations:
` yRx
xR˘y ` -˘left
` yRx
` xR˘y -˘right
xRz∗, z∗Sy `
x (R o9 S) y ` ; -left
` xRz ` zSy
` x (R o9 S) y
; -right
yRz∗, z∗Sx `
x (R ◦ S) y ` ◦ -left
` yRz ` zSx
` x (R ◦ S) y ◦ -right
Identity Relation:
y I x `
x I y ` sym-left
` y I x
` x I y sym-right
y ∈ A `
x ∈ A, x I y ` Iset-left
` y ∈ A
x I y ` x ∈ A Iset-right
zRt `
xRy, x I z ` Irel-left1
` zRy
x I z ` xRy Irel-right1
xRz `
xRy, x I z ` Irel-left2
` xRz
x I z ` xRy Irel-right2
Figure 7.5.: Gentzen Rules for Relations
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Constant Sets and Relations:
x ∈ {a1} ` . . . x ∈ {an} `
x ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , an} ` { }-left
` x ∈ {a1}, . . . , x ∈ {an}
` x ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , an} { }-right
x{a1 7→ b1}y ` . . . x{an 7→ bn}y `
x {a1 7→ b1, . . . , an 7→ bn} y ` { }-left
` x{a1 7→ b1}y, . . . , x{an 7→ bn}y
` x {a1 7→ b1, . . . , an 7→ bn} y { }-right
Figure 7.6.: Gentzen Rules for Constants
this is not possible then simple type theory (or a low order fragment of simple
theory) might be adopted to define the maximisation/minimisation required.
Similarly, in the above logic, we can capture the arithmetic part of the axioms for
reflexive transitive closures of relations i.e. for T the reflexive transitive closure of
R, I ⊆ T, R ⊆ T and T o9 T ⊆ T, and indeed, could add the corresponding inference
for an operator ∗ on binary relations. This would be adequate for reasoning in
a fixed finite system in the sense that for any pair of values connected by such a
closure there would be a proof of that connection (since the proof would simply be
the unwrapping of the closure into its steps). But the induction principle would be
missing, i.e. that the closure is the least relation satisfying the axioms. Here again,
the route of formalising in simple type theory and attempting to extract the logical
content as rules seems a way forward.
Although both these areas need to addressed before we can arrive at a full
deductive account of Trust Systems in general, the above proof system, with the
arithmetic axioms for reflexive transitive closure, is sufficient for practical work on
opinion consistent trust systems in the sense that it can be used to both prove the
club conditions on a set, and the existence of a social connection within a set.
Extending the deductive logic to the Conjunctive Coalition Systems, introduced
in Chapter 6, is of interest for at least two reasons. Firstly, intrinsically, because
it extends argumentation systems from pair-wise interaction of augments to
interaction between multiple arguments10.
Secondly, from the results of Chapter 6 it seems probable that a Preferential
10Not only is such interaction interesting in its own right but it can also provide a simple account of
higher order argumentation in which arguments may attack an attack rather than just another
argument [77]. To see how this may be done consider a simpler system with a ternary attack
relation R : P(Args×Args×Args), with the meaning of R(a, b, c) being, taken together a and
b attack c. We divide Args into two disjoint sets which we call facts and reasons. Facts play
the role of arguments that may attack one another and may also attack reasons. Reasons
are regarded as labels to attacks between facts and between facts and reasons. If we restrict
R to R : P(facts × reasons × Args) then we have the skeleton framework for a higher order
argumentation system.
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Axioms:
P ` P axiom
x ∈ {} ` {}set-left
` x ∈ Args Args -right
` x ∈ {x} {−}set-right
x {} y ` {}rel-left
` x∞ y ∞-right
` x I x I-right
` x {x 7→ y} y {−}rel-right
Figure 7.7.: Gentzen Rules for Axioms
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Coherence logic can be built from a logic for Conjunctive Coalition systems. Such
an approach would make Preferential Coherence a special case of argumentation.
Potentially the mix of Preferential Coherence and other argumentation would allow
the construction of trust systems in which Knowledge-on-Trust and Social-Trust
reasoning are combined.
The complicating factor here is that we need to quantify over sets of arguments,
so that we may say, for example, that a coalition A attacks a coalition B if there
is a subset of A that attacks a subset of B. Following the approach above, the
appropriate method would seem to be to start with a framework of type theory,
phrase a translation of the relational language into simple type theory, then create
a system of derived rules that extract the logical content of the definitions.
Finally, an interesting direction to consider is proof systems for finite models
i.e. what happens when we take models as finite but not specifically given. That
is, can we get a proof system in which we may draw conclusions about what must
be true for all finite sets of arguments when the relations have some particular
properties?
7.4. Risk and Influence
Trust is taken on-balance, all-things-being-equal, on the basis of nothing-to-the-contrary.
It is not absolute, it is not certain; rather it stands in place of certainty when cer-
tainty itself is absent. The attempt to find certainty is misplaced, a waste of effort
that could be better spent by getting on with life. We are human, we co-operate,
we trust. We start off trusting and learn to distrust, this is the fate of social animals.
The analysis of the gains of trust are exactly that. An analysis, not an explanation
of why we trust. Notions of reciprocation, and generalised reciprocation, cannot
give rise to trust because before there is reciprocation, there must be a deferred
return, a deferred part of an exchange, there must be a promise and there must
be trust in that promise. We do not learn trust from reciprocation, rather we
learn distrust from the failure of reciprocation. If we have gone so far in learning
distrust that we do not trust strangers then how are we to deal with them? The
social answer is to acquire trust from those who have unbroken trust. You are not
a stranger and I trust you when you say this stranger is trustworthy. So, at least
provisionally, I trust the stranger (that is all-things-being-equal, no-knowledge-to-
the-contrary etc.). And in all this there is risk. The risk I am exposed to is that I
was wrong to place faith in your opinion. So the question of risk is really the one
of how much your opinion mattered in my decision to trust. Just how sensitive
was my decision to your input?
In this section we consider a notion of the sensitivity of argumentation systems
and trust systems. This analysis is based on that of Kenneth Parker and Edward
McCluskey’s analysis of probabilities for boolean switching functions, reported
in “Probabilistic Treatment of General Combinational Networks” [86] and sub-
sequent elaboration [70, 87]. Here, the work is extended to non-functional (that
is, relational) systems11. The analysis below develops the notion of the degree of
11It should perhaps be pointed out that variations on this functional analysis have been indepen-
dently discovered many times in areas such as, voting analysis, in which it has been used to
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a b c = a ∧ b
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
Figure 7.8.: Truth Table for And
influence that one argument, or individual, being in a position, has upon another
argument, or individual, being in a position.
In an argumentation system, arguments which are not attacked or supported by
any other argument are independent variables whose values may be freely set to true
or false. An argument which is not an independent variable is called a dependent
variable. Dependent variables may not be wholly determined by the independent
variables but are constrained by them12. In trying to formulate a position for an
argumentation system we might consider asking how much influence a particular
independent variable has on a particular dependent variable being in a position.
Extending this to trust systems amounts to asking how much influence a particular
independent variable (an individual) has on a trust outcome. A complication that
arises when considering trust systems is that the independent variable may affect
the social connections between two individuals by affecting trust in any individual
in the social connections. So in the case of a trust system we ask the question as
to how much effect an independent variable has on a particular social connection
between individuals.
First the case of influence in argumentation systems. We consider generalised
argumentation systems via their boolean network representation.
If we consider a boolean network that represents a function from some inputs
to some output and ask the question of how much influence a particular input has
on the output, the answer is reasonably straightforward. The standard approach to
this problem is to calculate in what percentage of cases changing only the chosen
input causes the output to change. That is, if f is an n-argument function, then the
influence of the ith variable xi is:∣∣∣∣{(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)∣∣∣∣ f (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) 6=f (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)
}∣∣∣∣
2n
As a trivial illustration consider c = a ∧ b:
Examining the truth table in figure 7.8 we see that if b = 1 then if a changes
determined how much influence a single vote carries in a voting scheme and how that influence
scales with the population size. Possibly the earliest use of this is by L. S. Penrose in 1946 [88] to
derive that the influence of a vote in a simple majority choice scales as
√
n.
12We should observe at this point that taking the arguments that are neither attacked nor supported
by other arguments is a convention. In fact we are free to take any set of arguments as “indepen-
dent” and regard their value assignments as constraining the rest of the argumentation network.
However, given the intended meaning of attack and support the convention seems worthwhile.
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a b a⇒ b
1 1 1
1 0 0 ***
0 1 1
0 0 1
Figure 7.9.: Truth table for Implication Relation
from 1 to 0 then c must change from 1 to 0 and if a changes from 0 to 1 then c
must change from 0 to 1. In all other cases changing a does not require a change
to c. a’s influence on c is the number of rows of the truth table in which changing
a requires a change in c, which is 2, divided by the number of rows, which is 4, so
a’s influence on c is 12 .
For argumentation systems the relationship between independent variables and
dependent variables is not necessarily functional. As a result the “truth table”
connecting the independent variables to a dependent variable becomes relational,
i.e. it may contain two rows with the independent variables taking on the same
values for the different values of the dependent variable, and some values of the
independent variable may have no assignment to dependent variables.
To illustrate this let us consider the relation a⇒ b. That is, the implication is
required to be true so the truth table connecting a and b is shown in figure 7.9.
As we require the implication to hold, the starred row is banned since it
represents a case when the implication is false. As a result when b = 0 and a
changes from 0 to 1, b must change from 0 to 1 if the implication is to be maintained
(and this is the only case where changing a whilst maintaining the relation of
implication between a and b requires b to change). The influence of a on b is
therefore 13 . The general case is that we have an axiomatically constrained boolean
theory in a set of independent variables (x1, . . . , xn) and a dependent variable d.
This theory has a set of models M which we may write as vectors (d, x1, . . . , xn).
The influence of an independent variable xi on the dependent variable d is:∣∣∣∣{(d, x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)∣∣∣∣ (d, x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) ∈ M ∧(d, x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) 6∈ M
}∣∣∣∣
| M |
However, for argumentation this is not the whole story. We may be interested in
the risk associated with the assumption that the independent variable is assumed
to have a particular value. For example, if we assume an independent variable is
true what is the likelihood of this leading to including some dependent variable in
error? That is, what is the likelihood that changing the assumption will change
the inclusion of the dependent variable. Let us adopt the names influence0 and
influence1 for the influence of an independent variable on a dependent variable in
changing from 0 to 1 and analogously for the change from 1 to 0. As illustration, in
the implication example of figure 7.9, influence0 = 13 and influence1 = 0. Clearly,
infulence0 is given by:
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∣∣∣∣{(d, x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)∣∣∣∣ (d, x1, . . . , xi−1, 0, xi+1, . . . , xn) ∈ M ∧(d, x1, . . . , xi−1, 1, xi+1, . . . , xn) 6∈ M
}∣∣∣∣
| M |
and influence1 by:∣∣∣∣{(d, x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)∣∣∣∣ (d, x1, . . . , xi−1, 1, xi+1, . . . , xn) ∈ M ∧(d, x1, . . . , xi−1, 0, xi+1, . . . , xn) 6∈ M
}∣∣∣∣
| M |
and the total influence is the sum of influence0 + influence1. If the influence of
an independent variable on a dependent variable is 1 then the two variables are
completely correlated and the independent variable acts as a switch controlling
the dependent variable.
To apply the notion of influence to paths in trust systems we note that the
existence of a path can be modelled by a new dependent variable whose value is
the conjunction of the variables in the path. Applying this idea to the CA examples
in Chapter 5 we see that the variable News controls the trust in the company
websites of the examples.
This form of sensitivity analysis offers a method of assessing the risk we take
in making assumptions about the trustworthiness of individuals that are not
otherwise constrained by the network of relationships.
One intriguing possibility for further research is to use the notion of influence to
generate approximations to argumentation systems in general and trust systems in
particular. That is, we may generate simplified networks in which the influence of
selected independent variables on selected dependent variables is approximately
the same as the original system but lacking a number of the unselected variables.
Note: Moreover, the more advanced technique, spectral analysis of boolean
functions (see, for example, O’Donnell’s “Some topics in analysis of boolean
functions ” [80]) permit one to define further measures on functions such as:
Bias: the degree to which a particular outcome is favoured;
Energy: The average "swing input" i.e on average how many inputs need to change
to change the outcome;
Noise Stability: the probability that the output would remain the same even if
there was an independent input error probability of e for each input.
Extending these notions to relations offers the possibility of a more detailed
analysis of the behaviour of particular argumentation and trust systems.
7.5. Formal Logic of Promises
The theory of promises was informally developed in Chapter 2 as a basis for
discussing trust. The theory involves the interaction of actors via the promises
made between them, the belief states of actors and the choices and actions of the
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actor, including choosing to trust and the fulfilment, or otherwise, of the promises.
A formalisation of a logic of this system would have much in common with logics
for protocols, concurrency and, so called, agent logics, since they must discuss
similar notions, e.g. communication events, internal states of belief, actions, etc.
However the logic must differ in certain areas. It must encompass rational belief
based on uncertain knowledge and so non-monotonicity and/or paraconsistency;
it must encompass commitment as well as communication to capture consequential
promises (i.e. promises that have consequences if they are not fulfilled); and it must
encompass the choice to trust, i.e. the distinction between the potential trustee
simply performing an action from which the potential truster simply takes some
advantage and the action of the trustee being relied upon by a truster. The main
technical question to be addressed, however, is to what degree one can make
promises about promises and how to resolve the potential self-reference if this is
allowed. The logic of promises also takes us towards a logic of anticipatory systems
in that current actions may be based on the expectation, i.e. the anticipation, of
the fulfilment of promises by another party. To understand the significance of
this for trust consider the centipede game of Chapter 2. The backward induction
is avoided by each player anticipating the co-operation of the other. But this
anticipation is itself underwritten by trust. So we see may expect anticipatory logic,
and the full logic trust and promises, to be intertwined in their development.
Given such a logic we might move from the trust interaction diagrams given in
Chapter 2 to trust models which explain the dynamics of different forms of trust
and formalise by what rational basis we can avoid the collapse of trust, that so often
arises in the game theoretic analysis of interactions.
7.6. The Dynamics of Trust
This dissertation has been concerned with finding stable solutions to the problem
of Knowledge-on-Trust and Social-Trust. But what of the dynamics of how these
solutions are arrived at? If we consider, for example, Social-Trust, one might ask
how a stable trust assignment might evolve from a random assignment. In general,
such a process need not find a fixed point and may lock onto a cycle. The study of
the dynamics of social trust evaluation may illuminate pathologies of trust in the
real world, e.g. situations in which trust may fleetingly appear, only to disappear
and never be seen again. Such situations may arise because “local conditions”
initially give rise to trust but distant conditions overturn this local outcome. And
equally there may be insights into the opposite situation, in which distrust in an
individual gives way to trust as increasing social knowledge is obtained from
distant parts of one’s social network. Mathematically this problem seems closely
connected to the problem of solving satisfiability problems by finding fixed points
in a boolean network [23, 94].
If one shifts from an individual to a group perspective then one may further
imagine the dynamics as each individual re-evaluates and updates their position
in relation to the updates of other individuals. Which then itself leads to further
questions of how synchronous update versus asynchronous update differ in
outcome. The two processes are analogous to different social processes. For
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example, revision and update as the result of a news broadcast causes many
individuals to more-or-less simultaneously change their opinions, whereas update
driven by person-to-person spread rumour is essentially asynchronous. Clearly
the dynamics of trust offers many possible avenues to explore in future work.
7.7. The Elephant in the Room
As this research has continued it has become clear that there are many overlaps
with network theories in the social sciences. These connections did not show
up in my initial researches into theories of trust and trustworthiness but rather
emerged as I investigated a mathematical and computational theory of social trust.
This begs two questions: Why did such connections not emerge earlier? What, if
anything, is different about the theory developed here and other theories of social
networks?
The answer to the first question seems to be cultural. The majority of social
scientists and philosophers have tended to view trust informally and as a phe-
nomenon of individual psychology, with social context playing only a small role.
Those that have explored formal models have employed probability models based
on the notion that to trust is to take a risk, or have adopted game theoretic models
to explain the gains of trust versus distrust (i.e. some form of reciprocity model).
In these approaches the analysis is either in terms of pairwise interactions, or in
terms of a generalised group, or category, of interactants.
In contrast the network theorist have produced formal models in which pairwise
interactions form a network but the pairwise interactions they have considered
are the more-or-less objective properties of social groups, such, as connectivity,
influence, alliance, opposition, etc. In these models rather than considering
generalised categories of interactants, individuals interact with individuals to
whom they are explicitly connected to by some defined relation. Trust does not
seem to be a relation of interest to social network theorists, although one may argue
it is the key underlying relation assumed in the notions of alliance, friendship and
kinship (i.e., one assumes the significance of, say, a bond of friendship, in that it
entails that one participant trusts the other with respect to certain actions).
Rarely do these styles of analysis meet and where they do (see below) trust is
not explicitly discussed. In particular, in answer to our first question, no-one, it
seems, has attempted to answer questions of trust through network theory.
Where the styles of analysis do meet is in Harrison White’s notion of catnets
[114], and Dorwin Cartwright and Frank Harary’s Structural Balance Theory [25].
A catnet is the bringing together of “the notions of network (abridged net) and
category (abridged cat) in a new concept, catnet, which can be defined as any
set of individuals comprising both a category and a network” (Santoro [99]) or
"a bunch of people alike in some respect, from someone’s point of view” (White
[114]) who are connected by a relationship between pairs of individuals where
i) “the persons in the net accept the idea that they have meaningful indirect
relations with anyone paired with a man with whom they are paired (i.e.,
most of all persons, when considered as the ego viewing the net, accept
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“composition” as a meaningful “operator” on the net, to use mathematical
language);
ii) the relation diagrammed implies sufficient familiarity with the other in a pair
to have some idea of who else he is related to;
iii) yet the many possible indirect connections among people, at various removes
(through various numbers and patterns of intermediary persons) are not
recognised as falling into distinct new types of relations with their own
definitions and contents.” (White [114]).
So that, for example, we may consider a category, say neighbours, and a network
relation, say friendship, to determine a catnet of socialisation and co-operation
in my neighbourhood. Here the analysis differs from, say, that based on notions
such as solidarity (based for example on common, or shared, identity), in that it
is not simply a common property that determines the scope of socialisation and
co-operation but the particular network structure that exists between individuals
i.e. the particular structure of connections is important to understanding what can,
and cannot happen.
The second notion, Structural Balance Theory, is a theory of stable social
interaction that says social relationships are formed in such a way as to minimise
a certain form of stress in relationships. In essence it says that we form “friends”
and “enemies” and we attempt to maintain the triangle rules that “the friend of my
friend is my friend” and “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. The theory was
introduced and formalised using signed graph theory by Dorwin Cartwright and
Frank Harary in 1956 [25], and since then has been studied extensively (see, for
example, Frank Harary and Robert Norman’s “Structural Models: An introduction
to the theory of Directed Graphs” [47] and Per Hage and Frank Harary “Structural
Models in Anthropology” [45], or Chapter 6 of Stanley Wasserman and Katherine
Faust’s “Social Network Analysis” [113]).
Signed graphs are graphs with edges labelled + or − (or +1 and −1). Paths are
signed by multiplying the signs of the edges in the path. A half-edge is an edge
with a single vertex. A signed graph is called balanced if it has no half-edges and
every cycle has a positive sign. The central theorem of signed graph theory is that
a signed graph is balanced if, and only if, its vertices can be divided into two sets,
either of which may be empty, such that all edges within a set are positive and all
edges between the sets are negative. Signed graphs and the balance theorem are
used in social modelling as Structural Balance Theory to model the interaction of
groups with positive and negative connections. Balanced graphs are viewed as
stable and unbalanced graphs as unstable.
A weaker form of structural balance has also been posited by James Davis
[30] which only requires the first triangle rule, “the friend of my friend is my
friend”, thus permitting the possibility that “the enemy of my enemy is my
enemy”. The equivalent classification theorem becoming “if a signed graph is
weakly structurally balanced then it can be divided into groups in such a way
that all edges between members of a group are positive and all edges between
members of different groups are negative.
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Each of these notions has similarities to the approach taken to Social Trust
based on argumentation theory. In each case the notion of network is central, so
that the range of possibilities of individual action, or beliefs, arises from their
position in a network rather than from being part of some amorphous group or
class. In Structural Balance Theory, the stable sets that arise are the result of a
resolution of positive and negative forces on individuals, and the resolution can
be seen as a striving for consistent sets.
There are also differences. Social Trust theory, in contrast with catnets, lacks
a notion of category. Mathematically, this lack of the notion of category has no
great significance. After all, one could simply introduce the notion of categories
via an equivalence relation on individuals. Two individuals are equivalent if, and
only if, they are in the same category. Then, for example, trust might be restricted
to equivalent individuals and distrust is automatic between non-equivalent in-
dividuals. That is, only individuals in the same category can be trusted. The
more important question is should the social theory include a notion of category?
Should category membership play a role in establishing the grounds for trust and
distrust? The role of category is to establish a pre-condition beyond the direct
or transitive connections of the network. In this sense it may capture a notion
such as class solidarity. But, in the framework of the social trust theory it would
be a bias and not an absolute i.e. we would trust unless there was a reason to
distrust. In which case, however, there is no real difference between this notion
and the implicit trust discussed previously. That is, it is simply the complement
of the distrust relation. One view of this is to say that we have just restated the
mathematical equivalence. Another view, however, is that social category can
also be thought of via relationships between individuals rather than as a separate
concept. That is, social categories themselves arise out of the relationships between
individuals.
Similarly, Social Trust theory, when compared with Structural Balance Theory,
recognises the existence of competing ‘forces’ on individuals but does not assume
an evolution to a resolved situation. Rather it accepts that individuals may be
members of many different consistent communities, each of which can constitute
an alternative basis for a relation of initial trust in an individual via a social
connection within that community. Moreover the actual definition of consistency
differs between the various notions of Structural Balance and that of Social Trust.
Answering the second of the two questions then: The theory developed herein
is different from what appear to be the most relevant network theories. It makes
different social assumptions and different mathematical assumptions.
This said, it is undoubtedly true that a thorough investigation of the links
and differences between the notion of social trust and more mainstream social
network theories would be of considerable interest, as would an investigation of
the connection with the notion of Relational Sociology (see for example, Mustafa
Emirbayer’s “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology” [35]). Alas, this must be left to
future research.
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7.8. Conclusion
It is hoped that the topics covered in this chapter have gone some way to illustrating
both the breadth and depth to be found in the logical modelling of trust and
trustworthiness. The modelling approach has been one of unravelling logical
relationships between individuals or between utterance of individuals. On the
theoretical side, this gives rise to questions of how one reasons about these
relationships. When numeric considerations arise, they arise as intrinsic measures
of properties of the relationships, rather than as numeric indicators of uncertainty.
On the practical side, focusing on relationships forces us to consider the possible
sources of such information and the problems of individuals disclosing such
information for practical ends.
Thematically, the link to mathematical sociology offers many possibilities for
the future, not merely because of the overtly computational nature of the network
view of social interaction, but even more promisingly, because of the potential
applicability of the tools of theoretical computer science to the study of these
network structures.
Clearly, however, much must await future work. In the final chapter we will
turn to what has been gained from the journey so far.
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We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
Little Gidding V
T. S. Eliot
In which is discussed:
• Where we have arrived.
• What has been gained from the journey.
8.1. To Recap
Previous chapters have introduced a view of trust as arising from social embed-
dedness that makes it distinct from issues of security. Technical infrastructure can
offer security but not trust or trustworthiness. Trust is the decision to act on a
belief in the trustworthiness of an individual. Specifically it is the decision to act
on the basis that the promises made by the trusted individual will be fulfilled.
We have three sources of gaining information about trustworthiness:
• Our own direct experience;
• The experience of others as reported to us;
• The reports of the trustworthiness of others as reported to us.
Our problem in the modern world is to bootstrap from our own direct ex-
perience, using information gathered via our social network, to establish the
trustworthiness, or otherwise, of people of whom we have no (or insufficient)
direct experience.
In this dissertation I have posed two, related, sub-problems of bootstrapping
trust: How can one obtain Knowledge on Trust? And, How can one establish
Social Trust? These questions have been answered by developing both informal
and formal analysis of the concepts inherent in the questions and developing
effective, i.e. computational, means of performing the bootstrapping. The com-
putational approach has been based on adapting standard reasoning tools for
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classical logic (i.e. model checkers and proof systems in the form of tableaux) to
the new reasoning problem.
Throughout the dissertation I have deliberately emphasised those aspects of
trust arising through social processes as opposed to cognitive processes because, in
a modern society, trust rarely arises out of direct knowledge of other individuals.
This emphasis on social embeddedness is new and distinct from both the traditional
approach to trust which emphasises the experience of an individual, and from
swift trust which emphasises an individual’s experience of roles.
But where does all this get us? That is question to which we now turn in the
final section.
8.2. What is the Significance of this Theory of Trust?
Why is the theory of trust developed here significant? What might we do differently
in the light of such a theory?
There are two forms of answer that we dub the “immediately practical” and
the “contextual” answers.
Of the “immediately practical”, two answers are foremost:
• Because we want to improve the safety of remote interaction via the Internet
and the web;
• Because computer access control models are ultimately based upon, and
built around, an understanding of trust.
The first of these has been discussed in section 7.2 above. The latter answer
needs some elaboration, for it may not be obvious. The claim here is not that the
developers of access control models explicitly took a particular model of trust and
“implemented it”, but rather that particular models of trust, implicitly or explicitly,
underlie their decisions, and that these correspond to models of trust developed
elsewhere.
The original Bell-Lapadula model of confidentiality [7, 8, 9] was built on a
notion of explicit trust in which a vetting authority has direct trust in individuals
to handle documents at certain classifications. The Brewer-Nash, Chinese-Wall,
model of access control [20] kept with this explicit trust model but added dynamics
to the state of an individual (i.e. whether the individual is in possession of/has
accessed particular information). Ferraiolo and Kuhn’s Role Based Access Control
[39], is a model of access control based on Swift Trust, i.e. it is not the individual but
the role they occupy that is trusted to access classified information. Systems trust in
the role assignment mechanism underwrites this access, in this case meaning that
the vetting authority is trusted to correctly assign role entry permissions. Extended
versions of RBAC include delegation that allows others than a centralised vetting
authority to delegate or transfer access rights to others and so more closely
correspond to the flow of trust in social structures and organisations.
If then we develop alternative models for trust and trustworthiness, that apply
in new contexts or analyse trust and trustworthiness as arising in new ways,
then we may expect there to be correspondingly new access control models. In
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particular we might consider new access control models built on either Knowledge-
on-Trust or Social-Trust. Indeed, we may see the privacy model outlined in section
5.14 as exactly such a model built on Social-Trust.
Such are the immediate practical answers. The contextual answers are more
indirect in nature. By the “contextual” answer I mean that which alters the
context in which we do things and thereby alters what we do. By studying
trust, and examining new models of trust acquisition, we alter our perspective
on systems analysis. By considering trust as, at least in part, arising from our
social embeddedness, we change our perspective on trust, from one of individual
rationality, to one of social rationality in which we consider how an individual sits
in our social world.
For example, in buying an item from a supplier that does not have the item
in stock, I have the promise of the supplier that in return for my payment, made
now, that the supplier will deliver the goods at some bounded time in the future.
But I also have a promise from “civil society” to the effect that if the supplier
does not deliver the goods, then there are actions that can be taken against the
supplier. However, to secure the benefits of this second promise, I need proof
of the transaction, and therefore a secure record of the transaction, including
the jurisdiction it took place in, agreements entered into, etc. We take all this
for granted because buying something from a supplier is commonplace. But the
framework of good practice, social norms, case law and legislation governing such
simple transactions and underwriting trust in the transaction, has taken long to
establish and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Yet, almost daily, we are responsible for creating new mechanisms of interaction
and trade between people. The newness may arise because of relative anonymity,
the size of audience reached, because of trade across jurisdictional borders, because
it deals with new forms of content or commodity (e.g. information commodities
with no tangible form), because new payment models are involved or any number
of other forms of newness. Along with these mechanisms come new social
conventions, new business opportunities, and new crimes. And these give rise, in
their turn, to new laws, new responsibilities for individuals and new realms of
regulation by governments. The changes we make are not trivial. They alter the
dynamics of our society, often in unexpected ways1.
Whatever the newness involved, it is the job of the systems analyst2 to identify
what promises are made by whom, and to whom they are made; what needs to be
recorded and protected; and what needs to be audited and by whom, so that trust
is appropriately underwritten.
That is, systems analysis is not performed in a vacuum. Rather it is performed
against theories that fill in the “invisible” parts of the system. Having a different
theory of trust and trustworthiness means we perform our analysis differently. As
1As may be illustrated by two minor examples of the unexpected behaviour. Danah Boyd’s doctoral
dissertation gives an account of how account passwords for social network sites are shared as a
token of intimacy [19] and the BBC news reports on how iTunes passwords are left in Wills to
pass on music collections as part of an inheritance now that physical media are disappearing BBC
News 14 Oct 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-15292748. Neither of these possibilities are
foreseen in the terms and conditions of websites or digital retailers.
2An old fashioned term, but I know of no other that appropriately captures the role.
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Frederic Bastiat says of economists
There is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the
bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes
into account both the effect that can be seen and those effects that must be
foreseen3.
So it is with systems analysts.
And it is for this, if for no other reason, that we must study trust. So that we
may create theories of trust that are closer to trust-in-the-wild, so that we may be
good systems analysts and foresee that which is not visible.
3Bastiat, Frederic. “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” Online at: http://www.econlib.org/
library/Bastiat/basEss1.html.
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A. Proofs
PROPOSITION 1
• Acceptability - defined as R˘∃S ⊆ R∃S is equivalently expressed as S ⊆ R˘∀R∃S.
by R˘∃S ⊆ R∃S
hint Galois
≡ S ⊆ R˘∀R∃S
• Completness - defined as D(S) ⊆ S, is equivalently expressed as R˘∀R∃S ⊆ S.
by D(S) ⊆ S
≡ {y | R˘∃{y} ⊆ R∃S} ⊆ S
≡ {y | {y} ⊆ R˘∀R∃S} ⊆ S
≡ ∀ y. {y} ⊆ R˘∀R∃S⇒ y ∈ S
≡ ∀ y. y ∈ R˘∀R∃S⇒ y ∈ S
≡ R˘∀R∃S ⊆ S
PROPOSITION 2 S is conflict free is equivalent to R˘∃S ⊆ S
by R∃S ⊆ S
≡ S ⊆ R∃S
≡ S ⊆ R˘∀S
≡ R˘∃S ⊆ S
PROPOSITION 3 S∪ R∃S = Args is equivalent to S ⊆ R∃S.
by S∪ R∃S = Args
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≡ S∪ R∃S = Args
≡ S∩ R∃S = ∅
≡ S ⊆ R∃S
PROPOSITION 4 If S is admissible and S∪ R∃S = Args then it is preferred and
semi-stable.
S is preferred follows from all greater S′ are not admissible.
note from conflict free and S∪ R∃S = Args we have S = R∃S
assume S′ ⊃ S
hence S′ = S∪ S′′ for some S′′ ⊆ R∃S
hence S′ not conflict free and therefore not admissible.
and since S is preferred and S∪ R∃S = Args there can be no larger set T ⊃ S in
the coverage ordering.
PROPOSITION 5 If S is conflict free and stable then it is acceptable and complete.
S is acceptable
by R˘∃S ⊆ S
≡ S ⊆ R˘∀S
hint R∃S = S
≡ S ⊆ R˘∀R∃S
S is complete
by S = R∃S
⇒ S ⊆ R∃S
≡ R∃S ⊆ S
≡ R˘∀S ⊆ S
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hint R∃S = S
≡ R˘∀R∃S ⊆ S
PROPOSITION 7 X ⊆ T∗∃X
by X ⊆ T∗∃X
≡ X ⊆ X ∪ T∃X ∪ T2∃X ∪ . . .
≡ true
and hence, if X is trust closed, X = T∗∃X by
by X ⊆ T∗∃X
∧ T∗∃X ⊆ X
≡ X = T∗∃X
PROPOSITION 8 X is internally trust consistent is equivalent to: the attackers
of X are in the complement of the trust closure of X i.e. A˘∃X ⊆ T∗∃X.
by (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ X
≡ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ X
≡ T∗∃X ⊆ A∀X
≡ T∗∃X ⊆ A˘∃X
≡ A˘∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
PROPOSITION 9 X is externally trust consistent is equivalent to: the attack-
ers of the trust closure of X are in the complement of the trust closure i.e.
A˘∃(T∗∃X) ⊆ T∗∃X.
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by (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
≡ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
≡ T∗∃X ⊆ A∀T∗∃X
≡ T∗∃X ⊆ A˘∃T∗∃X
≡ A˘∃(T∗∃X) ⊆ T∗∃X
PROPOSITION 10 A set X is externally trust consistent if its trust closure is
conflict free, i.e. A∃(T∗∃X) ⊆ T∗∃X.
by (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
≡ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
PROPOSITION 11 If a set is externally trust consistent then it is internally trust
consistent.
by (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
≡ (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ X ∪ T∃X ∪ T2∃X ∪ . . .
≡ (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ X ∩ T∃X ∪ T2∃X ∪ . . .
⇒ (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ X
PROPOSITION 12 If a set is internally trust consistent then it is conflict free.
by (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ X
≡ A∃(T∗∃X) ⊆ X
≡ A∃((X ∪ T∃X ∪ T2∃X ∪ . . .)) ⊆ X
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≡ (A∃X ∪A∃T∃X ∪A∃T2∃X ∪ . . .) ⊆ T∗∃X
⇒ A∃X ⊆ X
PROPOSITION 13 If X is trust closed and internally trust consistent then it is
externally trust consistent.
by T∗∃X = X
and (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ X
⇒ (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
PROPOSITION 14 X is externally trust consistent is equivalent to:
A: X ⊆ T∗∀A˘∀ ◦ T˘∗∀X and hence to
B: T˘∗∃A˘∃T∗∃X ⊆ X and
C: T∗∃A∃T˘∗∃X ⊆ X
A by (A ◦ T∗)∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
≡ T∗∃X ⊆ (A ◦ T∗)∃X
≡ T∗∃X ⊆ ˘(A ◦ T∗)
∀
X
≡ T∗∃X ⊆ (T˘∗ ◦ A˘)∀X
≡ X ⊆ T∗∀(T˘∗ ◦ A˘)∀X
hint (U ◦ V)∀ = V∀ ◦ U∀
≡ X ⊆ T∗∀A˘∀ ◦ T˘∗∀X
≡ X ⊆ T∗∀A˘∀T˘∗∀X
B by X ⊆ T∗∀A˘∀T˘∗∀X
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hint Galois
≡ T˘∗∃A˘∃T∗∃X ⊆ X
C by X ⊆ T∗∀A˘∀T˘∗∀X
hint conjugates
≡ T˘∗∃A∃T∗∃X ⊆ X
PROPOSITION 15 If X is a Trust Extended admissible set then it is a subset of
some Y which is a Trust Closed admissible set, i.e.
admissibleX X⇒ ∃Y ⊇ X. admissibleT Y.
by admissibleX X⇒ ∃Y ⊇ X. admissibleT Y.
hint Choose Y = T∗∃X and simplify
⇐ admissibleX X⇒ T∗∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X ∧ admissibleD T∗∃X
hint T∗∃ is a closure operator
≡ admissibleX X⇒ admissibleD T∗∃X
≡ true
PROPOSITION 17 X is Externally Consistent is equivalent to there exists some
Y subset of X such that Y is T-closed and conflict free.
⇒ forward direction
by A∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
hint T∗∃T
∗
∃X ⊆ T∗∃X = true
≡ T∗∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X ∧ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
hint abstract over T∗∃X
⇒ ∃Y.T∗∃Y ⊆ Y ∧ A∃Y ⊆ Y
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⇐ backward direction
by ∃Y.T∗∃Y ⊆ Y ∧ A∃Y ⊆ Y
hint instantiate Y to T∗∃X
⇒ T∗∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X ∧ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
hint T∗∃T
∗
∃X ⊆ T∗∃X = true
≡ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X
PROPOSITION 18 X is Internally Consistent is equivalent to there exists some
Y subset of X such that Y is T-closed and Y is not in conflict with X.
⇒ forward direction
by A∃T∗∃X ⊆ X
hint T∗∃T
∗
∃X ⊆ T∗∃X = true
≡ T∗∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X ∧ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ X
hint abstract over T∗∃X
⇒ ∃Y.T∗∃Y ⊆ Y ∧ A∃Y ⊆ X
⇐ backward direction
by ∃Y.T∗∃Y ⊆ Y ∧ A∃Y ⊆ X
hint instantiate Y to T∗∃X
⇒ T∗∃T∗∃X ⊆ T∗∃X ∧ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ X
hint T∗∃T
∗
∃X ⊆ T∗∃X = true
≡ A∃T∗∃X ⊆ X
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B. Trivial Examples Using MACE4
The simple examples used in chapter 5 to illustrate the translation of Dungian
argumentation systems into Boolean Networks are used here to illustrate the use
of MACE4 for model finding for such systems.
Example 5.4(i) has the translation
• a⇒ ¬b,
• b⇒ ¬ c,
• c⇒ a,
• b⇒ false,
• a⇒ true.
Using the MACE4 equivalents given in the following table:
operation symbolic MACE4 input
implies a⇒ b a -> b
not ¬ a -a
and a ∧ b a & b
or a ∨ b a | b
true true $T
false false $F
gives the MACE4 input:
% inhibition
a -> -b.
b -> -c.
% feedback
a -> $T.
b -> $F.
c -> a.
For which MACE4 generates the assignments:
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% number = 1
a : 0
b : 0
c : 0
% number = 2
a : 1
b : 0
c : 0
% number = 3
a : 1
b : 0
c : 1
Continuing with the example 5.5(i) in the in the model checker’s language
gives:
% inhibition
a1 -> - b.
a2 -> -b.
b -> -c.
% feedback
a1 -> $T.
a2 -> $T.
b -> $F.
c -> (a1 | a2).
Giving assignments:
% number = 1
a1 : 0
a2 : 0
b : 0
c : 0
% Interpretation of size 2
a1 : 0
a2 : 1
b : 0
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c : 0
% number = 3
a1 : 0
a2 : 1
b : 0
c : 1
% number = 4
a1 : 1
a2 : 0
b : 0
c : 0
% number = 5
a1 : 1
a2 : 0
b : 0
c : 1
% number = 6
a1 : 1
a2 : 1
b : 0
c : 0
% number = 7
a1 : 1
a2 : 1
b : 0
c : 1
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C. An Outline of the Theory of
Information Security via Galois
Connections
Confidentiality is defined either by semi-operational models, such as Bell-Lapadula
[7, 8], or by abstract systems properties, such as Goguen and Meseguer’s Non-
Interference property [43], and its subsequent developments (see, for example,
Peter Ryan’s tutorial presentation “Mathematical Models of Computer Security”
[96]).
Typically, in a model based account, there is an assignment of labels to pieces of
information coding the information’s classification, and an assignment of labels to
individuals representing the individual’s clearance. Access is modelled by a state
transition system with states representing which individuals have access to what
information. The system is constrained to follow transition rules obeying some
invariance relating the classification of information to the clearances of individuals
with access to that information. The constraints capture an abstract notion of a
confidentiality policy for handling the information. Confidentiality is maintained
if all system transitions obey the constraints.
The abstract systems property approach steps back a further level from this by
not explicitly modelling the transition system. The system is regarded as some
relation connecting inputs, carrying information at various levels of classification,
to outputs, also at various levels of classification. That is to say, the notion of
classification is associated with the systems inputs and outputs. Individuals can
be identified with the outputs to which they have access1. The system property
approach identifies confidentiality with the lack of information flow between
selected inputs and selected outputs2. Different system properties are defined by
taking different definitions of information flow.
A simple generalised view of the system properties approach can be obtained
via Galois Connections. We may think of a system as an n-ary relation R that
connects n information spaces, each space representing an input or output of the
system. That is, R is a relation over n information sources Si, i.e. R : P(×ni=1Si). We
1This is because we are discussing confidentiality. If we were to consider integrity as well we
would need to identify individuals with the set of inputs and outputs to which they have access.
2Actually this view of inputs and outputs is not strictly accurate. Consider a cryptographic clock
with no input and two outputs high and low. Output low will be the time as measured by the
clock and output high is a secure digest of the time and a password creating a unique sequence
of one-time-passwords. Any individual may read the time but only highly cleared individuals
may read high. The system is secure if there is no information flow to low about the high output.
We should regard inputs and outputs as a naming heuristic rather than as a definition of role in
the systems property approach. Of course, the real problem here is that of finding a suitable
definition of information flow.
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now select two, disjoint, index sets I, J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, with I ∪ J = {1, . . . , n}, and
consider the possibility of information flow between the subspaces A = ×i∈ISi and
B = ×j∈JSj.
This all amounts to considering a binary relation R′ between the two spaces A
and B. For concreteness we will say R′ is from A to B. To simplify matters a little
we will assume that R′ is total in each direction. A property on a (sub)space is
defined as a subset of the (sub)space. The observation of a property on a subspace
of a system is the determination that the state of the system falls within the
region of the subspace defining that property. Information flow between spaces A
and B occurs when the observation of a property on B (i.e. that the system is in
some particular region of B) is sufficient grounds to conclude that some particular
property also holds on subspace A (i.e. we can determine a property of the A
projection of the system from information obtained about the B projection of the
system).
Specifically a property A′ ⊆ A is observable by observation B′ ⊆ B if R˘′∀A′ = B′.
That is, if the system R′ is observed to be in region B′ of B then the only elements
of A which correspond to this situation are in A′. Note we do not assume that it is
the case for every element of A′. Rather A′ contains an interior A′′ equal to R˘′∃B′,
i.e. equal to R˘′∃R˘′
∀
A′.
A property of A′ is unobservable if R˘′∀A′ = ∅7 (in which case the interior of A′
is also empty). In some cases an observer may also be interested in knowing that
some property definitely does not hold. A property A′ is negatively observable
when A′ is observable, and negatively unobservable when A′ is unobservable. If
A′ is both unobservable and negatively unobservable we will say it is completely
unobservable. If A′ is completely unobservable then no observation in B can
discriminate between A′ and A′ is A.
One interesting aspect of this characterisation is that it relates properties of
spaces i.e. observability depends on the chosen property of the space. Com-
plete non-interference is obtained by generalising over all properties, that is:
∀A′ ⊂ A.R˘′∀A′ = ∅. In which case no observation on B can reveal anything about
A. Dualising the notion of observability to controllability creates the corresponding
theory of integrity i.e. ensuring that a particular property A′ holds on A is a suffi-
cient condition to know that a particular property B′ holds on B. Integrity requires
that A is unable to control B. Taken together, observability and controllability give
an explicit notion of correlation between spaces in which knowing that a property
A′ holds on A is the same as knowing that some particular property B′ holds on B
and vice versa. If A is an input space, meaning that it is possible to externally select
which point the system occupies in A, and B is an output space meaning that it is
possible to observe the whole of B, then this notion of correlation through R may
legitimately be called communication channel, in that a signaller with access to A
may send a message to an observer of B by coding using means of pre-agreed
properties.
7That is, the unobservability of a property corresponds to: if the system is in A′ then it may
simultaneously be in any part of B.
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Boolean Coherence: Does it make sense?
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Abstract. We continually face the problem of making sense of the world
by resolving conflicting reports from multiple sources of information.
This is particularly so if we attempt to formulate Qualitative Safety1 Ar-
guments. Traditional logic offers little to assist in this process.
In every day reasoning we usually assume that, without information to
the contrary, we should use all information from all sources and that “in-
formation to the contrary” is the presence of an inconsistency between
the sources. In order to resolve these conflicts we must make use of ad-
ditional information which gives preference to one source of information
over another when conflict arises between sources.
The suggestion put forward in this note is that it is possible to reach a
‘best’ conclusion by taking the most coherent theory that respects the
preference ordering on sources and that this theory is the maximal con-
sistent theory with respect to the ordering. This process is parameterized
by an underlying notion of logic that provides the notions of consistency
and entailment. This notion is straightforward when applied to the stan-
dard notion of a strict preference ordering but is a little more involved
when we consider partially ordered preferences.
1 Introduction
A safety case documents the argument that links evidential claims to a safety
claim that they support. The evidential claims are propositions whose truth is
supported by evidence. The safety claim is a direct or indirect logical conse-
quence of the evidential claims. This is essentially the view set out by e.g. Bishop
and Bloomfield [3] or Wilson, Kelly and McDermid [14] (although both include
additions and extensions to this basic view). If this was all there was to con-
sider, the world would be simple and standard logical reasoning would allow
one to take the evidential claims and prove (or not) the safety claim. Indeed,
Rushby considers how a large system of claims might be formalized in a way
that could be handled by existing theorem proving tools [11]. The problem,
however, is that the real world is not so simple. Evidential claims need to be
selected from a collection of potentially conflicting claims that arise from dif-
ferent sources of information and that are supported by varying degrees of
1 Here, and throughout, safety refers to the real world safety of a system, as opposed
to the technical notions of safety (and liveness) introduced into program verification
by Lamport [8].
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evidence. Moreover the notion of degree, or strength, of evidence is far from
straightforward. In general we are neither neutral to what is asserted as an
evidential claim nor neutral about the source from which the claim arises. We
rate the plausibility of a claim by such assessments as the degree to which
it accords with our own experience, the degree of bias we might think is be-
ing expressed, the reproducibility of results, the experience of an individual
making a claim, the methodology (or lack of it) that lead to the claim, etc.
A safety case will simply be that some suitably selected set of the evidential
claims entails the safety claim. The issue is what does suitably selected actually
mean?
The approach taken here is to at least partially formalize these notions in
a framework we call Boolean Coherence2. It is related to Rescher and Manor’s
paraconsistent logic [10] and Default Logic [9] in the way that it deals with
the presence of inconsistencies, and is strongly related to Prioritized Default
Logic (see, for example, [2, 5, 6]) in its use of a preference relation to decide
which assertions should be considered active during reasoning. Unlike these
logics however, our concern is with selecting a consistent subset of the eviden-
tially supported claims rather than in defining a different notion of entailment.
The approach is parameterized by an underlying notion of logic which can be
varied, but for this paper we will assume the underlying logic to be classical
propositional logic. Entailment comes from the underlying logic and is used
to show that the claims either hold, or fail to hold, with respect to this selected
subset. This has the effect of making our notion of entailment more conserva-
tive than those used either in systems of paraconsistent or default logic.
To select one claim over another requires the use of additional information
about the claims. We require each claim to be labeled by a source and that a
preference ordering is imposed over sources.
A source is a formal notion reflecting whatever it is that supports the verac-
ity of the claim (e.g. an individual making the claim, a process that produces
a result, etc.), and the preference ordering over sources expresses the idea that
some sources reflect a higher strength of evidence than others. The selection
rule is that we start with the strongest sources and progressively include infor-
mation from weaker sources. When contradictions arise between sources or-
dered by the preference relation then we preserve stronger sources in favour of
weaker sources. When contradictions arise between claims not strictly ordered
by the preference relation we remove the weakest set of sources that removes
the contradiction, treating both sides of the contradiction symmetrically.
Consider a simple hypothetical example: A company intends to place a ra-
dio transmitter mast in a location near a school. Legislation permits the com-
pany to operate in one of two bands, Band X and Band Y. Recent medical
opinion from extensive experimentation on mice is that Band X is unsafe. An
expert biophysicist believes that if Band X is unsafe then the same is true of
Band Y, although he has no experimental evidence to back this up. A technical
expert is willing to testify that the company operates in Band Y. We might
2 In contradistinction to Bayesian Coherence as discussed in, e.g. [4]
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consider the ordering of plausibility of this evidence as: legislation is the most
definite fact, the medical expertise and the technical expertise are on a par and
that the biophysicist is expressing an opinion which is less well founded i.e.
legislation > medicalExpertise = technicalExpertise > biophysicist. The conclu-
sion we arrive at is that it is unsafe to place the transmitter mast given the
best evidence available. If now, however, additional evidence from a medical
expert is received to the effect that the same experiments that were performed
on mice using Band X were performed on mice using Band Y and there were
no ill effects, then we would revise our conclusion even if the biophysicist
still holds the same opinion about the relation between Band X and Band Y.
The reason we revise our assessment is that the new medical claim is stronger
than the biophysicist opinion because it is backed by experimental evidence.
In essence the overall safety case can be expressed as the hypothesis ‘safe’
follows from the most plausible theory we can construct given the available
sources of evidence and our relative evaluations of the plausibility, reliability
or trustworthiness of the evidence. Using a fairly self evident formalism the
overall safety case can expressed as:
legislation >
medicalExpertise = technicalExpertise >
biophysicist |
legislation: (BandX & ~BandY) + (~BandX & BandY),
medicalExpertise: BandX => ~safe,
medicalExpertise: BandY => safe,
biophysicist: (BandX => ~safe) => (BandY => ~safe),
technicalExpertise: ~BandX
hypothesis
safe
The ordering gives the reason that we reject the evidence of the biophysi-
cist, i.e. that, in the context of the other claims, it contradicts ‘stronger‘ claims.
Our goal is to formalize such reasoning to enable the capture of all of the
claims, whether used or rejected, in constructing the safety case.
2 Formalisation
The reasoning process can be viewed as finding a maximal consistent set of
sources that is also a maximal set in an ordering obtained when the source
ordering is extended to an ordering on sets of sources. This extension to sets
of sources should obey two simple conditions:
– Given two sets of sources, A and B, any sources they have in common
cannot help decide between them.
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– Given two sets of sources, A and B, with no sources in common, A is
greater than B if for every element b of B, A has some element greater than
b
That is, when we ignore the elements that A and B have in common, A
is bigger than B if, whichever element of B we look at, we can always find a
bigger element of A.
We formalize this as a relation over non-empty sets, by: Let  be the or-
dering on sources, which is a strict partial order (i.e. irreflexive and transitive),
possibly obtained as the strict part of a non-strict partial order (i.e. reflexive,
transitive and anti-symmetric), then, for non-empty, distinct, sets A and B3,
A A B ≡ ∀b ∈ B \ A. ∃a ∈ A \ B. a  b
and otherwise false.
If  is a strict total order then there is only one maximally consistent set
that is also maximal in this ordering A. If  is a strict partial order then this is
no longer the case and there may be none, one or many maximally consistent
sets that are ‘largest’. That is, we have a collection of sets that are incomparable
under the ordering A and are inconsistent with one another. In this case we
opt to take the common elements of all the maximally consistent sets that are
also maximally in A.
Let P be a propositional language and let L be a set of labels denoting
sources. The set of pairs L× P is the labeled propositional language generated
by L and P and we write elements of L× P as l : p where l ∈ L and p ∈ P.
We define the projections on sets of pairs prop(S) = {p | ∃l. l : p ∈ S},
lab(S) = {l | ∃p. l : p ∈ S} and the selective projection, for a set of labeled
propositions S and a set of labels l, S ◦ l = {p | x : p ∈ S ∧ x ∈ l}.
We assume P is equipped with a consistency predicate CONS Q which de-
termines for each Q ⊆ P whether or not Q is consistent and an entailment
relation ` which determines if a set Q ⊆ P entails a given p, element of P4.
Given a set of labeled propositions, S, we define cons S as the set of all consis-
tent subsets of S by5:
3 We should note that because this relation is only used over maximally consistent sets
to decide on which of two sets makes a ‘better’ choice with respect to resolving in-
consistencies, there is a degree of leeway in the exact relation that could be used. We
may also note that the relation we have used is closely allied to the Hoare ordering
used in defining the lower, or Hoare, power domain.
4 If we restrict ourselves to classical logic we may avoid having both CONS and `
as they are inter-definable. However, they are not necessarily so in a more general
setting. Moreover, one may be tempted to think of the setup with both relations as a
Scott information system [13] but this is not necessarily the case, as the underlying
logic not obey the axioms of information systems. For example, the underlying logic
could fail transitivity of entailment for consistent sets.
5 We treat the collection of assertions with the same label as if they were a single
conjunctive assertion with that label.
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cons S = {S ◦ l | l ⊆ lab(S) ∧ CONS(S ◦ l)}
Next we define the maximal sets under subset ordering (⊃) and the ex-
tended preference ordering (A):
max⊃X = {M ∈ X | ¬∃N ∈ X.N ⊃ M}
maxAX = {M ∈ X | ¬∃N ∈ X.lab(N) A lab(M)}
and these are used to define the set of alternative theories each of which is
maximal in the extended preference ordering:
alternatives S = maxA(max⊃(cons S))
Finally the most plausible theory is defined as the common elements of the
alternative maximal theories:
plausible S =
{
∅ if alternatives S = ∅⋂
(alternatives S) otherwise
The effect of the first maximization, by max⊃, is to take maximally con-
sistent sets. To aid the understanding the second maximization, maxA, we in-
troduce the notion of a conflict within a set of propositions. A conflict in a
set S is a minimal contradiction within S, i.e. a conflict is a set C ⊆ S such
that ¬CONS(C) and ∀C′ ⊂ C. CONS(C′). Let conflicts(S) be the set of all con-
flicts in S. We will say  uniquely resolves the conflicts of a set S if every
C ∈ conflicts(S) has a minimum element under this ordering.
Given a maximally consistent set A and a conflict C in A, then at least one
c ∈ C, is not in A. We say A excludes c. For maximally consistent sets, A
and B, A A B means that A excludes less preferred elements of conflicts than
does B. If  uniquely resolves the conflicts of a set S then there is a single
largest (under A) maximally consistent subset of S. If  does not uniquely
resolve the some conflicts of S then there are multiple maximally consistent
sets under A that differ in the elements they exclude of each conflict. As there
is no preference between these resolutions we cannot decide between them
and so reject all the alternative resolutions in favour of the common part of the
maximally consistent sets.
Returning to the example above and applying this definition of plausible
using a simple Boolean Coherence calculator program, the plausible theories
for “before” and “after” the additional medical information is obtained are:
medicalExpertise: BandX => ~safe
biophysicist: BandX => ~safe => BandY => ~safe
technicalExpertise: ~BandX
legislation: BandX & ~BandY + ~BandX & BandY
and
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legislation: BandX & ~BandY + ~BandX & BandY
medicalExpertise: (BandX => ~safe) &
(BandY => safe)
technicalExpertise: ~BandX
A hypothesis holds if it is entailed by the most plausible theory. In our
example case this gives either ~safe or safe respectively.
3 A Comparison with Some Other Logics
We briefly compare this approach to the paraconsistent logic of Rescher and
Manor and prioritized default logic.
Rescher and Manor define two closure operators derivable from the set of
maximally consistent sets in the presence of inconsistency, here modified to
deal with labeled propositions:
strong(S) =
⋂
(Th(max⊃(cons S)))
weak(S) =
⋃
(Th(max⊃(cons S)))
with strong(S) ⊆ weak(S).
A proposition, p, is true in strong(S) if it follows from every maximally
consistent subset, i.e. it may be true for different reasons in each maximally
consistent set. A proposition, p, holds in weak(S) if it follows from any maxi-
mally consistent set. In this case p may be true in some maximally consistent
sets and ¬p may be true in others. This does not necessarily mean that all
propositions are true in weak(S) since these contradictions do not collide in-
side a Th-closure.
If we restrict our attention to situations where  uniquely resolves all con-
flicts in S then strong(S) ⊆ Th(plausible(S)) ⊆ weak(S).
Prioritized default logic is an extension of Reiter’s default logic. We give a
brief sketch of Reiter’s logic and its extension to prioritized default logic.
Reiter’s default logic is constructed by extending classical logic with default
rules of the form ( α:β1,...,βnγ ), where α is called the prerequisite, βi the justifica-
tions and γ the conclusion, of the default rule. A rule is active if α is true in
the current theory and each βi is consistent with the current theory. If a rule is
active then the current theory can be extended by γ. If T is a classical theory
(deductively closed collection of propositions under classical inference) and D
is a collection of default rules, a theory extension of the default presentation
(D,T) is generated by repeatedly, whilst possible, non-deterministically select-
ing an active default rule and applying it to obtain a new theory T′ in which all
consequences of the conclusion of the rule are added to the theory. When it is
no longer possible to continue because there are no more active rules to apply,
if every justification of every default rule used in generating T′ is consistent
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with T′, then T′ is a default extension of T. A conclusion p follows skeptically
from (D, T) if p is true in all default extension of (D, T) and p follows credu-
lously from (D, T) if p is true in some default extension of (D, T). An extension
to these approaches is to say a proposition p is true preferentially if it holds in
all best preferred extension defined by a selection rule[7].
Restricting default rules to the form ( :pp ) gives a logic essentially the same
as Rescher and Manor’s with skeptical consequence corresponding to strong
closure and credulous consequence corresponding to weak closure.
Prioritized default logic extends default logic by allowing the specification
of priorities between default rules. A priority relation is a strict partial order.
Priorities may be used in at least two distinct ways: default extensions are
built using the highest priority active default rules available at each step of
the non-deterministic iteration; or default extensions are built in the standard
way except when a conflict arises between rules, in which case the highest
priority rule is applied. In either case, if there are multiple extensions, default
entailment may be taken skeptically, credulously or preferentially.
Our logic closely corresponds to a prioritized default logic with rules re-
stricted to the form ( :pp ) and partially ordered with the ordering used to resolve
conflicts and the semantics taken as skeptical entailment. It differs in the en-
tailment when the order relation does not fully resolve all conflicts in a set of
propositions because we take a more conservative entailment. A proposition
p is only entailed if it can be entailed from the same premises in all default
extensions i.e. it follows from the common part of the default extensions.
4 Conclusion
The logic presented here captures a notion of entailment from the most plau-
sible theory given some notion of ordering of the sources of information.
Considering the most plausible theory drawn from all the available eviden-
tial claims causes us to be explicit in rejecting information from sources. In-
formation is only rejected if there is more plausible, that is more preferred,
information. Rejection of information therefore becomes a matter of providing
explicitly the contrary case together with the assertion that the contrary case is
more plausible than the rejected information thereby making the overall safety
case more explicit.
The example discussed here uses classical propositional logic but it should
be clear from the formalization that any logic that offers a notion of consistency
and entailment can be used in its place. Practical calculation proceeds by using
the ordering to decide how to attempt to extend consistent sets of information
and backtracking when inconsistencies are encountered. The ability to per-
form the calculation is limited by the complexity of the satisfaction problem,
which in the current case is NP. This problem notwithstanding, it is interesting
to consider the use of logics, such as a conditional logic or relevance logic, to
better reflect the information relation between assertions. One may also con-
sider how much effort is put into finding the most plausible theory. We may, for
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example, consider limiting consistency checking by some computational limit,
reflecting the idea that there is only bounded foresight when considering how
claims interact. Such changes have the potential for formally capturing more
of the practical reasoning of real world a safety cases.
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Abstract—Richards Heuer’s book, ”The Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis”, sets out an approach to Intelligence
Analysis based on comparing Alternative Competing Hy-
pothesis (ACH). Heuer’s work is expressed in terms of an
informal logic of performing such comparisons. Previous
authors have formalized Heuer’s approach in a probabilistic
setting. Here we set out an alternative formalization in a non-
probablitistic setting which only requires the information
sources to be partially ordered with respect to their relative
trustworthiness or reliability. This approach avoids the need
to give numeric estimates of trustworthiness or reliability
and, as such, may be better suited to many real life situations
in which it is not possible to obtain meaningful estimates
these quantities. The analysis approach has been automated
and we give a short example of the resulting analysis.
I. Introduction
We consider the problem of formalizing the reasoning
process that supports Richard Heuer’s ”The Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis” [11].
Heuer presents a picture of Intelligence Analysis as an
essentially Popperian process of creating a complete set of
alternative hypotheses about a situation and then attempting
to systematically refute them using the available evidence
([13, 14]). Hypotheses that survive the refutation process are
then regarded as possible explanations for the situation. The
two main difficulties in the process are determining what
constitutes a complete set of hypotheses, and how to deal
with the fact that the available evidence to be used in the
refutation process is often a conflicting set of reports about
the state of the world.
Our approach to the first problem is to regard a hypothesis
as a binary condition and the refutation process as one
of determining the consistency of the both the hypothesis
and its negation with the available data. This means that
a hypothesis may be in one of three states: both it and its
contradiction may be consistent with the data; it may be
consistent with the data and its contradiction inconsistent
with the data; or it may be inconsistent with the data but its
contradiction is consistent with the data. An Intelligence An-
alyst forms a set of hypotheses by forming a boolean vector
of the characteristics of interest e.g. she might characterize
a potential attacker by a list of binary attributes and the
reasoning process will assign one of the three states to each
attribute.
The second difficulty of dealing with potentially incon-
sistent information is addressed by putting the information
sources into a hierarchy representing the relative trustworthi-
ness or reliability of the sources. Generally we refer to the re-
lation of relative trustworthiness or reliability of the sources
as the preference relation over the sources. Our reasoning
process attempts to build the most plausible theory possible
given the available information and the preference relation
over the sources. Once a most plausible theory has been
generated each hypothesis, and its negation, are checked for
consistency with the theory. The rule for using information
in building the theory is to use all information unless a
contradiction arises between sources. When a contradiction
arises, the more preferred source is taken over the less
preferred source and all information from the less preferred
source is rejected. Although this may seem extreme it is
easy to express sources where a rejection of one piece of
information does not cause all the information from the
source to be rejected by splitting a single source into multiple
logical sources.
The mechanism of using sources with preference relations
offers a quite flexible model of ranking information. For
example, we may combine an intrinsic notion of trustability
of a physical source with a measure of the strength of
evidence associated with a statement obtained from a source.
For concreteness sake let us suppose the physical sources
are P1 and P2 with the intrinsic trustworthiness as P1 t P2
and the strength of evidence being strong and weak with
strong e weak. We may then create logical sources (strong, P1)
, (weak, P1), (strong, P2) and (weak, P2) and order them by the
lexicographic ordering (e,t) i.e.
(x, p)  (y, q) ≡ x e y ∨ (x = y ∧ p t q)
That is, when there is equal strength of evidence we rely
on the intrinsic trustworthiness of the source but when one
set of evidence is stronger than another, the strength of
evidence determines which piece of information we prefer.
Finally we note Heuer’s discussion is framed as essentially
static in that it does not specifically address the dynamics
of belief revision as the available information changes. We
do not regard this as a fundamental issue in Heuer’s work,
rather it is seen as a presentational issue i.e. one computes the
best set of hypothesis given the available information. But
new information may cause non-monotonic revision of the
hypotheses evaluation. This interpretation leads intelligence
evaluation to be seen as a dynamic process in which there
is no ‘right answer’ but rather only a best answer given the
currently available information and set of assumptions.
We continue the paper with a small, fictitious, example
of how an intelligence analysis might evolve, followed by a
brief overview of the theory behind the reasoning process.
The theory itself has been implemented in a small calculator
program to permit experimentation with examples.
II. An Extended Example
We consider a simple situation in which an analyst has
various sources of information about a possible terrorist
attack. Firstly, she has specific knowledge of attacks acquired
over the years which places bounds on her expectations of
the terrorist activities. This knowledge is incomplete and
may be incorrect but it is the most certain knowledge she
has. Then there is information that she may obtain from
sources such as intercepts, police reports, sightings at transit
points and informers. This information has various degrees
of credibility and can be arranged in a hierarchy. The general
rule is that she will consider all information as true but
when a conflict arises between two sources she will discard
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2the less credible source in favour of the more credible. Note
that this will mean a single conflict causes all the information
provided by the least credible source to be disregarded. If
this is an issue for a particular source, e.g. the source is
regarded as more credible for certain types of information
than for others, this is handled by splitting the source into
multiple independent sources, each providing a part of the
sources information.
Our analyst has a set of background assumptions built up
from experience:
• That potential terrorists fall into two categories, Profes-
sional and Amateur. Professionals are further divided
into Career terrorists and Disposable terrorists. Career
terrorists carry out repeated acts of terrorism whereas
Disposable terrorists carry out suicide missions. Pro-
fessionals tend to operate with support teams and the
identification of the presence of a support team is
sufficient to indicate an attack will be professional.
• The modes of attack that are available are Sniper, Bomb
and Mortar, with Bomb divided into Placeable, Car
Bomb and Suicide Bomb. A career terrorist may attack
as a Sniper, with a Placeable Bomb or with a Mortar.
• A Disposable terrorist will attack with a Suicide Bomb
or a Car Bomb (which is often regarded as a form of
Suicide Bomb). And an Amateur will act as a Sniper or
use a Suicide Bomb.
• The only true distance attack option is the Mortar and
this is only used by Career terrorist
• Amateurs will use homemade explosives, whereas pro-
fessionals will steal or purchase explosives, or purchase
explosive precursors (not necessarily legally).
• The quantity of materials involved will indicate the
likely size of an explosive device. So reports of theft or
purchase of small quantities of explosive will indicate
Placeable or Suicide Bombs, whereas large quantities
will indicate Car Bombs. Purchase of large quantities
of precursors will indicate a Car Bomb but purchase of
small quantities of precursors is likely to go unnoticed
and also is unlikely to be indicative (since by their very
nature they can be purchased for legitimate ends).
• Career terrorists always have an escape plan, Amateur
and Disposable do not need one.
For this particular example we will assume that the analyst
believes there will only be a single attack (as opposed to the
possibility of multiple simultaneous attacks).
In addition to these background assumptions, the analyst
also has some weak default assumptions that, given no
evidence to the contrary, the analyst takes as good working
hypothesis. In this case:
• The attack will be carried out by an amateur.
The analyst partially orders the information sources by
reliability and trustworthiness. In doing so she must also
assess where her own assumptions sit with respect to other
sources of information. For example, she may regard inter-
cepts and police reports as definite pieces of information that
are more reliable than her own assumptions, whereas she
may regard sightings as less reliable, and informers as simply
less trustworthy than her own background assumptions (but
as a more reliable guide than her default assumptions).
In examining her own background assumptions she might
find that they fit into logical groupings such that if any
item in the grouping was to be contradicted by a pre-
ferred source then she would give up the entire group
of assumptions. In this example we divide the analyst’s
background assumptions up into assumptions about the
weapons that might be used in an attack (WEAPONS),
assumptions about the type of attacker (ATTACKER TYPE),
assumptions about the preferred weapons associated with
ATTACKER_PREFERENCES 
INTERCEPTS  POLICE REPORTS 
SIGHTINGS 
INFORMER1  INFORMER2 
DEFAULT_ASSUMPTIONS 
WEAPONS  ATTACKER_TYPE  SINGLE_ATTACK  SINGLE_BOMB_TYPE 
DEFINITIONS 
Fig. 1. Example Ordering
a type of attacker (ATTACKER PREFERENCES) and as-
sumptions about whether there is a single of multiple
type of attack (SINGLE ATTACK) and, if the attack uses
explosives, whether or not there is a single type of bomb
involved (SINGLE BOMB TYPE). The preference ordering
is illustrated in figure 1 (there may also be a set of definitions
which is taken as trustworthy, one might say, by definition).
The analyst also forms a collection of hypothesis of
interest, in this case:
• Type of attacker:
– Amateur,
– Professional:
∗ Career,
∗ Disposable
• Type of attack:
– Bomb:
∗ Placeable Bomb,
∗ Suicide Bomb,
∗ Car Bomb
– Sniper,
– Mortar
Our example unfolds in seven time steps as reports come
in from various information sources
1) An initial intercept reports a bomb threat. At this stage
the default assumption that the attacker will be an
amateur restricts the alternative attacks to suicide bomb
or car bomb.
2) A sighting of support personnel causes the deduction
that the attacker is a professional. This overrides the
default assumption and replaces the attacks by place-
able bomb or suicide bomb. At this stage the attacker
may be a career terrorist or a disposable terrorist.
3) A police report of a small theft of explosives comes
in. This is confirmatory evidence that it is a career
terrorist and does not alter the set of the most plausible
hypotheses.
4) Informer 1 reports that the attack will be carried out
by a sniper. This is contradicted by a more preferred
information source, intercepts, and so is discarded.
5) Informer 2 reports that there is no escape plan. This
means that the attacker is a disposable professional and
the attack is a suicide bomb.
6) Intercepts reports the discovery of an escape plan. This
causes the reports from informer 2 to be discarded
because the intercepts source is preferred over informer
2. The attacker is re-categorized as a career professional
and the attack is re-categorized as a placeable bomb.
7) Intercepts reports that a simultaneous bomb threat and
sniper attack will take place. This undermines the
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3analyst’s assumption of a single attack and backs up
informer 2’s report. This causes sniper to be added to
the attacks and opens the possibility of a mortar attack
as well (since the analyst’s exclusion principle has been
discarded).
Table I sets out this timeline of reports from the various
sources and the evolution of the hypothesis set. Appendix
A gives the formalization of the background assumptions,
default assumptions and ordering used in the example.
TABLE I
Evolution of Hypotheses
TIME 1 2 3 4
SOURCE INTERCEPTS SIGHTINGS POLICE REPORTS INFORMER 1
REPORT Bomb Threat Support Small Theft Explosive Sniper
Amateur + - - -
Professional - + + +
Career - +/- +/- +/-
Disposable - +/- +/- +/-
Bomb Threat + + + +
Placeable Bomb - +/- +/- +/-
Suicide Bomb +/- +/- +/- +/-
Car Bomb +/- +/- - -
Sniper - - - -
Mortar - - - -
TIME 5 6 7
SOURCE INFORMER 2 INTERCEPTS INTERCEPTS
REPORT No Escape Plan Escape Plan also Sniper
Amateur - - -
Professional + + +
Career - + +
Disposable + - -
Bomb Threat + + +
Placeable Bomb - + +
Suicide Bomb + - -
Car Bomb - - -
Sniper - - +
Mortar - - +/-
Although the example presented here shows an evolution
as information is obtained, it may still give the impression
of being somewhat static in that the background theory,
sources and order relation are given up front. This is not
essential to the approach. There is no reason why the set
of sources, background assumptions, default assumptions
and the ordering should not be modified at each step in
the analysis.
III. The Formal Model
Although throughout this paper we use classical proposi-
tional logic the formalization of the reasoning process is
relatively independent of the underlying logic used. The
requirement is that we have some suitable versions of the
notion of consistency, so we can discuss what-conflicts-with-
what, and of entailment, so we can discuss what-follows-
from-what. We define the formal version of our reasoning
process in terms of a language equipped with both of these
notions. In classical logic these notions are inter-definable
(e.g. Γ |= φ iff Γ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent) but we may consider
other logics where the connection is weaker. Consider, for
example, extending the idea of the inconsistency of a set
of propositions to include an additional constraint, such as
physical realizability. Such a condition may be used to rule
out unacceptable situations e.g. those that imply traveling
backwards in time.
Let P be a propositional language and let L be a set of
labels denoting sources. The set of pairs L× P is the labeled
propositional language generated by L and P and we write
elements of L× P as l : p where l ∈ L and p ∈ P. We define the
projections on sets of pairs, S, by prop(S) = {p | ∃l. l : p ∈ S}
and lab(S) = {l | ∃p. l : p ∈ S} and the selective projection,
for a set of labeled propositions S and a set of labels l,
S ◦ l = {p | x : p ∈ S ∧ x ∈ l}.
L is equipped with an strict partial order (i.e. transitive
and irreflexive relation) . P is equipped with a consistency
predicate consistent Q which determines for each Q ⊆ P
whether or not Q is consistent and an entailment relation
Q ` p which determines if a set Q ⊆ P entails a given p,
element of P.
Our intuition on the order relation is that its fundamental
role is to decide between sources when contradictions arise
between them. That is, it gives us a criteria for the unaccept-
ability of a source.
Given a set of labelled propositions S, let I(S) be the set
of minimal inconsistent subsets of labels of S, defined by:
I(S) = {lab(i) | i ⊆ S ∧ ¬consistent(S ◦ lab(i))∧
∀j ⊂ i.consistent(S ◦ lab(j))}
Given a minimal inconsistent set of labels, i, we say that
the causes of the inconsistency are the minimal elements
(under the ordering ) of the set. Minimal elements are
defined as the the least elements of each of the maximal
chains in an inconsistent set of labels i.
chains(i) = {j ⊆ i | ∀x, y ∈ j. x 6= y =⇒ x  y ∨ y  x}
mchains(i) = {j ∈ chains(i) | ∀k ∈ chains(i). j 6⊂ k}
causes(i) = {x | ∃c ∈ mchains(i). x ∈ c∧∀y ∈ c.x 6= y =⇒ y  x}
Under this definition of the causes of a contradiction, if
there is a least element in an inconsistent set of labels i,
then this element is the cause of the contradiction. If, on
the other hand, there is no single least element because
not all elements are comparable, then the least elements
of the incomparable chains are taken as the causes of the
contradiction. In the case of all elements being mutually
incomparable, all elements of the contradiction are taken as
mutual causes (since we have no way of preferring one cause
over another).
The complete set of all causes of inconsistencies in S is
defined as the set of unacceptable labels in S :
unacceptable(S) =
⋃{causes(i) | i ∈ I(S)}
We now define the acceptable elements of S as those sets
that do not contain a cause of an inconsistency.
acceptable(S) = lab(S) \ unacceptable(S)
The most plausible theory of S is taken as the subset of S
labeled by acceptable labels i.e. the largest set of elements
of S that do not contain the causes of contradictions.
We briefly compare this semantics to the paraconsistent
semantics introduced by Rescher and Manor [16]. Let Th(S)
be the deductive closure of a set of propositions. Then there
are 4 closure operators derivable from the set of maximally
consistent sets in the presence of inconsistency. Let mcons(S)
be the set of maximally consistent subsets of S defined by:
mcons S = {S ◦ l | l ⊆ lab(S) ∧ consistent(S ◦ l)∧
∀l′. l ⊂ l′ ⊆ lab(S) =⇒ ¬consistent(S ◦ l′)}
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4conservative(S) = Th(
⋂
(mcons(S)))
strong(S) =
⋂
(Th(mcons(S)))
weak(S) =
⋃
(Th(mcons(S)))
inconsistent(S) = Th(
⋃
(mcons(S)))
Where strong and weak are Rescher and Manor’s notions
of strong and weak closures modified to deal with labeled
propositions1 and inconsistent is the obvious inconsistent set
of all propositions (equally specified, less symmetrically, as
Th(S)).
Clearly the closures are ordered by subset inclusion
conservative(S) ⊆ strong(S) ⊆ weak(S) ⊆ inconsistent(S). A
proposition, p is in conservative(S), if it follows from the
same propositions in every maximally consistent set, whereas
it is true in strong(S) if it follows from every maximally
consistent subset, i.e. it may be true for different reasons
in each maximally consistent set. A proposition, p, holds in
weak(S) if it follows from any maximally consistent set. In
this case p may be true in some maximally consistent sets
and ¬p may be true in others. This does not mean that all
propositions are true in weak(S) since these contradictions
never collide inside a Th-closure. Finally all propositions
hold in inconsistent(S).
Adding labels and preferences changes the notion of a
maximally consistent set to that of a maximally consistent
set that does not contain unacceptable elements. Let us call
the new notion maximally preferentially consistent, mpcons,
defined as:
mpcons S = {S ◦ l | l ⊆ lab(S) ∧ consistent(S ◦ l)∧
∀l′. l ⊂ l′ ⊆ lab(S) =⇒ ¬consistent(S ◦ l′) ∧
l ∩ unacceptable(S) = ∅}
Replacing mcons by mpcons in the definitions of the
closure operators we obtain preferential versions of each
operator, conservativep, strongp, weakp and inconsistentp, with
the inclusion between operators maintained. If, additionally,
we restrict our attention to situations where the set of
labeled propositions, S, and the order relation over sources
is such that causes(i) is a singleton for each i ∈ I(S)2
then conservative(S) ⊆ conservativep(S), strong(S) ⊆ strongp(S),
weakp(S) ⊆ weak(S) and inconsistentp(S) ⊆ inconsistent(S).
However,
⋃
mpcons(S) = S \ unacceptable(S) = ⋂mpcons(S),
so the operators collapse into a single operator because the
notion of unacceptability resolves the choices of resolving
inconsistencies. Let us call this operator acceptablep. Then we
have, strong(S) ⊆ acceptablep(S) ⊆ weak(S).
IV. Conclusion
We have given a brief analysis of the ACH process and a
logic that supports the ACH process in Intelligence Analysis.
Currently we use a trivial program to perform the analysis
based on a relatively inefficient tableaux reasoner and work
with a small number of propositions. But the logic is well
suited to automation by SAT solvers for finding contradictory
sets with large numbers of boolean variables. We hope that
future work will allow us to explore the utility of this form
of reasoning in practical applications with large data sets.
On the theoretical side there is much to be said, and even
1In effect we treat a label as labeling the conjunction of all proposi-
tions with that label in the set.
2As will be the case e.g. if  is a total order.
more to be explored, about the logic and its relation to other
paraconsistent logics3. and preferential default logics4. This,
we hope, will be the subject of another paper.
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5Appendix
TABLE II
The Ordering
DEFINITION > INTERCEPT, DEFINITION > POLICE
INTERCEPT > WEAPONS
INTERCEPT > ATTACKER TYPE, INTERCEPT > ATTACKER PREFERENCES, INTERCEPT > SINGLE ATTACK
INTERCEPT > SINGLE BOMB TYPE, INTERCEPT > SINGLE ATTACK
POLICE > WEAPONS, POLICE > ATTACKER TYPE, POLICE > ATTACKER PREFERENCES
POLICE > SINGLE ATTACK, POLICE > SINGLE BOMB TYPE, POLICE > SINGLE ATTACK
WEAPONS > SIGHTINGS, ATTACKER TYPE > SIGHTINGS, ATTACKER PREFERENCES > SIGHTINGS
SINGLE ATTACK > SIGHTINGS, SINGLE BOMB TYPE > SIGHTINGS, SINGLE ATTACK > SIGHTINGS
SIGHTINGS > INFORMER1, SIGHTINGS > INFORMER2
INFORMER1 > DEFAULTASSUMPTIONS
INFORMER2 > DEFAULTASSUMPTIONS
TABLE III
Assumptions and Hypotheses
DEFINITION : Professional ≡ Career∨Disposable
DEFINITION : BombThreat ≡ PlaceableBomb∨ CarBomb∨ SuicideBomb
WEAPONS : QuantityTheftExplosive∨QuantityPurchasedPrecursors ⊃ CarBomb
WEAPONS : SmuggledRifle∨ PurchasedRifle ⊃ Sniper
WEAPONS : DistanceAttack ⊃ Mortar
WEAPONS : SmallTheftExplosive∨ SmallPurchaseExplosive ⊃ PlaceableBomb∨ SuicideBomb
WEAPONS : QuantityThe f tExplosive ∨ SmallTheftExplosive ⊃ Professional
ATTACKER TYPE : Support ⊃ Professional
ATTACKER TYPE : QuantityPurchasedPrecursors ⊃ Career
ATTACKER TYPE : EscapePlan ⊃ Career
ATTACKER TYPE¬EscapePlan ⊃ Disposable∨Amateur
ATTACKER PREFERENCES : Disposable ⊃ SuicideBomb∨ CarBomb
ATTACKER PREFERENCES : Career ⊃ PlaceableBomb∨Mortar
ATTACKER PREFERENCES : Amateur ⊃ SuicideBomb∨ CarBomb∨ Sniper
ATTACKER PREFERENCES : Mortar ⊃ Professional
SINGLE ATTACK :
(Career∧ ¬Disposable∧ ¬Amateur)∨
(¬Career∧Disposable∧ ¬Amateur)∨
(¬Career ∧ ¬Disposable∧Amateur)
SINGLE ATTACK :
(Sniper∧ ¬Mortar∧ ¬BombThreat)∨
(¬Sniper∧Mortar∧ ¬BombThreat)∨
(¬Sniper∧ ¬Mortar∧ BombThreat)
SINGLE BOMB TYPE : BombThreat ⊃
(PlaceableBomb∧ ¬CarBomb∧ ¬SuicideBomb)∨
(¬PlaceableBomb ∧ CarBomb ∧ ¬SuicideBomb)∨
(¬PlaceableBomb ∧ ¬CarBomb ∧ SuicideBomb)
DEFAULT ASSUMPTIONS : Amateur
HYPOTHESES
Amateur
Professional
Career
Disposable
BombThreat
PlaceableBomb
SuicideBomb
CarBomb
Sniper
Mortar
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Networks of Trust and Distrust: Towards Logical
Reputation Systems
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Abstract. We introduce the notion of a network of trust and distrust
relations between individuals and take an argumentation approach to
the assessment of whether one individual should trust another.
. . . good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers”
Plato - Early Dialogues - Laches
1 Introduction
This paper reports ongoing work in creating a logical foundation for reasoning
about trust and trustworthiness in networks of individuals that may recom-
mend one another as trustworthy or untrustworthy. One solution is to adopt
some form of voting or counting scheme as in commonly done in reputa-
tions systems [10]. But in many circumstances, when the stakes are sufficiently
high, e.g. deciding to trust a root certificate or disclose confidential informa-
tion, weight of numbers does not constitute a good argument. As Plato puts it
". . . good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers"1.
One of the ultimate goals of this work is to provide the foundations for a
logically well founded trust management system, or Logical Reputation System,
where ‘reputation’ is computed by maintaining some notion of consistency
between trust assertions made by trusted individuals. This approach contrasts
1 For those without a classical education, or more relevantly today, an Internet con-
nection, this is part of a general argument that Plato directs against amalgamating
opinions as a basis for reaching a good decision. This is actually a cornerstone of
Plato’s arguments against democracy. Today we take a more liberal view and re-
gard some decisions as being appropriately arrived at by amalgamating individual
opinions (such as who should rule the country, or what colour should we paint the
school) and other decisions as arrived at by knowledge. It is certainly the contention
of this paper that trust is best arrived at through knowledge rather than opinion.
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2with trust models, such as those of Coleman[6] or Marsh[12], that appeal to
probabilities of trustworthiness or any similar numeric notions of degree of
trustworthiness. Rather, in the approach considered here, a trust judgment is a
purely logical resolution of possibly conflicting trust arguments. The intent is
to use such a system to automatically make trust judgements in social network
applications based on relational information gathered from users. This paper
aims at setting out a logical framework based on argumentation theory to
achieve this goal.
Our starting point is to consider networks of individuals that assert that
they trust some individuals and distrust others.
Trust and distrust2 are statements about the relationship between two in-
dividuals in relation to some action, such as, information disclosure, that holds
in some context, such as, today, in this building (see, for example, Hardin’s dis-
cussion in [9]). Throughout this paper we will consider the action and context
as fixed so that we may talk of trust and distrust as binary relations. It should
be apparent that we can put the additional dimensions back into the picture
by considering families of relations parameterized by action and context.
If we only had information to the effect that certain individuals were trust-
worthy we would have a web of trust model (see, e.g. Zimmermann [13]) in
which one individual trusts another if there is a trusted path between them.
Here we consider how such models may be extended in the presence of ad-
ditional negative assertions to the effect that certain individuals distrust one
another. This allows the possibility of a trust path being undermined by a
distrust path. Here we present a model of such systems in three stages of in-
creasing complexity.
The first stage, simple trust systems, captures the idea that an individual
trusts another if there is a trust path between them that is not undermined by
distrust. Simple trust systems are modeled after argumentation theory[3, 4, 7].
Essentially, the approach is to assess the soundness of the argument that an
individual, x0 say, can trust an individual xn. In our case the argument for
trust is the existence of a trust path between x0 and xn in a network of trust
relations. However, this argument may be undermined by an attack on it. An
attack is an argument that some link in the chain of trust from x0 to xn is
untrustworthy. In our case, such an argument is the existence of a path of
trust from x0 to some node ym such that ym distrusts some node connecting x0
and xn (including xn itself). The existence of such an attack would make the
original argument unsound, unless, of course, the attack itself was attacked in
a similar manner, etc. etc.
2 The relationship between trust and distrust is far from uncontroversial, see, for ex-
ample, the discussions in the collection of articles [8]. We take distrust as more than
the mere absence of trust. That is, distrust is not simply the complement of trust.
Rather, trust and distrust are two relations that can exist between individuals and it
is even possible for an individual to trust and distrust another individual simultane-
ously about the same topic. In such cases, although the individual is conflicted about
trust, they are not logically inconsistent about trust.
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3The argumentation theory approach to resolving the set of attacks and
counterattacks is to say that the original argument is sound if it is possible
to partition the set, S, containing the original argument and the closure of all
the attacks and counter attacks possible based on the initial argument, into
two distinct sets, which we call S+ and S−, such that: S+ is consistent in that
no paths in S+ attack one another; S+ contains the original trust path; and for
every path in S− that attacks a path in S+, S+ contains a path that counter
attacks that path.
Although formally straightforward, simple trust systems fail to capture
an important aspect of trust: that when faced with a choice over conflicting
recommendations of who to trust we have preferences over the choices. This
leads to the formulation of the second stage, preferential trust systems, which
introduces the notion that individuals may rank the other individuals into a
partial ordering indicating their relative efficacy at making trust or distrust
recommendations. This relative ranking is then extended to a partial order on
paths which is used to measure the relative strength of paths. A distrust path
can only undermine another path if it is sufficiently strong when compared to
the path it is attacking (up to the point of attack). This second form of system
is formalized by revising the notion of attack between paths.
The final stage asymmetric preferential trust systems addresses the fact that, in
many situations, individuals have an asymmetric attitude to trust and distrust
in that they are more willing to accept an argument that leads them to distrust
than they are to accept one that leads them to trust. In the approach considered
here, individuals require stronger arguments to make them trust than they do
to make them distrust.
In order to directly describe the relationship between individuals, individ-
uals’ efficacy assessments, trust paths and distrust paths, trust systems are
described relatively concretely. Of course these systems may be considered
more abstractly using Dung’s abstract argumentation systems framework. The
connection between trust systems and Dung’s framework is sketched in sec-
tion 7.
2 Trust Systems
First we set out the framework of trust systems that we use throughout the
paper.
A trust system is a collection of individuals I each of which may as-
sert some collection of propositions, Pi for i ∈ I, and two binary relations
Trust : I ⇔ I and Distrust : I ⇔ I. If an individual, say x0, trusts another
individual, say xn, then x0 accepts Pn as true. If however x0 distrusts xn then
x0 neither accepts Pn as true nor rejects P0 as false.
Informally, a trust system is a collection of individuals each of which may
make assertions about the state of the world. In particular, each individual
may assert whether or not they regard some other individuals as trustworthy
or untrustworthy. If an individual i regards an individual j as trustworthy we
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4will say that i trusts j. If, on the other hand, i regards j as untrustworthy we
will say that i distrusts j. It is also possible for i to neither trust nor distrust
j. If i trusts j then i is willing to accept j’s assertions as true. In particular i
accepts j’s assertions about the trustworthiness of others as true. If i accepts a
trust assertion of j as true e.g. if j trusts k, then i accepts there is an argument
for trusting k, specifically i trusts j and j trusts k. If, however, j distrusts k then
i accepts there is an argument that k is untrustworthy i.e. j whose assertions i
trusts, distrusts k. It should be clear at this point that trust arguments can be
extended (i.e. if i trusts j, j trusts k and k trusts l, then there is an argument
for i trusting l) but distrust arguments cannot (i.e. if i trusts j, j distrusts k and
k trusts l, then, since j does not accept k’s assertions there is neither a trust
argument nor a distrust argument, derivable from these facts alone, linking i
and l).
Formally a trust system is a collection of individuals I and two binary
relations Trust : I ⇔ I and Distrust : I ⇔ I. Arguments for the trustwor-
thiness and untrustworthiness of individuals will be modeled as trust paths
and distrust paths between individuals. A trust path from x0 to xn is a se-
quence <x0, x1, . . . , xn−1, xn> such that every pair (xi, xi+1) is in Trust. A dis-
trust path from x0 to xn is a sequence <x0, x1, . . . , xn−1, xn> such that every pair
(xi, xi+1) for i < n− 1 is in Trust and (xn−1, xn) is in Distrust. That is, the path
<x0, x1, . . . , xn−1> is a trust path and the final step <xn−1, xn> is distrusting.
The set of trust paths will be called TP and the set of distrust paths will be
called DP.
Given a path, p, (either a trust path or a distrust path) then range p is the set
of all individuals in the path i.e. if p = <x0, . . . , xn> then range p = {x0, . . . , xn}.
We will also say that first p = x0 and last p = xn, and, for later use, front p =
<x0, . . . , xn−1>.
A distrust path, q, attacks a path if it attacks the trust supporting the path,
meaning it either attacks any point of a trust path (including its last node) or
it attacks any point on the front of a distrust path (i.e. the trust path part of
the distrust path).
Let tr p be the trust part of a path p, defined by
tr p =
{
p if p ∈ TP
front p if p ∈ DP
Then attacks relation between paths is defined by:
q attacks p ≡ q ∈ DP ∧ first(q) = first(p) ∧ last(q) ∈ range(tr p)
An attack is admissible if it satisfies an admissibility condition that varies be-
tween the three forms of trust system considered. For simple trust systems all
attacks are admissible. For preferential trust systems an attack is admissible
only if it is of adequate strength. For asymmetric trust systems the strength
condition varies depending on the way the attack will affect the overall out-
come. The following section illustrates the effect of the different admissibility
conditions with a short example.
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53 A Short Example
To illustrate the three systems consider the following network of trust and
distrust.
– Alice trusts Bob,
– Bob trusts Carol,
– Carol trusts Dan,
– Dan distrusts Bob,
– Alice trusts Elizabeth,
– Elizabeth distrusts Dan.
– Does Alice trust Carol?
Under simple trust systems, where we have no other information, Dan’s
distrust of Bob defeats the chain of trust connecting Alice and Carol but Eliz-
abeth’s attack on Dan defeats it, and so cancels its effect, leaving Alice having
trust in Carol.
If additionally we know:
– Alice rates herself, Bob and Carol strictly higher in ability to make trust
judgements than she does Dan.
Then, under a preferential trust system, Alice will trust Carol because Dan’s
distrust of Bob will lead to an attack path that is weaker than the trust path
between Alice and Carol. If, however,
– Alice rates herself, Bob, Carol and Dan equally in ability to make trust
judgements
then we would need to consider the exact formulation of the preference sys-
tem: does an attack from a path of equally strength defeat the attacked path
or not? Below we differentiate between conservative systems in which attacks
must be strictly stronger to defeat a path and paranoid systems in which attacks
from paths of equal strength, or attacks from incomparable paths, can defeat
the attacked path.
Finally, to illustrate asymmetric trust systems, which are conservative if the
consequence is trust and paranoid if the consequence is distrust, we consider
two situations
1. Alice rates everyone equally in their ability to make judgements.
2. Alice rates Elizabeth higher than everyone else in her ability to make trust
judgements.
Under assumption 1, Dan’s distrust of Bob will lead to Alice not trusting
Carol even though Elizabeth distrusts Dan, because the distrusting outcome is
favored over the trusting outcome. Whereas under assumption 2, Elizabeth’s
distrust of Bob can cancel the attack and lead to Alice having trust in Carol.
The rest of the paper provides the technical details of each of the systems.
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64 Simple Trust Systems
As mentioned above, in simple trust systems all attacks are admissible.
We wish to define notion of a sound trust path, p, between two individuals
as a path which is either not attacked or only attacked by distrust paths that
are themselves defeated by other attacks. To do this we first define the attack
closure set of the path p to be pa , the least set closed under:
– p ∈ pa,
– q ∈ pa and r ∈ attacks(q) =⇒ r ∈ pa.
and say p is sound if and only if pa can be partitioned into two sets S+ and
S− such that:
– p ∈ S+,
– S+ is consistent in that no path in S+ attacks any other path in S+, i.e.
S+ ∩ attacks∃(S+) = ∅,
– S+ defends itself against S− in that every path in S− that attacks a path in
S+ is itself attacked by a path in S+, i.e.
^
attacks ∃(S+) ⊆ attacks∃(S+).
where, for a relation R, R∃X is the forward image of X under R i.e. {y|∃x ∈ S.xRy}.
We will call a set, S, a support, if it is consistent and defends itself (i.e. it can
support some trust path p).
We say an individual x0 trusts an individual xn iff3 there is a sound trust
path between x0 and xn.
Given a simple trust system T = (I, {Pi}i∈I , Trust, Distrust) its set of sound
trust paths (STP) is defined by:
STP = {(x0, xn) ∈ I × I | ∃p ∈ TP. f irst(p) = x0 ∧ last(p) = xn ∧ sound(p)}
Two simple trust systems S and T are trust equivalent iff they have the same
set of individuals and the same set of sound trust paths.
5 Preferential Trust Systems
Preferential trust systems restrict admissible attacks using a notion of rela-
tive strength between the attacked path and the attacking path. The particular
notion that we use is that the strength of the path is derived from the com-
petence, trustworthiness or reliability of the individuals in the path in making
judgments about other individuals. We will settle on the neutral term efficacy
for any of the terms competence, trustworthiness or reliability (or any other
such notion).
In the above, all individuals have been regarded as of equal efficacy in
rating the trustworthiness of other individuals. We will now consider what
3 Here, and throughout, we will adopt the convention of writing iff for if and only if.
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7happens when individuals are partially ordered by their efficacy in perform-
ing such rating. We will assume every individual i has available their own
assessment of the relative efficacy of all other individuals at rating the trust-
worthiness of others. Formally we take this to be a family of partial orders
(reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive binary relations) over the set of indi-
viduals I, one for each member i ∈ I, denoted i reflecting i’s view of the
relative efficacy of individuals. Our goal is that, given a path p which is at-
tacked by a path q, we wish to compare the strength of p up to the point of
the attack, last(q), with the strength of q. To do this we need to derive a partial
ordering of paths from the partial ordering of the efficacy of the individuals in
the paths.
We will call the segment of the path p up to the attack, p |last(q). If we
were to use a strict total ordering to compare paths then we would say that
one path, say q, was weaker than another, say p, when range(q) contained an
element less than any element in range(p). We generalize this idea to partial
orders by considering minimal elements in the ranges of the paths.
First we define an extension of a partial order over a set to a partial order
over subsets of that set.
Given a partial order, , over a set S, we say that a subsets P and Q of S
are comparable4, written P ∼ Q iff:
(∀x ∈ P. ∃y ∈ Q. x  y) ∨ (∀y ∈ Q. ∃x ∈ P. x  y)
The set of minimal elements of a set P i s defined as:
minimal(P) = {x ∈ P | ∀y ∈ P. (y  x) =⇒ y = x}
A set, P ⊆ S, is at-least-as-strong-as a set, Q ⊆ S, written P w Q, iff
P ∼ Q ∧ ∀x ∈ minimal(P). ∃y ∈ minimal(Q). x  y
A set P subset of S is stronger than a set Q subset of S, written P A Q, iff
P w Q ∧Q 6w P
All this amounts to is that subsets are ordered by comparing the least ele-
ments of the chains and if one of the subsets has strictly smaller elements for
any of its chains (and the other does not) then it is the smaller set.
A path p is stronger than q, also written p A q, iff
f irst(p) = f irst(q) ∧ last(p) = last(q) ∧
range(p) \ {last(p)} A range(q) \ {last(q)}
The removal of the last elements of the paths is due to the fact that we
derive the efficacy of the individuals on the path that make the trust recom-
mendations.
4 Warning: For those familiar with the notation x || y for x incomparable with y under
the partial order . The notion defined here is over subsets of the ordering, not
elements of the ordering. So P ∼ Q ≡ ∃p ∈ P, q ∈ Q.¬(p || q).
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8We now modify the definition of attack to take account of the relative
strength of paths. There are two possible views of relative strength that cor-
respond to whether the individual x0 takes a conservative or a paranoid stance
with respect to attacks. If x0 takes a conservative stance, then a path is only
defeated by a strictly stronger attack. If, on the other hand, x0 takes a para-
noid stance, then a path is defeated if the attacking path is incomparable or
is at-least-as-strong-as the attacked path. The paranoid position allows attacks
to defeat other attacks if x0 is not in a position to positively assert that the
attacked path is the stronger of the two.
That is, if x0 has a conservative stance, then an attack, q, on a path, p, only
succeeds if q A p |last(q):
q attacksC p ≡ q ∈ DP ∧ f irst(q) = f irst(p) ∧ last(q) ∈ range p ∧ q A p |last(q)
and if x0 has a paranoid stance, then an attack, q, on a path, p, only succeeds
if p |last(q) 6A q:
q attacksP p ≡ q ∈ DP ∧ f irst(q) = f irst(p) ∧ last(q) ∈ range p ∧ p |last(q) 6A q
Preferential trust systems are formulated by replacing the definition of at-
tack in simple trust systems with either the conservative or the paranoid defi-
nition of attack5.
6 Asymmetric Preferential Trust Systems
In practice individuals are often asymmetric in their attitude to trust and dis-
trust. That is, they are paranoid about trust and conservative about distrust.
This means that the admissibility of an attack changes according to the overall
role it plays in determining the outcome, introducing an asymmetry between
paths which ultimately lead to a trust decision and paths which ultimately lead
to a distrust decsion. We capture this asymmetry by redefining the conditions
for forming S and forming the partitions S+ and S−:
– The attack closure set S is the least closed set of paranoid attacks based on
a trust path p as above.
– S+ is restricted to only containing the initial trust path, p, and conservative
attacks.
– Since conservative attacks are a subset of paranoid attacks, S− may contain
both types of attack.
Trust path p is sound iff it is possible to form a partition of S such that:
5 A system may also be formulated where the stance varies from individual to indi-
vidual which is essentially a simple trust system with an indexed family of attacks
operators.
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– S+ is consistent in that no path in S+ attacks any other path in S+.
– S+ is conservative in that every path in S+ is either p or a member of
attacksC(x) for some x.
– S+ defends itself against S− in that every path in S− that attacks a path in
S+ is itself attacked by a path in S+.
7 Connecting Trust and Dung’s Abstract Argumentation
Dung [7] defines an abstract argumentation system as a pair (AR, Attacks)
where AR is a set of arguments and Attacks is a binary relation over AR called
the attacks relation. We write x Attacks y for x attacks y. A set, S ⊆ D, at-
tacks an argument, x ∈ D, if some argument in S attacks x (we will say that
S ATTACKS x for ∃y ∈ S. y Attacks x ).
Dung then goes on to define the notions of:
– Conflict free: A set of arguments S ⊆ AR is conflict free iff there is no pair of
arguments x ∈ S and y ∈ S such that x Attacks y.
– Acceptable: An argument x ∈ AR is acceptable with respect to S iff for every
argument y ∈ AR if y Attacks x then S ATTACKS y. Following [2] we will
also say that S defends x when x is acceptable with respect to S.
– Admissible: A set S ⊆ AR is admissible iff S is conflict free and each argument
in S is acceptable with respect to S.
Dung then goes on to discuss various notions of semantics that further
restrict the notion of admissibility which are not used in our current semantics.
To translate the above into Dung’s framework we consider an individual a
and the set of trust paths, P, rooted at a. For the simple trust systems:
– The set of arguments AR is the set P.
– The attacks relation between holds q, p ∈ P, i.e. q Attacks p, iff there exists
a distrust path d = <x0, x1, . . . , xn−1, xn> with q = <x0, x1, . . . , xn−1> and
d attacks p.
Note that this definition of Attacks loses information by conflating multiple
distinct attacks from q to different points on p.
A path p is soundD iff P can be partitioned into two sets S+ and S− such
that p ∈ S+ and S+ is admissible.
Clearly the above notions of consistency and conflict freeness are the same
(albeit on different domains):
Proposition 1. S ∩ R∃(S) = ∅ ≡ S ⊆ R∃(S)
Likewise, S defends itself and S is acceptable are essentially the same as
demonstrated by the following two propositions.
First we introduce the dual of the forward image operator on binary rela-
tions over a set S: Given a binary relation R : S↔ S, the function R∀ : PS→ PS
is defined by:
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R∀Y = {x | ∀y.xRy =⇒ y ∈ Y}
R∃X is the forward image of X and R∀Y is the set of elements in the inverse
image of R that only result in elements in Y. 6.
R∃ and R∀ form a (covariant) galois connection, or axiality, over S. This
means that R∃ ◦R∀ is an interior operator on S and R∀ ◦R∃ is a closure operator
on S. Letting
^
R represent the converse of R (i.e. x
^
R y ≡ yRx) then
Proposition 2. S is acceptable iff S ⊆ (
^
Attacks)∀(Attacks∃(S))
Proof Sketch. This follows from R∀X = (
^
R)∃(X) and Amgoud & Cayrol’s the-
orem, quoted in [2], which rendered in our notation is S is acceptable iff : S is
acceptable iff S ⊆ Attacks∃(Attacks∃S).
Proposition 3. S is acceptable iff (
^
Attacks)∃S ⊆ Attacks∃S
Proof Sketch.
=⇒
S ⊆ (
^
Attacks)∀(Attacks∃(S))
by proposition 2
(
^
Attacks)∃S ⊆ (
^
Attacks)∃((
^
Attacks)∀(Attacks∃(S)))
by (
^
Attacks)∃ preserves order
(
^
Attacks)∃S ⊆ Attacks∃(S)
by (
^
Attacks)∃ ◦ (
^
Attacks)∀ being an interior operator
⇐=
(
^
Attacks)∀((
^
Attacks)∃S) ⊆ (
^
Attacks)∀(Attacks∃S)
by (
^
Attacks)∀ preserves order
S ⊆ (
^
Attacks)∀(Attacks∃S)
by (
^
Attacks)∀ ◦ (
^
Attacks)∃ being an closure operator
Proposition 4. soundD(p) ≡ sound(p)
Proof Sketch. Since the definitions of S being a support and S being admis-
sible are essentially the same between the two definitions of soundness, the
major work falls on showing that the existence of a suitable partition of pa is
equivalent to the existence of a suitable partition of P.
6 R∀Y is closely related to the weakest precondition operator in programming lan-
guages semantics. The exact relation depending on the particular relational theory
of programs and termination used.
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Recall
tr(p) =
{
p if p ∈ TP
front(p) if p ∈ DP
Let p be a trust path, then tr∃(pa) ⊆ P. Assume the pair S+, S− form
a suitable partition of pa then the pair tr∃(S+), P \ tr∃(S+) form a suitable
partition of P.
Conversely, if the pair S+, S− form a suitable partition of P then the pair
^
tr ∃(S+) ∩ pa, pa \ (^tr ∃(S+) ∩ pa) form a suitable partition of pa.
To obtain the corresponding Dungian systems for preferential and asym-
metric trust systems we modify the definition of the Attacks relation. Given
the conflating of attacks mentioned above we must ensure that the potential
multiplicity of attacks is correctly dealt with when comparing strength.
For two paths p, q ∈ P such that q Attacks p we define:
q AC p ≡ ∀x ∈ range(p).(last(q), x) ∈ Distrust =⇒ q A p|x
q AP p ≡ ∀x ∈ range(p).(last(q), x) ∈ Distrust =⇒ p|x 6A q
And given a partition of P into S and S ( = P \ S):
ASA≡ ((S× S)∩ AC) ∪ ((S× S)∩ AP)
Using these orderings we define the three corresponding attacks relations
as:
– Conservative Preferential Trust: AttacksC = Attacks ∩ AC.
– Paranoid Preferential Trust: AttacksP = Attacks ∩ AP.
– Asymmetric Trust: AttacksSA = Attacks ∩ ASA.
Finally we demonstrate that the asymmetric trust systems have a pleas-
ing simplification of the acceptability condition in that AttacksA factors into
AttacksP and AttacksC on either side of the acceptability condition.
Proposition 5. AttacksSA = ((S× S) ∩AttacksC) ∪ ((S× S) ∩AttacksP)
Proof Sketch. by boolean algebra
Proposition 6. An set, S, is acceptable in the asymmetric trust system iff (
^
AttacksP)∃S
⊆ (AttacksC)∃S
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Proof Sketch.
(
^
AttacksSP)
∃S ⊆ AttacksSC
∃S
by proposition 2
(
^
((S× S) ∩AttacksC) ∪ ((S× S) ∩AttacksP) ∃)S ⊆
(((S× S) ∩AttacksC) ∪ ((S× S) ∩AttacksP)∃)S
by proposition 5
^
((S× S) ∩AttacksC) ∃S ∪
^
((S× S) ∩AttacksP) ∃S ⊆
((S× S) ∩AttacksC)∃S ∪ ((S× S) ∩AttacksP)∃S
by distribute (_)∃ over union
(
^
AttacksP)∃S ⊆ (AttacksC)∃
by domain restrictions
8 Conclusions
For us at least, the idea of using argumentation to reason about networks
of trust, and distrust, is in its infancy. The work presented here raises more
questions than it answers, some of which we raise below (and there are many
more than raised here).
Trust systems as outlined above offer a logically well founded approach to
reasoning about trust based on minimal information gathered from individu-
als i.e. the individuals relative assessment of the efficacy of the judgements of
others and a map of immediate trust and distrust relations between individ-
uals. The natural next step is to investigate this in practice in an actual social
network application.
The asymmetric preferential trust systems above rely on the fact that con-
servative attacks are a subset of paranoid attacks. Clearly it is possible to gen-
eralize further and define relevant attacks and acceptable rebuttals to relevant
attacks. Given a set of attacks, we classify some attacks as relevant, some as
acceptable rebuttals of relevant attacks, and some as neither. S is built as the
closure of attacks on a trust path p as above and we define S+ and S− by:
– p ∈ S+,
– S+ is consistent in that no path in S+ attacks any other path in S+,
– S+ is a rebuttal set in that every path in S+ is either p or a rebuttal attack,
– S+ defends against relevant attacks from S− in that every relevant attack in
S− that attacks a path in S+ is itself attacked by a path in S+.
This generalization opens up the possibility of considering richer asymme-
tries between trust and distrust arguments. For example, if we drop the use
of the extended order relation and consider using a labeling of the individu-
als in paths. Consider, as illustration, a sensor network based on three kinds
of individual sensor: electronic sensing and people that perform either casual
or detailed inspections. We may trust an individual because we have a mixed
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trust path to it but relevant attacks may be limited to chains that exclude elec-
tronic sensors and rebuttals may be limited to chains of people who perform
detailed inspection7. This approach will be the subject of further investigation.
The relation to Dungian argumentation outlined in section 7 uses only the
most basic semantic notion of admissibility. This raises the question whether or
not the other possible semantics have a useful meaning for trust (and distrust)
relations. The question is why we would want a richer set of arguments than
that required to support the sounds of a particular trust path? Perhaps there is
a useful notion of sets of individuals you can consistently trust corresponding
to the other possible semantics. It certainly is worth investigating.
During the revision of this paper the authors encountered the work of Cay-
rol and Lagasquie-Schiex on Bipolar Argumentation [5] systems, and of Kaci
and Torre , and Amgoud, Dimopoulos and Moraitis Preference Based Argu-
mentation (se e.g. [11] and [1] respectively). Both seem to overlap on the intent
pursued here and offer interesting directions for future investigation.
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Abstract. We set out to address what kind of theoretical framework is re-
quired to discuss Internet Trust if ‘trust’ is to have the same meaning as it
does in other social and business contexts. And, given such a framework,
what are its implications for the technical, social and legal mechanisms
that must be provided to support that notion of trust? We suggest that the
elements of the analysis of trust offered by Luhmann, Barber, Miztal and
Giddens provide a framework for discussing trust and that the techni-
cal mechanisms for ensuring Internet Trust should be assessed against it.
Moreover we claim that assessing current Internet Trust models against
such a framework shows that they fail to offer meaningful support for
trust. We attempt to illustrate this with two brief examples.
1 Introduction
Luhmann1 and Barber2 , independently, propose the role of trust is to create
certainty in the face of uncertainty and thus allow action as opposed to endless
indecision.
Misztal3 elaborates this line of thought by discussing the role of different
forms of trust, Habitus, Passion and Policy, in creating different forms of order
in society that act in concert to reduce uncertainty4. In modern societies we
go beyond interaction with known individuals and extend trust to anonymous
others. What reduces the uncertainty in dealing with anonymous others?
Luhmann argues that these interactions in modern societies give rise to
abstract mechanisms of interaction, such as Money and Power. These abstract
mechanisms, which Luhmann calls generalized communication media, substitute
1 Niklas Luhmann. Trust and Power. John Wiley & Sons, 1979
2 Bernard Barber. The Logic and Limits of Trust. Rutgers University Press, 1983.
3 Barabra A. Misztal. Trust in Modern Societies. Polity Press, 1996.
4 Habitus is a system of dispositions acquired by an agent through participation in
society and may be seen as the set of implicit rules or conventions that exists below
conscious and rational thought. Passion is trust arising from the development of the
intimate social bonds between people based on shared values and experiences. It is
the “internalized trust” that arises from those basic face-to-face interactions. Policy
operates at the conscious dispositional level. It is built on the set of dispositions that
we consciously hold towards individuals and groups.
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2for the personal relationships built up in face-to-face societies and their role is
to provide equivalent certainty to personal trust. But this then leads to a need
for systems trust, which is the belief in the ability of these abstract mechanisms
to guarantee ‘equivalent certainty’. Thus, Luhmann sees systems trust as the
cost, and necessary underpinning, of the modern, networked, society.
This theme is picked up by Giddens5: “Trust in abstract systems is the con-
dition of time-space distanciation and of the large areas of security in day-to-day life
which modern institutions offer compared to the traditional world.”
It is possible to ‘trust’ anonymous individuals because interaction with
them is through generalized communication media, through generalized sys-
tems of exchange, that are themselves supported by systems trust. We posit
the general goal of any online trust framework is either, to reflect the societal trust
frameworks built on Habitus, Passion and Policy, or to establish a new generalized
communication medium to carry the burden of trust. In either case it must be sup-
ported by systems trust underwriting the particular mechanism. Below we discuss
how common Internet solutions fail to meet these ends.
2 Some Simple (Counter)Examples
Reflecting Societal Trust - Reputation and Recommender Systems: In many
cases when we lack direct experience we make rational judgments about peo-
ple and things by using our social network. We know someone, who knows
someone, who knows X. We have a chain connecting us to X, and we have
information about the nodes in that chain that allows us to transfer opinions
back to ourselves. That process may be by receiving information along the
chain, or it might be by using the chain to create introductions so that we may
have direct contact with some of the individuals in the chain. Indeed there may
be many such chains and we may amalgamate information gained by exploit-
ing many of them. In amalgamating information we make judgements about
the competence of the individuals involved in arriving at assessments, the sim-
ilarity of their circumstance to our own and the authenticity of an individual’s
statements (i.e. the likelihood of them making authentic statements about the
matter at hand rather than pursuing some covert agenda). This social network
is not simply a background givens, its existence, its shape and its utility comes
about by use, participation and reciprocation. It is not merely that we return the
favors derived from the network but that feedback and reinforcement shapes
our network.
If we compare our network of social trust to online reputation or recom-
mender systems we quickly see that many elements are missing. There is little
opportunity to gain the information to determine the competence, similarity or
authenticity of individuals involved in the network. As such we are ill placed
to amalgamate their views to arrive at a rational judgement. Moreover shaping
our network by participation is often not an option.
5 Giddens. The consequences of Modernity. Polity Press, 1990.
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3Creating Equivalent Trust - Online Purchase: Technical infrastructure of-
fers to protect us when we undertake online financial transactions. But that
protection fails to amount to providing a generalized medium that offers equiv-
alent certainty. The general pattern for such a medium is “X offers equivalent
certainty to Y because of the underlying systems trust in Z”. In this case we
take Y to be making a purchase in a (real) shop with a credit card, X to be
making an online purchase from an online shop with a credit card and we
explore the nature of Z. The certainty generate by Y in this case arises from,
amongst other things:
– The assurance of physical premises (the existence of premises, the nature
of the premises, the location of the premises, the time the business has
occupied the premises).
– The applicable law due to location.
– The assurance of staff (their presence, their attitude, their knowledgeabil-
ity, their competence).
– The attribution of responsibility for the transaction to one or more staff
members.
– The contact between your direct social network and the shop and its staff
(which includes knowing people who know people that work there etc.).
– The assurance of an exchange transaction i.e. goods in hand (at least in
many cases).
– The assurance derived from the social understanding and familiarity of
shops.
The technical infrastructure supporting ‘safe’ online shopping gives no real
assurances about the identity of the organization we are dealing with, its per-
manence, its real location, applicable law and legal domain or the responsible
individuals associated with an order. Corresponding assessments to those that
we derive from the physical premises and from the interaction with staff are
denied us, as are assessments derived from location and our wider social net-
work.
3 Conclusion
Unlike Fahrenholtz and Bartelt6 , who conclude that true trust on the Internet
must always be elusive as it is deeply dependent on social and psychological
factors, we see things more positively. Trust can be achieved but to do so we
must meet its preconditions. We can reflect societal trust networks in the Inter-
net but only by reflecting the societal processes that give rise to them. We can
construct equivalent certainty if we construct mechanisms that provide spe-
cific certainties (e.g. legal domain) that are underpinned by abstract system in
which we can trust.
6 Dietrich Fahrenholtz and Andreas Bartelt. Towards a sociological view of trust in
computer science. Eighth Research Symposium on Emerging Electronic Markets
(RSEEM), 10 2001.
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H. Full Program Listing
H.1. Overview
The program PCC (Preferential Coherence Calculator) is a small test bed for
various versions of preferential coherence. Its basic structure is a pipeline that
reads a file from standard in, parses it, calculates a preferential theory according to
rules determined by the input format and pretty prints an output on standard out.
A preferential theory is a labelled propositional theory with a binary relation
imposed between some of the labels. The binary relation is taken to be a gener-
alised notion of a preference ordering over the labels. However, in general, no
particular order conditions are required. If the relation is specified using the key
word ‘simple‘ then it is a free relation i.e. the relation is exactly what is specified.
If the keyword ‘transitive‘ is used then the transitive closure of the relation is gen-
erated. The relation is then used induce an ordering on sets of labels as described
in the thesis.
Other kinds of relation are also supported by the program and correspond
to other possible approaches to coherence. The key words ’upper’, ’lower’ and
’combined’ correspond to taking the given ordering, making the assumption that
it specifies a pre-order, and generating the ordering for the upper, lower and
combined power domain.
Use of the key word ‘majority’ disallows the use of an order relation but causes
conflicts to be resolved by majority voting. In this case the coalition theory consists
of the propositions most supported by agents i.e. if some agent supports p and
some agent supports ¬ p then the coalition theory contains the which ever of the
two propositions is entailed by most agents.
The key word ‘majority’ offers a variant on this in which agents may be given a
weight, or strength, which they lend to each of their propositions. The coalition
theory is arrived at taking the theory in which the weight of p or ¬ p is used to
determine which is included in the theory.
The workhorse of the program is the signed tableaux routine that is used both
finds inconsistent sets of propositions and to compute entailments (i.e. it finds
proofs that A follows from B). This routine corresponds to the non-deterministic
model finder described in chapter 3.
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File Description
AgentLogic.y YACC style grammar file for parser and
lexer function
AgentLogic.hs Generated Parser and lexer – this file
is automatically generated
from AgentLogic.y
Sets.hs Functions for treating lists
as sets
Relations.hs Functions for treating lists of pairs as
binary relations
SyntacticRelations.hs Functions for turning relations defined in the
syntax to lists of pairs
Coalitions.hs Functions for building coalitions i.e. sets
of sources. Mainly concerned with extending
element orderings to set orderings.
TrustExpansion.hs Functionality for an experiment with a notion
of trust as “speaking as/for another”.
Not currently relevant.
Tableaux.hs An implementation of signed tableaux based
on Smullyan’s book and some wrappers
for the functionality.
Beliefs.hs Contains the function “beliefs” which
calculates the alternative preferential
theories.
Pretty.hs A set of pretty print routines for the output
uses PPrint library module written by
Daan Leijen
Inspect.hs Mainly a place holder left after much code has
been replaced/relocated.
main.hs Top level driver for read/process/print.
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{ 
module AgentLogic  where 
import Data.Char
import Data.List
}
%name system System
%name orderings Orders
%name ordering OrdSeq
%name agents AgentAssertions
%name sources SourceAssertions
%name formula Formula 
%tokentype { Token } 
%error { parseError } 
%token 
simple { TokenSimple }
transitive { TokenTransitive }
majority { TokenMajority }
weighted { TokenWeighted }
upper { TokenUpper }
lower { TokenLower }
combined { TokenCombined }
int { TokenInt $$ }
hypothesis { TokenHypothesis }
'<=>' { TokenEquiv } 
'=>' { TokenImplies } 
   '+' { TokenOr } 
   '&' { TokenAnd } 
name { TokenName $$ } 
'~' { TokenNeg }
'(' { TokenBra } 
')' { TokenKet } 
',' { TokenSep }
{- '@' { TokenAt } -}
   '{' { TokenCurlyBra }
   '}' { TokenCurlyKet }
'=' { TokenEqual }
'>' { TokenGreater }
{- ';' { TokenSemi } -}
':' { TokenColon }
'|' { TokenBar }
%left '@'
%left '<=>'
%right '=>'
%right '+'
%right '&'
%left "~"
%left NEG
%% 
OrderTypes :   simple Orders { Simple $2 }
| transitive Orders { Transitive $2 }
| majority { Majority }
| weighted WeightSeq { Weighted $2 }
| upper Orders { Upper $2 }
| lower Orders { Lower $2 }
| combined Orders { Combined $2 }
WeightSeq :   WeightAssign { [ $1 ] }
| WeightSeq ',' WeightAssign { $1 ++ [ $3] }
WeightAssign : QualifiedName ':' int { ($1, $3) }
Orders : {- EMPTY -} { [] }
{- | OrdSeq ',' Orders {  [$1] ++ $3 }  -}
| OrdSeq { [ $1 ] }   
  | Orders ',' OrdSeq { $1 ++ [$3] }
OrdSeq :   QualifiedName {  [GTag $1] }
| OrdSeq '>' QualifiedName { $1 ++ [GTag $3] }
| OrdSeq '=' QualifiedName { $1 ++ [ETag $3] }
System : OrderTypes '|' AgentAssertions  { ($1, $3, []) }
       | OrderTypes '|' AgentAssertions hypothesis Formulalist { ($1, $3, $5) }
AgentAssertion : QualifiedName ':' Formula { Says $1  $3  } 
AgentAssertions : AgentAssertion  { [$1] }
| AgentAssertions ',' AgentAssertion { $1 ++ [$3] }
SourceAssertion : '{' Qualifiednames '}' ':' Formula { Source $2 $5 }
SourceAssertions : SourceAssertion { [$1] }
| SourceAssertions ',' SourceAssertion { $1 ++ [$3] }
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Formulalist : Formula { [$1] }
| Formulalist ',' Formula { $1 ++ [$3] }
Formula :  Formula '<=>' Formula { Equiv $1 $3 } 
| Formula '=>' Formula { Implies $1 $3 } 
| Formula '+' Formula { Or $1 $3 } 
| Formula '&' Formula { And $1 $3 } 
| '(' Formula ')' { $2 } 
| '~' Formula %prec NEG { Neg $2} 
| QualifiedName { Prop $1 }
Params : name { [$1] }
| Params ',' name {  $1 ++ [$3] }
QualifiedName : name { Name $1 [] }
| name '(' Params ')' { Name $1 $3 }
Qualifiednames : QualifiedName { [$1] }
 | Qualifiednames ',' QualifiedName {  $1 ++ [$3] }  
{
{- change TokenProp to TokenName and prop to name -}
parseError :: [Token] -> a
parseError _ = error "Parse error"
data Formula  = Prop Names | 
Neg Formula |
And Formula  Formula |
Or Formula Formula  |
Implies Formula  Formula  |
Equiv Formula  Formula  
deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
data AgentSays = Says Names Formula 
deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
data Sources = Source [Names] Formula
deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
data Names = Name String [String]
deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
data OTags = GTag Names | ETag Names
deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
data Orders a = OGreater a a | OEqual a a
deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
data OrderTypes =   Simple [[ OTags ]]
 | Transitive [[ OTags ]]
| Majority
| Weighted [ (Names, Int) ]
| Upper [[ OTags ]]
| Lower [[ OTags ]]
| Combined [[ OTags ]]
deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
restructure l =
  let restruct' s [] = s
restruct' s ((GTag x):(GTag y):l) = if l /= [] then  restruct' ((OGreater x y):s)  ((GTag y):l) else ((OGreater x y):s)
restruct' s ((GTag x):(ETag y):l) = if l /= [] then  restruct' ((OEqual x y):s)     ((ETag y):l) else ((OEqual x y):s) 
restruct' s ((ETag x):(GTag y):l) = if l /= [] then  restruct' ((OGreater x y):s)  ((GTag y):l) else ((OGreater x y):s)
restruct' s ((ETag x):(ETag y):l)   = if l /= [] then  restruct' ((OEqual x y):s)     ((ETag y):l) else  ((OEqual x y):s)
   in
restruct' [] l
data Token = 
  TokenSimple
| TokenTransitive
| TokenMajority
| TokenWeighted
| TokenUpper
| TokenLower
| TokenCombined
| TokenEquiv 
| TokenImplies 
| TokenOr
| TokenAnd
| TokenName String 
| TokenNeg
| TokenBra 
| TokenKet 
| TokenSep
| TokenAt
| TokenCurlyBra
| TokenCurlyKet
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| TokenEqual
| TokenGreater
| TokenSemi
| TokenColon
| TokenBar
| TokenInt Int
| TokenHypothesis
deriving Show 
lexer :: String -> [Token] 
lexer [] = [] 
lexer (c:cs) 
| isSpace c = lexer cs 
| isAlpha c = lexName (c:cs) 
| isDigit c = lexNum (c:cs)
lexer ('<':'=':'>':cs) = TokenEquiv : lexer cs 
lexer ('=':'>':cs) = TokenImplies : lexer cs 
lexer ('+':cs) = TokenOr : lexer cs 
lexer ('&':cs) = TokenAnd : lexer cs 
lexer ('~':cs) = TokenNeg : lexer cs 
lexer ('(':cs) = TokenBra : lexer cs 
lexer (')':cs) = TokenKet : lexer cs 
lexer (',':cs) = TokenSep : lexer cs
lexer ('@':cs) = TokenAt : lexer cs
lexer (':':cs) = TokenColon : lexer cs   {- alternative name for @ -}
lexer ('{':cs) = TokenCurlyBra : lexer cs
lexer ('}':cs) = TokenCurlyKet : lexer cs
lexer ('=':cs) = TokenEqual : lexer cs
lexer ('>':cs) = TokenGreater : lexer cs
lexer (';':cs) = TokenSemi : lexer cs
lexer ('|':cs) = TokenBar : lexer cs
lexer (_:cs) = lexer cs
lexNum cs = TokenInt (read num) : lexer rest 
where (num,rest) = span isDigit cs
lexName cs = 
case span isAlphaNum cs of
  ("simple",rest) -> TokenSimple : lexer rest
  ("transitive",rest) -> TokenTransitive : lexer rest
  ("majority",rest) -> TokenMajority : lexer rest 
  ("weighted",rest) -> TokenWeighted : lexer rest 
  ("upper",rest) -> TokenUpper : lexer rest 
  ("lower",rest) -> TokenLower : lexer rest 
  ("combined",rest) -> TokenCombined : lexer rest 
  ("hypothesis",rest) -> TokenHypothesis : lexer rest
(var,rest) -> TokenName var : lexer rest 
pa = print . formula . lexer
parseFormula = formula  . lexer
parseAgents = agents . lexer
parseSources = sources . lexer
parseSystem = system . lexer
} 
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module Sets where
import Data.List
subset xs ys = and [x `elem` ys | x <- xs ]
equalSets xs ys = and ([x `elem` ys | x <- xs ] ++ [y `elem` xs | y <- ys])
kern [] = []
kern (x:l) = x: (kern [ y | y <- l , not(equalSets x y)])
 
subsets_down l = 
 let  
      ll = nub l
      subsets' acc ss = 
let next = [ y | y <- nub [ delete u s | u <- ll, s <-ss ], y `notElem` acc ]
          in
 if (any null ss)  then   acc else (subsets' (acc ++ next) next)
  in
    (subsets'  [ ll ] [ ll ])
notMember x xs = not(any (equalSets x) xs)
subsets_up l = 
 let  
      ll = nub l
      subsets' acc ss = 
let next = kern [ y | y <- [ u:s | u <- ll, s <-ss ], notMember y  acc ]
          in
 if length (head ss) == length ll  then   acc else (subsets' (acc ++ next) next)
  in
    (subsets'  [ [] ] [ [] ])
remove x [] = []
remove x (y:ys) | x == y = remove x ys
| otherwise = y:(remove x ys)
difference xs []  = nub xs
difference xs (y:ys)  = difference (remove y xs) ys
bigCap [] = []
bigCap [x] = x
bigCap (x:xs) = x `intersect` (bigCap xs)
bigCup [] = []
bigCup (x:l) = x `union` (bigCup l)
first p [] = []
first p (a @ (x:l)) = if p x then a else first p l
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module Relations where
import Data.List
import Sets
import AgentLogic
close step l = 
 let close last l = if equalSets last l then nub l else close l  (l ++ (step l))
 in close [] l
stepTrans l = nub [ (x,z) | (x,yr) <- l, (yl,z) <- l, yr == yl ]
stepSym l = nub [ (y,x) | (x,y) <- l]
stepRef l = nub ([ (x,x) | (x,_) <- l] ++ [ (y,y) | (_,y) <- l])
stepRST l = (stepRef l) `union` ( stepSym l) `union` ( stepTrans l)
closeTrans l = close stepTrans l
closeRST l = close stepRST l
field ord = nub( [ a | (a, _) <- ord] ++ [b | (_,b) <- ord])
least xs = nub [ x | (_, x) <- xs, [y | (x1,y) <- xs, x == x1] == [] ]
bottom elm ord = (least ord) ++ ( elm `difference` (field ord))
{- Useful to wrap a Relations with its field, particularly orderings hence the name -}
{- new Ord compose of field equivalence relation and order relation -}
data OrderedSet a = Ord [a] [(a,a)] [ (a,a)] 
    deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
ends (Ord elms _ ord) = bottom elms ord
ords (Ord _ _ ord) = ord
equiv(Ord _ equ _ ) = equ
elems (Ord elms _ _) = elms
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module SyntacticRelations where
import Data.List
import AgentLogic
import Relations
extractOEq l = [(x,y) | OEqual x y <- l]
extractOGr l = [(x,y) | OGreater x y <- l]
expand eq gr = 
let expand' eq gr = nub([ (x,y) | (x,y1) <- gr, (y2,y) <- eq,  y1 == y2] ++
        [ (x,y) | (x1,y) <- gr, (x2,x) <- eq,  x1 == x2] ++ gr)
in
  expand'  (closeRST eq) gr
po eq gr =  closeTrans (expand eq gr)
{- functions for syntactically defined orders -}
{- transitive ordering -}
mkpo ord =
let 
    eq = extractOEq ord
    gr = extractOGr ord
in
po eq gr
mkOrd order = mkpo (restructure  order)
mkOrds order = mkpo (concat (map restructure order))
{- succ = immediate Successor -}
successor ord =
let 
    eq = extractOEq ord
    gr = extractOGr ord
in
(expand eq gr)
mkSuccOrd order = successor (restructure  order)
mkSuccOrds order = successor (concat (map restructure  order))
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module Coalitions where
import Data.List
import Sets
import AgentLogic
import Tableaux
import Relations
import SyntacticRelations
import TrustExpansion
{- Ways of lifting a simple ordering to a list ordering -}
{- for all y in ys there exists an x in xs such that x > y -}
upper ord  xs ys =  and [or  [ ((x,y) `elem` ord)  | x <- xs] | y <- ys]
lower ord xs ys =  and [ or [ (x,y) `elem` ord | y <- ys] | x <- xs]
combined ord xs ys  = (upper ord xs ys) && (lower ord xs ys)
image ord x = [y | (x1,y) <- ord, x1 == x]
invImage ord y = [x | (x, y1) <- ord, y1 == y ]
converse ord = [(y,x) | (x, y ) <- ord]
{- invImage r x = image (converse r) x -}
forward ord ys = bigCup (map (image ord) ys)
previous ord xs = bigCup (map (invImage ord) xs)
{- Weak set filters -}
smaller ord xs ys = 
let common = xs `intersect` ys
 in
 (upper (closeTrans ord) (difference ys common) (difference xs common))
smallerX ord xs ys = 
let common = xs `intersect` ys
 in
 (upper (closeTrans (ords ord)) (difference ys common) (difference xs common))
uppereq equ ord  xs ys =  and [or  [ or [((x,y) `elem` ord) , ((x,y) `elem` equ) ] | x <- xs] | y <- ys] 
{- uppereq equ ord  xs ys =  and [or  [ ((x,y) `elem` ord)  | x <- xs] | y <- ys] -}
biggereq ord xs ys =  (uppereq (equiv ord)  (ords ord) xs ys)
compbiggereq ord xs ys = biggereq ord (difference (elems ord) ys) (difference (elems ord) xs)
bigger ord xs ys = (biggereq ord xs ys)  && (not (biggereq ord ys xs)) 
compbigger ord xs ys = bigger ord (difference (elems ord) ys) (difference (elems ord) xs)
filterWeakSetsOld ord l = [ x | x <- l, and[ not(smaller ord x y) | y <- l, x /= y]] 
filterWeakSets ord l = [ x | x <- l, not (or[(compbigger ord y x) | y <- l, x /= y]) ]
implies  x y = (not x) || y
defended ord   s = 
let r = ords ord
in
  and[ or[ ((x1,y) `elem` r) |  x1 <- s]  |  (y,x) <- r, x `elem` s, not(y `elem` s) ]
{- experimemtal covers consistent complement -}
{- filterDefendedSets ord l = [ x | x <- l, biggereq ord x (difference (bigCup l) x)  ] -}
filterDefendedSets ord l = [ x | x <- l, biggereq ord x (difference (elems ord) x)  ]
{- important bits from theory -}
maxcon cons s  =
  let  maxcon' acc ys  = 
   case (first cons ys) of
     x:xs ->  ( maxcon' (x:acc) [y | y <- xs, not(any (subset y) (x:acc)) ] )
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      [] -> acc
  in maxcon' [] (subsets_down s)
maxSet ord  cons s = bigCap (filterWeakSetsOld ord (maxcon cons s))
consistentFormulaSet fs =  (prove [map L fs]) /= []
consistentAA as agentSet = consistentFormulaSet [ f | a <- agentSet, Says b f <- as , a == b]
maximalSets as ord = filterDefendedSets ord (filterWeakSets ord (maxcon (consistentAA as) (nub [a | Says a _ <- as])) )
{- functions for weighted orderings -}
replace [] x = 0
replace ((a,b):l) x | x == a = b
| otherwise = replace l x
weight weights xs = (sum(map (replace weights) xs))
weighted weights xs ys = 
let wxs = (weight weights xs)
    wys = (weight weights ys)
in
if wxs > wys then GT
else if wxs == wys then EQ
else LT
{- functions unchanged -}
collectAssertions as = [ f | Says _ f <- expandAgents as]
{- filtering out inconsistent agents from coalitions L-}
collectSupport as = [ Says a f | a <- nub[ a | Says a _ <- as], 
 f <- collectAssertions as, 
let agentsTheory = [ form | Says x form <- expandAgents as, x == a]
 in if consistentFormulaSet agentsTheory 
then (entails [ form | Says x form <- expandAgents as, x == a] f) 
else False ]
collectSupporters as = nub [ (nub [a | Says a f1 <- as, f1 == f], f) | Says _ f <- as]
{-
extractEq l = [ (x,y) | (x,y) <-l, x == y ]
extractGr l = [ (x,y) | (x,y) <- l, x /= y]
{- functions to do with ordrings changed -}
-}
{- ------------------------------ -}
comparisons cmp equ l = nub( [ OGreater x y | x <- l, y<- l,  cmp x y] ++ 
   [ OEqual x y | x <- l,   y<- l,  equ  x y] )
coalitions cmp equ l = comparisons cmp equ (kern(map fst l))
equSets a b = (a /= b) && (equalSets a b)
mkSuccOrd' cmp l = successor(coalitions cmp equSets l)
{- ------------------------------ -}
consistentSource as sourceSet = consistentFormulaSet [ f | a <- sourceSet,  (b, f) <- as , equalSets a b]
maxiSource ord as s = maxSet ord (consistentSource as) s
extenSource as xs s = if  consistentSource as (s:xs) then (s:xs) else xs
consist' as ord x = extenSource as (consistStar' as ord [ y | (y,x1) <- ord, x1 == x ]) x
consistStar' as ord s = maxiSource ord as (bigCup [consist' as ord e | e <- s])
majority xs ys = (length xs) > (length ys)
weigh w xs ys = (weight w xs) > (weight w ys)
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module TrustExpansion where
import AgentLogic
import Tableaux 
asserts a as  = [ f  | (Says x f) <- as, x == a]
anything = Prop ( Name "$$" [] )
notAnything = Neg anything
tt = Or anything notAnything
ff = And anything notAnything
foldrOpt f v [] = v
foldrOpt f v l = foldr1 f l
mkAnd  l = foldrOpt And tt  l
mkOr l =   foldrOpt Or ff l
mkTrust as a = mkAnd (asserts a as)
mkDistrust as a = mkAnd (map Neg (asserts a as))
mkWeakDistrust as a = Neg (mkTrust as a)
substProp   f n (a @ (Prop (Name y l)))  = if n == y then f l else a
substProp   f n (Neg y)  = Neg (substProp f n y )
substProp   f n (And  x y) = And (substProp f n x ) (substProp f n y )
substProp   f n (Or  x y) = Or (substProp f n x ) (substProp f n y )
substProp   f n (Implies  x y) = Implies (substProp f n x ) (substProp f n y )
substProp   f n (Equiv  x y) = Equiv (substProp f n x ) (substProp f n y )
{- Tp Do: make params qualified names - the following is a temporary fix for simple names -}
expTrust as =  (\l -> mkAnd(map ((mkTrust as) . (\ x -> Name x [])) l)) 
expDistrust as = (\l -> mkAnd(map ((mkDistrust as) . (\ x -> Name x [])) l)) 
expWeakDistrust as = (\l -> mkAnd(map ((mkWeakDistrust as) . (\ x -> Name x [])) l)) 
expandTrust as f = substProp (expTrust as) "Trusts"  f
expandDistrust as f = substProp (expDistrust as) "Distrusts"  f
expandWeakDistrust as f = substProp (expWeakDistrust as) "WDistrusts"  f
{- To Do: expand agent assertions for Trusts, Distrusts and WDistrusts -}
containsProp pl  (Prop (Name y l))  = y `elem` pl
containsProp pl  (Neg y) = containsProp pl y
containsProp pl (And x y) = (containsProp pl x) || (containsProp pl y)
containsProp pl (Or x y) = (containsProp pl x) || (containsProp pl y)
containsProp pl (Implies x y) = (containsProp pl x) || (containsProp pl y)
containsProp pl (Equiv x y) = (containsProp pl x) || (containsProp pl y)
expandAllOnce as f =  ((expandTrust as) . (expandDistrust as) . (expandWeakDistrust as)) f
expandAll as f = while (containsProp  ["Trusts","Distrusts","WDistrusts"]) (expandAllOnce as) f
expandAgents as = [Says a (expandAll as f) | Says a f <- as]
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module Tableaux where
import Data.List
import AgentLogic
{- We are using Smullyans labeled tableaux. In this representation proof goals are represented by lists of labeled formula. 
We adopt the names L(eft) and R(ight) for the labels (Smullyan uses T and F). We also adopt Smullyans alpha/beta notation -}
data Label a = L a | R a
deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
{- data Formula a = Prop a | 
Neg (Formula a) |
And (Formula a) (Formula a)|
Or (Formula a) (Formula a) |
Implies (Formula a) (Formula a) |
Equiv (Formula a) (Formula a)
deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
-}
single (L (Neg _)) = True
single (L (And _ _)) = True
single (R (Neg _)) = True 
single (R (Or _ _)) = True
single (R (Implies _ _)) = True
single (_) = False
atomic (L (Prop _ )) = True
atomic (R (Prop _ )) = True
atomic (_) = False
double (L (Or _ _)) = True
double (L (Implies _ _ )) = True
double (R (And _ _)) = True
double (L (Equiv _ _)) = True
double (R (Equiv _ _)) = True
double (_) = False
alphas (L (Neg x)) = [R x]
alphas (L (And x y)) = [L x,L y]
alphas (R (Neg x)) = [L x] 
alphas (R (Or x y)) = [R x,R y]
alphas (R (Implies x y)) = [L x,R y]
alphas (x) = [x]
betas (L (Or x y)) = ([L x],[L y])
betas (L (Implies x y )) = ([R x],[L y])
betas (R (And x y)) = ([R x],[R y])
betas (L (Equiv x y)) = ([L x,L y],[R x,R y])
betas (R (Equiv x y)) = ([L x,R y],[R x,L y])
betas (_) = ([],[])
{- A goal is a list of labeled formulas. 
   reduce takes a goal and transforms the goals using non-branching tableaux rules -}
reduce1 l =  concat [alphas x | x <- l]
while p f x = if p x then (while p f (f x)) else x
reduce l = nub(while (any single) reduce1 l)
dual (L x) = R x
dual (R x) = L x
closes [] = False
closes (x:l) = if (dual x) `elem` l then True else closes l
{- prove takes a list of goals and transforms the list of goals by first applying reduce, checking for brach closure
(and discarding closed branches)  and then applying branching rules to generate a new list of goals. -}
prove [] = []
prove (x:l) = 
  let y = nub(reduce x)
  in if closes y then prove l 
else if (any double y)
     then
let (front, beta:back) = break double y
in  let (b1,b2) = betas beta 
    in  prove   ((front++b1++back):(front++b2++ back):l)
     else y:(prove l)
entails as c = (prove [(R c):(map L as)]) == []
{-  simple uses of proves -}
{- counter writes out the the counter example as a string -}
stringList l =
let stringList1 [] = ""
stringList1 [x] = x
stringList1 (x:xs) = x ++ "," ++ (stringList1 xs)
in
if l == [] then "" else "(" ++ (stringList1 l) ++ ")"
counter l =
  if (all atomic l) then
let counter' [] = ".\n"
counter' ((L (Prop (Name x a))):l) = x ++ (stringList a) ++ " is True\n" ++ counter' l
counter' ((R (Prop(Name  x a))):l) = x ++ (stringList a) ++ " is False\n" ++ counter' l
in counter' l
  else  "Not fully reduced\n"
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{- pp prints the counter examples from a failed proof -}
pp l = do
 mapM_ putStrLn (map counter l)
ppp l = do
putStrLn (if l == [] then "NO COUNTER EXAMPLES\n" else "COUNTER EXAMPLES:\n" ++ concat (map counter l))
{- functions using the parser interface -}
{- the parser uses grammar
Formula :  Formula '<=>' Formula 
| Formula '=>' Formula  
| Formula '+' Formula  
| Formula '&' Formula  
| '(' Formula ')'  
| '~' Formula 
| prop [ prop* ]
with priority ordering (least to greatest) <=>, =>, +, &, ~
E.G. A + ~A & B
is A or ((not A) and B)
-}
{- prover takes a string and returns True if the formula is a tautology and false otherwise -}
prover f = prove [ [ R (parseFormula f) ]  ]  ==  [ ]
{- consistent takes a list of strings (formula) and returns true if the list is consistent and false otherwise -}
consistent l = prove [(map (L . parseFormula) l)] /= []
{- refutation lists the counter examples of  a formula -}
refutation f = 
let l = prove [ [ R (parseFormula f) ]  ]
in
   do
  putStrLn (if l == [] then "NO COUNTER EXAMPLES:\n" 
     else "COUNTER EXAMPLES:\n" ++ concat (map counter l ))
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module Beliefs where
import PPrint
import Data.List
import Sets
import AgentLogic
import Tableaux
import Relations
import SyntacticRelations
import TrustExpansion
import Coalitions
diag [] = []
diag (x:xs) = (x,x):(diag xs)
{- variant of successor -}
equivpart ord = 
let 
    eq = extractOEq ord
in
(closeRST eq)
{- added in diag to equ -}
extractBaseOrdSimple ass synOrd = 
let fld = [ a | Says a _ <- ass]
    ord = (successor (concat(map restructure synOrd)))
    equ = (equivpart (concat(map restructure synOrd)))
in
Ord fld (nub (equ++(diag fld)))  ord
extractBaseOrdTransitive ass synOrd = 
let fld = [ a | Says a _ <- ass]
    ord = (successor (concat(map restructure synOrd)))
    equ = (equivpart (concat(map restructure synOrd)))
in
Ord fld (nub (equ++(diag fld)))  (closeTrans ord)
extractCoaltionOrd cmp ass =
let c = successor(coalitions cmp equSets ass)
 in
   Ord (field c) [] c
data Assertions a = AgentAssert (a, Formula) | SourceAssert ([a], Formula)
    deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
data Conclusion a = AgentConclusion (OrderedSet a) [[a]] [Assertions a] [Assertions a] [(Formula, Bool, Bool)]  |
                    SourceConclusion (OrderedSet [a]) [[a]] [Assertions a] [Assertions a] [(Formula, Bool, Bool)]
    deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Ord)
consistentWithHyp fs f = (f, consistentFormulaSet (f:fs), consistentFormulaSet ((Neg f):fs))
{- mod to print out maximal sets rather than ends -}
theories as ms = [ bigCup[ [f | Says a1 f <- as, a1 == a]  | a <- s] | s <-  ms ]
proofSets ths f = [  m  | m <- ths,   not(consistentFormulaSet ((Neg f):m)) && (consistentFormulaSet (f:m)) ]
{- coding in table 
u-code == code for extent of undeterminedness
t-code == code for extent of truthset
(f, t-code, u-code)
if tp union tn == ts  then ths --> t-code == t else t-code = false
if either tp or tn obtains a limit (either [] or ths) then the u-code is true
otherwis eit is false.
-}
classify ths f =
let tp = proofSets ths f
    tn = proofSets ths (Neg f)
in
    if       (ths /= []) && (tp `equalSets` ths) && (tn == []) then (f, True, True)
    else if  (ths /= []) && (tp == []) && (tn `equalSets` ths) then  (Neg f, True, True)
    else if  (tp == []) && (tn == []) then (f, False, True)
    else if  (ths /= []) && (tp `union` tn) `equalSets` ths then (f, True, False)
    else (f, False, False)
hypClass as ms hyp =
let ths = theories as ms
in   [ classify ths f | f <- hyp]
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beliefs s =
  let (ord, as, hy)  = parseSystem s
   in 
    let
       asexp  = expandAgents as
in
   case ord of
(Simple ordx) -> (let  
orders = extractBaseOrdSimple asexp ordx
 in
let maxSets = (maximalSets asexp orders)
 in
   let agentTheory = [ AgentAssert(a, mkAnd[f | Says a1 f <- as, a1 == a]) 
                                                               | a <- (bigCap maxSets), [f | Says a1 f <- as, a1 == a] /= [] ]
in
AgentConclusion orders 
maxSets
[ AgentAssert(a,f) | Says a f <- asexp] 
agentTheory
(hypClass as maxSets hy) )
(Transitive ordx) -> (let  
orders = extractBaseOrdTransitive asexp ordx
 in
let maxSets = (maximalSets asexp orders)
 in
   let agentTheory = [ AgentAssert(a, mkAnd[f | Says a1 f <- as, a1 == a]) 
                                                               | a <- (bigCap maxSets), [f | Says a1 f <- as, a1 == a] /= [] ]
in
AgentConclusion orders 
maxSets
[ AgentAssert(a,f) | Says a f <- asexp] 
agentTheory
(hypClass as maxSets hy) )
     
(_) ->
(let
ass    = collectSupporters (collectSupport asexp)
orders =  
(case ord of
(Majority) ->    extractCoaltionOrd majority ass
(Weighted wl) ->   extractCoaltionOrd (weigh wl) ass
(Upper ordl) ->    extractCoaltionOrd (upper (mkSuccOrds ordl)) ass
(Lower ordl) ->    extractCoaltionOrd (lower (mkSuccOrds ordl)) ass
(Combined ordl) -> extractCoaltionOrd (combined (mkSuccOrds ordl)) ass)
     in 
let sourceTheory = [ SourceAssert(c, f) | c <-  consistStar' ass (ords orders) (ends orders), (c1,f) <- ass, c == c1]
in
SourceConclusion  orders 
    (ends orders)   
    [SourceAssert t | t <-  ass] 
    sourceTheory
    [   consistentWithHyp  [f | SourceAssert (a, f) <- sourceTheory] h | h <- hy ] )
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module Pretty where
import PPrint
import Data.List
import Sets
import AgentLogic
import Tableaux
import Relations
import SyntacticRelations
import TrustExpansion
import Coalitions
import Beliefs
tupledOpt [] = empty
{- tupledOpt l = tupled l -}
tupledOpt l = lparen <> (foldrOpt (<>) empty (intersperse (comma <> space) l)) <> rparen
mkDocOfName (Name a l) = (text a) <> (tupledOpt (map text l))
mkDocOfNames l = encloseSep lbrace rbrace comma (map mkDocOfName l)
mkDocOfSets ls = foldrOpt (<$>) empty (map mkDocOfNames ls)
mkDocOfNameSets l = encloseSep (text "Coalitions ")  empty comma  (map mkDocOfNames l)
priority (Prop _) = 5
priority (Neg _) = 5
priority (And _ _) = 4
priority (Or _ _) = 3
priority (Implies _ _) = 2
priority (Equiv _ _) = 1
parenOpt x f = if (priority f) < (priority x) then  softline <> (parens (mkDocFormula f)) 
 else (mkDocFormula f)
{-
mkDocFormula (Prop n) = mkDocOfName n
mkDocFormula (a @(Neg f))  = (char '~') <> (parenOpt a f)
mkDocFormula (a @(And f1 f2)) = (parenOpt a f1) <> (text " & ") <>  (parenOpt a f2)
mkDocFormula (a @(Or f1 f2)) = (parenOpt a f1) <> (text " + ") <>  (parenOpt a f2)
mkDocFormula (a @(Implies f1 f2)) = (parenOpt a f1) <> (text " => ") <> (parenOpt a f2)
mkDocFormula (a @(Equiv f1 f2)) = (parenOpt a f1) <> (text " <=> ") <> (parenOpt a f2)
-}
mkDocFormula (Prop n) = mkDocOfName n
mkDocFormula (a @(Neg f))  = (char '~') <> (parenOpt a f)
mkDocFormula (a @(And f1 f2)) = PPrint.group(nest 2 ((parenOpt a f1) <> (text " & ") <>  (parenOpt a f2)))
mkDocFormula (a @(Or f1 f2)) = PPrint.group(nest 2 ((parenOpt a f1) <> (text " + ") <>  (parenOpt a f2)))
mkDocFormula (a @(Implies f1 f2)) = PPrint.group(nest 2 ((parenOpt a f1) <> (text " => ") <> (parenOpt a f2)))
mkDocFormula (a @(Equiv f1 f2)) = PPrint.group(nest 2 ((parenOpt a f1) <> (text " <=> ") <> (parenOpt a f2)))
topLevelparenOpt x f = if (priority f) < (priority x) then  (parens (mkTopLevelAnd f)) 
 else (mkTopLevelAnd f)
mkTopLevelAnd (a @(And f1 f2)) = (topLevelparenOpt a  f1) <> (text "   &") <> line <> (topLevelparenOpt a  f2)
mkTopLevelAnd  f = mkDocFormula f
mkDocOfAgentOrder (a,b) = (mkDocOfName a) <> (text " > ") <> (mkDocOfName b)
mkDocOfAgentOrders [] = text "Flat Set"
mkDocOfAgentOrders l = foldr (<>) empty (intersperse (comma <$> empty)  (map mkDocOfAgentOrder l))
mkDocOfSourceOrder (a,b) = (mkDocOfNames a) <> (text " > ") <> (mkDocOfNames b)
mkDocOfSourceOrders [] = text "Flat Set"
mkDocOfSourceOrders l = foldr (<>) empty (intersperse (comma <$> empty)  (map mkDocOfSourceOrder l))
mkDocAgentAssertion (n,f) = (mkDocOfName n) <> (text ": ") <> (mkDocFormula f)
mkDocAgentAssertions l = foldr (<$>) empty (map mkDocAgentAssertion l)
mkDocOfSources ns =    encloseSep lbrace rbrace (comma <> space) (map mkDocOfNames ns)
mkDocAssertion (AgentAssert (n,f)) = (mkDocOfName n) <> (text ": ") <> (align (mkTopLevelAnd f))
mkDocAssertion (SourceAssert (ns,f)) = (mkDocOfNames ns) <> (text ": ") <> (mkTopLevelAnd f)
mkDocAssertions l = foldrOpt (<$>) empty (map mkDocAssertion l)
mkDocHypothesis (f, True, True) =   (text "scep    ")  <>  (mkDocFormula f) 
mkDocHypothesis (f, True, False) =  (text "cred D  ")  <>  (mkDocFormula f)  
mkDocHypothesis (f, False, True) =  (text "ND      ")  <>  (mkDocFormula f)   
mkDocHypothesis (f, False, False) = (text "cred N  ")  <>  (mkDocFormula f) 
mkDocHyps [] = text "No Hypothesis"
mkDocHyps l = foldrOpt (<$>) empty (map mkDocHypothesis l)
mkDocResults [] = text "No Preferred Consistent Set"
mkDocResults l = foldrOpt (<$>) empty (map mkDocAssertion l)
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mkDocConclusions  (AgentConclusion orders maximal assertions result hyps) = 
       (text "Ordering") <> line <>
(indent 3 (mkDocOfAgentOrders (ords orders))) <> line <>
  (text "Maximal Sets") <> line <>
  (indent 3 (mkDocOfSets maximal)) <> line <>
  (text "Assertions") <> line <>
 (indent 3 (mkDocAssertions assertions)) <> line <>
  (text "Core Beliefs") <> line <>
(indent 3 (mkDocResults result))  <> line <>
  (text "Hypothesis") <> line <>
(indent 3 (mkDocHyps hyps))  <>
  line
mkDocConclusions (SourceConclusion orders ends assertions result hyps) =
       (text "Ordering") <> line <>
(indent 3 (mkDocOfSourceOrders (ords orders))) <> line <>
  (text "Least elements") <> line <>
  (indent 3 (mkDocOfSources ends)) <> line <>
  (text "Assertions") <> line <>
 (indent 3 (mkDocAssertions assertions)) <> line <>
  (text "Core Beliefs") <> line <>
(indent 3 (mkDocResults result))  <> line <>
  (text "Hypothesis") <> line <>
(indent 3 (mkDocHyps hyps))  <>
  line
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module Inspect where
import PPrint
import Data.List
import Sets
import AgentLogic
import Tableaux
import Relations
import SyntacticRelations
import TrustExpansion
import Coalitions
import Pretty
import Beliefs
theory s = mkDocConclusions (beliefs s)
inspect = theory
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% top level driver that reads from standard in and writes to standard out.
module Main where
import Data.Char
import Inspect
main = do
th <- getContents
putStr (show (theory th))
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